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This thesis was motivated by concern regarding an alleged lack of investment 
in research and development of vaccine products which could offer 
considerable net benefit to societies, particularly in the developing world. The 
aim of this thesis is to provide decision support for science and technology 
policy which aims to promote private research and development in new 
vaccine products. 
The literature suggests that markets fail to allocate sufficient resources to the 
development of new vaccines. Science policy can attempt to influence the 
direction of research through government subsidies, targeted fiscal support, 
regulatory measures or policies designed to influence human capital 
formation. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of these measures in the context of the 
vaccine industry a R&D resource allocation model is empirically tested in 
Chapter Six. In a partial adjustment specification and error correction form, a 
relationship between the cost of funds and the allocation of R&D resources 
could be established for the US vaccine industry over a twenty five year 
period. It was also found that public sector research effort does not appear to 
'crowd out' private sector R&D spending. Other factors emphasised in the 
literature, such as the relative market size and improvements in patent 
protection, were not significantly related to research intensity. 
In the Second Part of this thesis the scope has been extended to include firms 
in the biotechnology industry which play an important role in vaccine 
innovation. The focus of research in Chapters Seven and Eight is on 
collaborative research which is believed to be a particularly productive way to 
bring new vaccines to the market. 
In an empirical investigation of established US biotech firms it was suggested 
that companies which undertake more science or co-operate more closely 
with universities than their competitors are likely to show a higher level of 
V 
research productivity. What could not be established is whether scientific 
activity results in superior research outcomes or whether successful 
companies attract star scientists who are more likely to publish the results of 
their work. 
This emphasises the importance of the promotion of scientific talent and the 
movement of scientists between the public and private sectors and 
internationally. It is suggested in Chapter Nine that the institutional structure of 
higher education has an important effect on the mobility of scientists: a 
country which imports highly-skilled personnel may maintain or improve its 
technological capabilities by this means. Using data from the British Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) it is suggested that contrary to belief, 
disciplines such as biological sciences experience a moderate net inflow of 
scientists from the private sector and abroad. 
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PART ONE 
VACCINE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
I Introduction 
1.1 The problem and its seffing 
Innovative pharmaceutical companies invest heavily in research and 
development (R&D) of new products. Breakthrough innovations, or so 
called blockbuster drugs, offer large returns, guaranteed for a number of 
years by patent protection which legally prohibits the imitation of such a 
new product. The investment into innovative drugs will thus be guided by 
expected returns which in the light of many of today's as-yet incurable 
diseases is potentially very high. 
Although today's large research intensive pharmaceutical companies are 
developing vaccines alongside therapeutical drugs, they are devoting 
comparatively little resources in vaccine R&D. Not only since the ongoing 
AIDS, Malaria, Tuberculosis and Measles epidemics, the public in 
general has realised that existing vaccines fall short of medical needs. 
Physicians, world-wide, also remain frustrated by the death tolls caused 
by diseases against which vaccines are readily available and have in 
many cases been developed years, if not decades, ago. According to the 
World Health Organisation (2000a) Measles still kills 1 million children a 
year; Neonatal tetanus is responsible for 450,000 deaths among young 
children; Pertussis causes 355,000 deaths mainly among babies and 
young children; Meningococcal Meningitis is fatal in 35,000 cases, mainly 
among young children, and diphtheria still causes 8,000 deaths a year, 
with a huge proportion of deaths occurring in the developing world. 
Improvements of existing vaccines such as combinations of vaccines to 
reduce logistics costs, to improve heat stability, and to improve 
immunogenicity are highly desirable (Baudrihaye 1992), while most of the 
existing childhood vaccines have undergone little modifications since they 
were first brought to the markets decades ago. Vaccine experts lament 
2 
that research into new vaccines has been stagnating during the past 30 
years (Henderson 1994, p. 4). 
A number of factors are blamed for the underinvestment in preventive 
medicine: vaccination can adversely affect the sales of pharmaceuticals, 
vaccine markets are often much smaller than drug markets, or medical 
need arises where people cannot afford to pay for a new vaccine, in 
developing countries for example. In industrialised countries many 
parents are growing 'wary' of vaccination'; and during the 1980s US 
vaccine producers were made liable for injuries linked to vaccination. 
Patent protection on what is essentially a living organism is still disputed. 
Such was the perceived adversity of the market place that large US 
pharmaceutical companies such as Pfizer, Lilly, and Dow have in the 
past decided to leave the vaccine market for good (Galambos and Sewell 
1996, p. 145). 
Vaccine markets are also generally deemed to 'fail' in two respects. The 
individual vaccine user protects other members of society from 
contracting the disease and therefore conveys a benefit to them. In other 
words, vaccines carry strong positive externalities. Yet, the larger the 
percentage of the population vaccinated, the lower the individual's risk of 
catching the disease while the risk of adverse reactions remains 
unchanged. This gives a strong incentive for 'free-riding' on other 
people's use of vaccines leading to an overall underutilisation of 
vaccination. 
Technologies for new vaccines are also considered 'international public 
goods' (World Bank 2000), which again creates a 'free-rider' problem, not 
of usage, but of investment in new vaccine technology. Individuals and 
1 At the time of preparation of this chapter, the alleged link between autism in children 
and the joint Measles Mumps Rubella vaccines has caused considerable controversy in 
the media, and the medical establishment, and this has led many parents not to 
immunise their children against these diseases. 
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governments will be paying less than the benefits they receive from other 
organisations' R&D inputs. 
At the same time benefits in terms of saved treatment costs are in many 
cases estimated to be much higher than costs of developing, purchasing 
and administering the vaccine. Vaccines are thus often considered to be 
one of the most cost-effective measures available to the health care 
system and make better or even excellent use of resources. For 
example, in one of the reviews of the literature (Steering Committee on 
Future Health Interventions 1988, pp. 34-36) it was found that net 
savings from measles immunisation in the United States were US $ 1.3 
billion during the period 1963-1972. 
Albritton (1978), to mention another example, found a benefit-cost ratio of 
10: 1 with regard to measles vaccination. This means that the benefits in 
terms of saved treatment costs of the disease are ten times the costs of 
purchasing and administering the vaccine. In practically all cases 
vaccines can reduce health care costs provided that they are applied to 
the optimal population group (i. e. the population with a certain level of 
risk of contracting the disease). Mass immunisation campaigns 
throughout the 1970s and 80s reflected the belief of many health 
services that no better use could be made of their resources than 
investing in prevention and, ideally, eradication of diseases. 
Since private investment may thus be falling far short of what is 
considered socially desirable, government has a potentially prominent 
role to play in influencing the outcome of the market. Governments in fact 
do make efforts either to develop vaccines themselves and/or to 
encourage the development of vaccines within the pharmaceutical 
industry. Quite how this is best achieved is subject to debate. The World 
Health Organisation has together with the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunisation (GAVI) established (WHO 2000b) that both 'push' and 
'pull' factors will influence the pharmaceutical industry's investment 
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decision into new vaccines. Among the push factors, protection of 
property rights is cited as crucial for the successful development of a new 
vaccine. Public-private collaborations between academia and industry are 
also attributed a greater chance of success than industry effort alone to 
come up with a new formulation. 
As far as pull strategies are concerned "one of the central issues is that 
of credibility. Specifically, "industry needs to be able to demonstrate that 
there is a credible market for the new products that it develops" (WHO 
2000b, p. 24). The importance of a guaranteed market for future vaccine 
has also been emphasised by Michael Kremer (2000). The author 
acknowledges that drug companies are sometimes forced to sell 
products at a price not high enough to cover R&D costs. The small 
market in developing countries for vaccines -which amounts to no more 
than $200m a year- is not offering enough incentive to incur the huge 
costs of development. In Kremer's view a fund set aside for the purchase 
of a future vaccine would provide the right incentives, and, unlike R&D 
subsidies, public money would not be wasted should the industry's efforts 
to develop the desired vaccine not come to fruition. Acknowledging the 
importance of demand, the World Bank has recently pledged to set aside 
US$ 1 bn for the purchase of future vaccines. 
While efforts are made to encourage industry investment, government 
has also become an increasingly important and, as a consequence, very 
cost-conscious purchaser of vaccines. Industry has repeatedly pointed 
out that lower vaccine prices present fewer incentives to invest in new 
vaccines (Baudrihaye 1992). 
The following problem presents itself: for the reasons cited above, 
vaccine projects find it difficult to attract sufficient private R&D funds 
although more investment would, arguably, in many cases increase 
social welfare. Hence government wants to encourage vaccine R&D in 
the most cost-effective manner. In order to do this, policy makers need to 
5 
develop a clearer understanding of the factors influencing private R&D 
spending behaviour and research success in the area of vaccine 
products. 
1.2 Aims and methodology 
This study does not attempt to assess absolutely all factors relevant to 
the successful development of new vaccines. Its purpose is to focus 
upon, and clarify three distinct aspects of research and development into 
vaccine products. A first empirical study in Chapter Six investigates the 
determinants of R&D spending in the vaccine industry, controlling for 
regulatory and market forces and the cost of finance. This should help 
policy-makers to assess the effectiveness not only of 'pull' factors such 
as market demand and expected returns, but also regulatory influences 
such as patent protection and price regulation. 
'Technology push' is at the centre of the second empirical investigation in 
Chapter Eight. Public-private collaboration is often seen as the most 
productive way to bring new medicinal products to the market although 
this has not been tested for in the field of biotech nolog ical products. An 
empirical investigation of the biotechnology industry assesses whether 
those companies collaborating with the public sector are more productive 
researchers than companies 'going it alone'. This again might help policy 
makers to target public funds on R&D projects with the highest chance of 
success. 
What comes to light in Chapters Seven and Eight is that the geographical 
location and movement of scientists appears to be associated with the 
research success of bio-pharmaceutical firms. Chapter Nine investigates 
the mobility of scientists further and looks at the wider implications for 
science and technology policy in Europe, in particular the funding of 
higher education institutions and the incidence of 'brain drain' and 'brain 
6 
gain' in biological sciences and a range of other relevant academic 
subject areas. 
Ideally the thesis would conclude on the question of how a national or 
perhaps even an international system of biotechnology innovation should 
be designed. This would, however, be a near-impossible task, since 
many other factors also affect the effectiveness of such a system; their 
consideration is beyond the scope and size constraint of this thesis. 
Chapter Ten does, however, try to put the findings of the thesis in the 
wider context of Science and Technology Policy. Those aspects of 
Science and Technology Policy, which lie beyond the scope of this 
thesis, are discussed in outline. 
1.3 Organisation of the remainder of the study 
The thesis is divided into two main parts: Part One investigates the 
vaccine market and by reviewing the relevant literature aims to build a 
model of the determinants of private vaccine R&D spending. The model 
is introduced and empirically tested at the end of this part. Part Two 
looks at wider issues in science and technology policy specifically in the 
context of the biotechnology industry which is becoming increasingly 
important for vaccine innovation. An important aspect of research 
productivity in biotechnology is knowledge transfer and the associated 
movement of scientists, an issue which will be discussed in greater detail 
at the end of Part Two. 
Part One is organised as follows: Chapter One introduces the subject. 
Chapter Two outlines the current state of world health and demonstrates 
how today's and future vaccines might control diseases in a very cost- 
effective manner. Chapter Three presents the economic rationale for 
government intervention in the vaccine market. This part will also 
investigate what is believed to be the most effective way to get industry to 
undertake research into the 'right' vaccines. Chapter Four reviews the 
7 
innovation economics literature for evidence that 'push' and 'pull' factors 
are at work when firms allocate R&D funds specifically in the context of 
the pharmaceutical industry. Chapter Five presents the little material 
there is about the economics of the vaccine industry, which will help to 
formulate a model of R&D investment, which is then introduced and 
tested empirically in Chapter Six. 
Part Two starts with Chapter Seven, which reviews the literature 
assessing public-private cooperation in R&D and is followed by an 
empirical investigation of the biotechnology industry in Chapter Eight. 
Chapter Nine looks at the mobility of research scientists followed by 
Chapter Ten which reviews the broader context of science and 
technology policy. Chapter Eleven concludes the thesis and raises areas 
which could warrant further research. 
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2 Vaccines' contribution to world health 
2.1 Background 
Vaccines' are weakened or killed micro-organiSMS2 which stimulate the 
body to produce antibodies against an infectious virus or bacteria. 
Vaccines can therefore confer immunity from an infection of that micro- 
organism and protect the vaccinated person form contracting the disease. 
In this chapter it will be shown that vaccines are among the most cost- 
effective health care measure available to health services, and are best 
suited to prevent diseases which levy the heaviest burden on populations 
in particular in the developing world 3. 
What will also be shown, is that the effective use of vaccines will in many 
instances save costs incurred by the health service. Despite all this, new 
vaccine development has in the past fallen short not only of medical 
needs but what is believed to be technically feasible by vaccine experts. 
The apparent lack of firms' interest in new vaccine development has led 
many to believe that private sector research cannot exclusively be relied 
'Vaccinia' is the medical term for cowpox ('vacca', latin for cow). In 1796 the British 
country doctor Edward Jenner administered the first experimental vaccination with the 
cowpox virus to build immunity against smallpox. Jenner had observed that milkmaids 
which had previously contracted cowpox were no longer susceptible to contracting 
smallpox. 
2 Vaccines of weakened microorganisms are also called 'live' vaccines. Live vaccines, 
such as for example the Measles vaccine, will replicate inside the host and protection 
with a live vaccine often lasts a life-time (Ellis 1988, p. 568). They may, however, also 
revert to a more dangerous form and cause adverse reactions. Killed vaccines do not 
replicate inside the host and as a consequence are less efficient. In order to achieve 
long-term protection, booster doses are required. 
3 Many infective diseases are controlled though vaccination in the developed world so 
that heart disease and cancer have become relatively more important in terms of burden 
of disease. 
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upon when it comes to addressing the medical needs of those most 
severely affected by infectious diseases. While this chapter aims to 
outline the contribution vaccines can make in preventing diseases, the 
following chapter assesses whether vaccine markets do fail to allocate 
sufficient resources to research and development. 
2.2 The state of world health 
Infectious diseases represent the world's leading cause of premature 
death killing at least 17 million people in 1995, among them 9 million 
young children, who died from preventable causes such as diarrhoea, 
pneumonia and measles (WHO 1996). There was once a sense of 
optimism that the struggle for control of infectious diseases was nearly 
over. In October 1977 twenty-three year old Ali Maow Maalin was the last 
human ever to have contracted smallpox. Then a disease which caused 
widespread suffering and millions of deaths over many hundreds of years 
ceased to exist. Not only was immense suffering averted, hundred of 
millions of dollars of treatment and immunisation costs could then be 
allocated for the fight against other diseases. But why has smallpox been 
the only successful disease eradication so far? Will other diseases follow 
and can we look forward to a disease-free world with more powerful 
vaccines to be developed in the near future? What are the underlying 
biological, economic, and social criteria which seem to make eradication 
possible for some diseases and impossible for others? 
Figure 2.1 shows the burden of the most devastating infectious diseases 
as identified in the World Health Report 1996 (WHO 1996), which is the 
most recent of the annual World Health Report series exclusively devoted 
10 
to infectious diseaseS4. Clearly marked with asterisks are those diseases 
which have been prioritised by the WHO. 
4 World Health Reports are published annually by the WHO and each report includes a 
detailed coverage of a specific global health issue, such as 'Fighting Disease, Fostering 
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Once a disease has been prioritised by the health service, any attempt to 
fight this disease would normally start at a national level, would then 
target a whole continent and finally attempt to eliminate the disease on a 
global level. A disease is only eradicated when the last samples of a virus 
kept in test tubes in laboratories are finally destroyed. For the smallpox 
virus this final step had originally been envisaged for the year 1999, but 
was subsequently delayed 5. 
Many diseases have been prioritised due to their overall disease burden, 
but what are the criteria that can make a disease eradicable or at least 
controllable? 
First of all an effective and easy to administer vaccine has to be available. 
Some of today's most widely used vaccines are only moderately effective. 
The BCG vaccine against tuberculosis, for example, is only effective in 
60% of children. This will make eradication an impossible task because 
more than one out of four children who have received the vaccine 
remains unprotected against the disease. Given that only a certain 
proportion of children can be reached, the overall protection rate is even 
lower. 
Second, the disease must be easily diagnosed, so that the spread of the 
disease can be averted by early treatment. 
Thirdly, it is crucial than the agent which causes the disease only 
replicates inside humans. Some other agents live inside animals or soil/ 
water/air so they can survive effectively outside the human body. 
5 It was believed at the time that the US and Russia are the only two countries to have 
retained samples of the smallpox virus. This is no longer certain and it is feared that a 
'rogue state' may also have kept samples of the virus, for possible use in biological 
weapons. The two governments now consider it safer to keep their samples should the 
need for further research or the production of vaccines arise. 
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Finally, it is important that the biological variability of the virus is low so 
that an effective vaccine can be used at the same time at different 
locations. Should the genetic potential of the virus be large, so that the 
virus occurs with different strains and subtypes (such as HIV, with 
different sub-types in different continents), it is likely that a vaccine or 
treatment is ineffective against some of the sub-types. 
Another key factor of success is the motivation of the population to 
participate in an immunisation campaign. Complacency, misperception of 
risk, and a general fear of adverse reactions to vaccines, have all caused 
some campaigns to fall short of their initial goal. 
The WHO has set priorities according to the overall burden of disease 
and the feasibility of control. One has to bear in mind that the control of 
infectious diseases is only part of the agenda since: 
"the war against ill health in the 2111 century will have to be fought 
simultaneously on two main fronts: infectious disease and chronic, 
noncommunicable diseases. Many developing countries will come 
under greater attack from both, as heart disease, cancer, diabetes and 
other 'lifestyle' conditions become more prevalent, while infectious 
illnesses remain undefeated" (WHO 1998, p. 2). 
Here, only infectious diseases which could one day be effectively 
controlled by vaccination will be discussed below. 
Half of all premature deaths from infectious diseases killing mostly 
children and young adults, are caused by six diseases - pneumonia, 
tuberculosis, diarrhoeal diseases, malaria, measles and HIV/AIDS (WHO 
2000a). While effective treatment or prevention is not available for some 
of these diseases, many of the under-5 deaths in children, up to 2 million 
a year by some estimations, are preventable by existing vaccines (WHO 
1998, p. 3). 
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Infectious diseases are commonly classified by their main mode of 
transmission and the following will give a brief overview of the character, 
burden and potential treatment or prevention of diseases classified for 
global priority by the World Health Organisation. 
2.3 Person to person transmission 
Among the acute lower respiratory infections, pneumonia and the two 
agents which cause childhood pneumonia, streptococcus pneumonia and 
haernophilius influencae are the main cause of concern. Infants and 
young children, whose health is already weakened by low birthweight and 
malnutrition, have little resistance to it and show high case fatality rates. 
Millions of children are dying every year from these diseases which could 
be treated with antibiotics at very low costs (WHO 1996, p. 25). 
However, the provision of antibiotics is sometimes prohibitively difficult in 
communities with little access to health care. The availability of an 
effective vaccine is therefore of great importance. According to the 
Childrens' Vaccine Initiative (CVI Forum, 13,1996), a pneumococcal 
vaccine for children of all ages would bring the greatest benefit among all 
the vaccines which are likely to be developed within the next ten years. 
Four of the largest vaccine suppliers are currently undertaking clinical 
trials for conjugate pneumococcal vaccines. The outcome of these trials, 
however promising, is still uncertain. 
Four airborne infections kill 1.4 million children each year world-wide, 
despite the availability of vaccines (WHO 1996, p. 25). These are 
measles, pertussis (whooping cough), meningococcal meningitis and 
diphtheria. Today, 1 million children a year still die of measles, the great 
majority in developing countries. An effective measles vaccine exists, 
although it cannot be administered before the age of nine months. A great 
number of children are affected by the disease before that age and 
therefore remain unprotected. 
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Pertussis became vaccine-preventable around 1960 and the number of 
deaths since then has dropped dramatically; however, 355 000 babies 
and children still die of it each year, most of them in Africa, Asia and 
Central and Latin America (WHO, 1996, p. 26). 
A vaccine against diphtheria was introduced 50 years ago, although it is 
estimated that diphtheria still causes 8000 deaths a year. The recent 
outbreak in the countries of the former Soviet Union shows what can 
happen if immunisation levels are not maintained or do not keep track of 
large movements of population. 25,000 cases have been reported and up 
to 25% of those affected have died. 
Tuberculosis, estimated to kill 2.9 million people a year (WHO 1998, p. 
10), was declared a-global emergency by the WHO in 1993. The WHO 
(WHO 1996, p. 27) warned that, 
"if the effectiveness and availability of tuberculosis control measures 
do not improve substantially, more than 30 million tuberculosis deaths 
and nearly 90 million new cases are expected to occur in the last 
decade of this century. [ ... ] To make the global situation worse, 
tuberculosis has formed a lethal partnership with HIV. The AIDS virus 
damages the body's natural defences - the immune system - and 
accelerates the speed at which tuberculosis progresses from a 
harmless infection to a life threatening condition. [ ... ] Tuberculosis 
is 
already the opportunistic infection that most frequently kills HIV- 
positive people. " 
Tuberculosis can be treated but a growing number of drug-resistant 
strains appears world-wide, mostly due to incomplete or inappropriate 
treatmene. Tuberculosis is not restricted to developing countries. 
6 Drug resistance occurs when treatments are stopped too early enabling the remaining 
cells to build resistance against that particular drug. 
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Outbreaks are occurring in the United States in prisons or hospitals 
including several forms of drug-resistant strains, involving people with 
HIV infections and health workers infected by patients. Partly due to the 
low effectiveness of the existing vaccine, Tuberculosis is most effectively 
prevented by early detection and cure. A new strategy where health 
workers make sure that all patients finish their course of treatment has 
been successfully adopted in many countries. I 
Leprosy does not kill but causes an immense physical and social burden. 
The breakthrough to cure leprosy came in 1981 with the adoption of a 
multidrug therapy which proved to be highly effective, although the target 
to eradicate the disease by the year 2000 (WHO 1998, p. 10) has been 
missed. 
Poliomyelitis has also been targeted for eradication. The 'kick polio out of 
Africa' campaign is currently on top of the WHO agenda and thanks to an 
old but still highly effective vaccine the virus has already disappeared 
from the Americas and industrialised countries, with cases world-wide 
declining by over 90% since the start of the polio eradication campaign in 
1988 (WHO 1998, p. 10). The disease, which is today prevalent mainly in 
the Indian Subcontinent, parts of West and Central Africa, some countries 
in the middle East and the Horn of Africa, affects mainly very young 
children, causing in one out of a hundred cases paralysis of the muscles. 
Although the existing vaccine is extremely cheap, the total costs of the 
eradication campaign are estimated at $2.5 billion between 1996 and 
2000. However, the potential world-wide savings resulting from polio 
eradication are estimated to exceed $1.5 billion a year (WHO 1996, p. 
36). 
AIDS, unlike most other infectious diseases, kills young and middle-aged 
adults who are at their most productive and whose loss represents a 
particularly serious burden to developing countries. It has become one of 
the prime causes of adult death in some urban areas in Africa, the US 
and Europe with 1.8 million adult deaths in 1997 (WHO 1998, p. 3), and 
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swallows up to 80% of the health budget of some African countries. At the 
same time HIV could reverse some of the major gains achieved in child 
health over the past years with 590,000 children aged under 15 infected 
with the HIV virus in 1997 alone (WHO 1998, p. 3). Although a 
combination therapy using existing drugs can significantly reduce the viral 
load of HIV positive patients and thereby delay the progression of the 
disease, no effective cure or vaccine has been found. Any cure found is 
also most likely to be too expensive for health services in the developing 
countries, so that the adoption of safer sex practices appears to be the 
most appropriate strategy to control the disease in these countries in the 
medium term. 
Hepatitis B is one of six different Hepatitis viruses (A, B, C, D, E, and G). 
Hepatitis B and C are the most serious due to their long term implications 
for the health of the people affected. More than 2 billion people alive 
today have been infected with Hepatitis B (WHO 1998, p. 11). The virus 
is transmitted by exposure to contaminated blood and blood products, 
semen and vaginal fluids. The infection is passed from the mother to her 
child, from children to other children, from children to adults and adult to 
adult which then infect their own offspring. Once infected, the carrier may 
either develop acute hepatitis and in a small number of cases die within 
days or weeks, or may recover and develop lifelong immunity, or develop 
the chronic carrier state. The chronically infected are at risk of serious 
illness and death from liver cirrhosis and liver cancer, and every year 
more than 1 million people die of these two conditions (WHO 1996, p. 
33). 
A highly effective vaccine was brought to the market in 1982 but has only 
recently been adopted in mass immunisation campaigns in developing 
countries, where most of the deaths occur, after the initially very high 
price has fallen significantly. However, some countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, India, eastern and central Europe are still not able to afford the 
vaccine at the preferential price for developing countries of $0.50 to $1 
per dose (WHO 2000b). Childhood immunisation is even more important 
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since young children affected have a higher probability of becoming 
chronic carriers than older children or adults. In industrialised countries 
mainly health workers are vaccinated against the disease. 
Hepatitis C, similar in transmission and health consequences, was first 
identified in 1989 and it is estimated that today 170 million people are 
chronic carriers at risk of developing liver cirrhosis and liver cancer (WHO 
1998, p. 11). No effective cure or treatment has yet been developed. 
2.4 Food-, water-, and soil-borne diseases 
The control of food- and water-borne diseases relies on the provision of 
clean water and food hygiene, which in turn depends on whether 
communities have an adequate system for disposing of their faeces, the 
availability of clean drinking water, and improving the hygienic quality of 
foodstuffs. 
Diarrhoeal diseases, which caused more than 3 million deaths in 1995 
(WHO 1996, p. 28) are caused by water and food contaminated most 
commonly with the organism Escherichia coli (E. coli). 
Guinea worm disease may be eradicated in the near future. The disease 
which is transmitted through contaminated water and is associated with 
the emergence of guinea worms through skin of the hands, feet and other 
parts of the body, can be combated very easily by breaking the 
transmission cycle. An effective vaccine or cure is, however, not 
available. 
Tetanus, being a soil-borne disease, is responsible for the deaths of at 
least 450,000 children a year (WHO 1996, p. 42). Tetanus cannot be 
treated; vaccination of pregnant women which prevents the transmission 
of the disease to their new-born babies is an effective measure to control 
the disease. Tetanus will never be eradicated since the organism will 
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always live in the environment and pose a threat of infection but the 
disease can be controlled by the widely available combination vaccine 
DTP (diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis). Up to five doses of DTP have to be 
given to insure sufficient immunisation, which makes the development of 
a slow-release tetanus vaccine desirable which could improve coverage 
and reduce costs by ensuring long lasting immunity with only one 
injection. 
2.5 Insect-borne diseases 
Among the insect-borne diseases, malaria is the most severe. It puts 
about 40% of the world population at risk, with 300-500 million of clinical 
cases of malaria each year and 1.5 - 2.7 million deaths caused by the 
disease (WHO 1996, p. 47). Malaria was thought to be controllable by the 
intensive use of insecticides, most notably DDT, but today epidemics are 
re-occurring in areas where transmission had formerly been interrupted. 
No vaccine has been developed yet and the elimination of mosquito 
breeding places and the prevention of mosquito bites (using bed nets) 
has been the most effective control strategy so far. Despite the availability 
of malaria drugs: 
"the greatest threat to the control of malaria in the near future is the 
loss of effectiveness of these drugs because of resistance. The 
potentially lethal malaria parasite, P. falciparum, has shown itself 
capable of developing resistance to nearly all antimalaria drugs now 
used. Chloroquine, perhaps the best ever antimalaria drug [ ... ] is now 
failing against falciparum malaria in most areas of the tropical world" 
(WHO 1999, p. 52), 
The predicted loss of effectiveness of anti-malaria drugs underlines the 
importance of developing a malaria vaccine as the only reliable means of 
preventing this disease. 
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River blindness is an infection with the filateral worm, which is transmitted 
by blackflies that breed in fast flowing rivers mainly in Africa. The worm 
matures inside the human host. Adult worms settle into visible lumps or 
nodules under the skin. Female worms then produce millions of 
microfilaria, which invade the skin and the eye, eventually destroying the 
skin and the retina of the eye, causing blindness. 17.5 million people are 
affected by the disease (WHO 1996, p. 52). The last 20 years have 
shown dramatic success in controlling river blindness either through 
insecticide spraying or the use of a newly developed drug. 
Chagas disease is caused by a parasite which is transmitted from 
domesticated or wild animals by a blood sucking triatomine bug. It occurs 
mainly in the Americas and is the leading cause of cardiac deaths among 
young adults in parts of South America. 45000 people a year die (WHO 
1996, p. 53). Chagas, although untreatable, can be controlled by 
systematically attacking the vector and screening of donor blood in 
endemic countries. Remarkable success in this regard has already been 
made in South America where Chagas has been targeted for elimination 
as a public health problem. 
In light of the devastating effect of the diseases described above, it 
becomes a difficult task to declare some of them as a priority. Given the 
limited health resources world-wide, calculating the burden of disease is 
however crucial for the cost-effective control of diseases and the 
minimisation of the overall burden of disease. Any evaluation of the 
burden of disease using the number of deaths has its merits since it is an 
easily measurable and indeed, by the statistical offices of most countries, 
widely measured event. 
However, some diseases such as polio levy a heavy burden on society 
without necessarily causing death, hence the measurement of disease 
burdens will need to consider health states other than death. QUALYs 
(Quality Adjusted Life Years, explained in Box 2.1) and DALYs (Disability 
Adjusted Lifeyears) are used by the WHO and the World Bank (1993) to 
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measure the overall burden of disease taking different degrees of 
disability and quality of life into account. DALYs are computed by 
grouping diseases into six different classes of severity of disability in 
comparison with a loss of life. Blindness would, for instance, be assigned 
a severity weight of 0.6, and death representing the severity of 1 or a full 
year of life lost. Less severe conditions will be multiplied by the average 
duration of the condition. In this case allowances are also made for future 
life years lost, which are discounted by 3% a year and for age weights, so 
that life years lost at different ages were given different relative valueS7 
(World Bank 1993, p. 26). 
Figure 2-2 
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As shown in figure 2.2, among the childhood diseases which are 
preventable by the Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI), 
developing countries carry the heaviest toll. The burden of disease 
7 The relative value of a year of life is at its maximum of 1.4 at the age of 25 and 
declining to 0.4 at the age of 90. 
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expressed in DALYs is many times greater in the developing world than 
in the developed world where childhood immunisation has been well 
established for many years. Targeting diseases prevalent in these 
countries is likely to generate a higher health gain overall. Of all diseases 
prevalent in low and middle income countries, six diseases - pneumonia, 
tuberculosis, diarrhoeal diseases, malaria, measles and HIV/AIDS 
impose a disproportionately high burden on these societies (WHO 
2000a). 
Of all conditions, five major childhood conditions cause 23% of all 
Disability Adjusted Lifeyears (DALYs) in low and middle income 
countries, three major adult conditions cause 10% of all DALYs, here 
shown in figure 2.3. 
Figure 2-3 
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The relative disease burden of the five major childhood conditions (acute 
respiratory infections, perinatal conditions, diarrhoea, Malaria, and 
Measles) is shown in figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2-4 
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Among the major adult conditions HIV causes 54%, maternal conditions 
25%, and Tuberculosis 22% of all DALYs, here shown in figure 2.5. 
Figure 2-5 
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Using adjusted lifeyears for the calculation of disease burdens improves 
the targeting of diseases and the setting of priorities for health 
intervention measures. At the same time health policy would need to be 
guided by what is technically possible or indeed affordable to the health 
service. A particular disease may be high on the agenda in terms of 
overall health burden, the treatment or prevention might however come at 
25 
a disproportionately high cost compared to other forms of health 
interventions. Prioritising certain interventions would therefore have to be 
guided by the cost effectiveness of health measures. The following 
section will demonstrate how cost effectiveness may be calculated in the 
context of health policy. 
2.6 Cost-effectiveness of vaccines 
The aim of calculating cost effectiveness figures for a particular health 
intervention is to make the best possible decision about the allocation of 
resources for the purchase of a particular drug or vaccine or the 
investment into the development of new products. There are three stages 
of evaluating a new drug or vaccine. First of all it must be effective, i. e. it 
must prevent the target disease and only those substances which show 
the highest probability in doing so will be used and/or further developed. 
Secondly, it must be safe. Effectiveness together with safety is measured 
in clinical trials. Economic evaluation, finally, is a process 
"whereby the costs of programmes, alternatives or options are 
compared with their consequences, in terms of improved health or 
savings in resource. It is also known as the cost-benefit approach or 
economic appraisal. It embodies a family of techniques including cost- 
effectiveness analysis, cost-benefit analysis and cost-utility analysis" 
(Drummond et al. 1988, p. 12). 
Cost-benefit analysis measures all the cost and benefits attributed to e. g. 
a vaccination programme in money terms. Estimation difficulties, 
however, often reduce cost-benefit analysis to a consideration of those 
costs and consequences which are expressed in money terms. 
Cost effectiveness studies are a form of economic evaluation where costs 
are expressed in money terms but where some of the consequences are 
expressed in physical units (e. g. lives saved). Cost-utility analysis is a 
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form of cost effectiveness analysis and expresses some of the 
consequences in utility units (e. g. quality adjusted life years)8. 
Figure 2-6 presents a general framework for economic evaluation. 
Figure 2-6 
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source: Drummond et al. (1988, p. 9), own modifications 
All types of economic appraisals compare inputs, usually the money costs 
of a health measure, with the outputs of that measure, the main 
distinction being whether the output is measured in money terms or 
health effects. What are the costs and benefits which should be taken into 
consideration? 
Drummond et al. (1994, p. 21) gives an overview of the types of costs 
and benefits involved. The direct costs include the cost of organising and 
operating the programme, i. e. the variable costs (staff time) and fixed 
a Some authors do not differentiate between cost effectiveness and cost utility analysis, 
so some of the work written on e. g. QALYs may appear under the heading 'cost- 
effectiveness analysis'. The main distinction between the economic evaluation 
techniques is indeed whether outcome is measured in money terms or not. 
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costs (light, heat, rent, capital costs, etc. ). Direct costs also include the 
costs borne by patients and their families, i. e. out-of-pocket expenses or 
other resources they use up in the treatment process. Loss of time from 
work, the so-called production losses incurred by patients and family 
members, are referred to as indirect costs9. There may also be 
'intangible' costs in the form of pain or suffering resulting from therapy. It 
may also be the case that the operation of a health programme causes 
costs outside the health service; these are external costs. Health and 
safety measures in a factory may, for example, reduce productivity and 
hence increase prices for other members in society. 
Direct economic benefits signify changes in resource use within the 
health sector; an effective vaccination programme averts the future costs 
of treating the people who would have contracted the disease. Patients 
and their families may also use less resources; these benefits are also 
included in direct benefits. Any gain in working time in that group 
accounts for the indirect benefits. Since Drummond et al. (1994) added 
external costs to the earlier framework (Drummond et al. 1988), external 
benefits should logically be included as well. External benefits as part of 
the measurement of economic benefit of a health measure would 
comprise any benefits incurred outside the health system. Vaccination 
would be the prime example of this type of externality. Vaccination, as 
opposed to most other treatments, incurs a benefit to other members in 
society which although unvaccinated will not contract the disease due to 
the vaccination of their peers. These benefits are therefore part of the 
outcome of the health measure, although in many cases extremely 
difficult to measure. 
Apart from benefits expressed in money terms, benefits can also be 
expressed in natural units or health effects. These benefits are usually 
9 Drummond (1994, p. 24) points out that "care must be taken however, when including 
this cost item in an analysis, since its inclusion implies that the cost was incurred as a 
result of participation in treatment and therefore that the individual's condition was not of 
a type which would have prevented productive activity anyway. " 
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described as changes in physical functioning, e. g. the wound healed. The 
last category comprises benefits expressed in utility units, an attempt to 
attribute a common utility to a variety of health outcomes and therefore 
make comparisons between different interventions possible. One possible 
utility measure is explained in box 2-1. 
Economic evaluations will then provide benefit (effectiveness, utility) - 
cost ratios which can be compared with alternative vaccination 
programmes, medical interventions or even other forms of public 
spending, for instance an anti-alcohol campaign. 
29 
Box 2-1 
The use of QUALYs 
Extending life is hardly ever the prime aim of a treatment or preventive measure. It is in 
the physician's interest to make the patient feel well. If the cost-effectiveness of a range 
of treatments or vaccines is to be compared, an outcome which would describe solely 
life years gained could be misleading. Some of the patients might live five years longer 
but suffer from restricted mobility and pain while others gain only three years but enjoy 
reasonable health and mobility. Which one is more cost- effective? What the economic 
evaluator aims to look at is the utility derived from a particular intervention. This can in 
principle be measured by letting the patient or health professionals assign values usually 
between 0 (death) and 1 (perfectly healthy) to certain health states and add them up to a 
weighted total. Let's assume the utility value for person A after receiving treatment X 
would be 0.5 meaning that the patient is about half as well off as he or she would be had 
the patient never suffered from the disease. Person B after receiving treatment Y has a 
utility value of 0.8. Treatment X costs $1000 per person and prolongs life by 5 years, 
treatment Y cost $2000 and saves 3 years of life. Which treatment is more cost 
effective? The answer is given in the term 'cost per quality-adjusted life year gained'. 
Treatment X saves 5 years at a value of 0.5 each which is the equivalent of 2.5 
QUALYs (or healthy life years, to use a simpler term). The cost per QUALY gained is 
then $1000/2.5 QUALYS = $400. Treatment Y saves 3 years at a value of 0.8 which 
corresponds to 2.4 QUALYs gained, the costs per QUALY gained sum up to $2000/2.4 
QUALYs = $800. Treatment X is the better buy since it saves a quality adjusted life year 
at half the cost. The World Bank (1993) considers health interventions which cost less 
than $50 per QUALY a 'good buy'. 
Some evaluations try to take into account that a life year gained in the distant future has 
a smaller value to the individual than a life year gained in the near future. This is of 
particular importance for the evaluation of vaccines against diseases such as Hepatitis B 
which affect the individual at a late stage in life. Obviously, if people grow up in 
conditions where life expectancy is generally low, a life year gained at the age of 55 
might not have the same utility value as a life year gained at the age of 18 when they 
become income earners and have to look after their family. The easiest way to account 
for this is to discount life years gained by a certain percentage - the World Bank (1993) 
uses a discount rate of 3% - so that e. g. next years healthy life is only worth 1/1.03 
0.97 QUALYs. 
Economic evaluation serves as a guideline on how to spend scarce 
health care resources most effectively. The most straightforward 
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approach is to compare alternative treatments, preventive measures, 
which are designed to achieve the same therapeutic aim, then judge 
which one does the job at least costs. The broader the outcome is 
defined, the broader can be the choice of compared alternatives. With 
regard to vaccines, for instance, the way public health providers look at 
cost-benefit figures has undergone considerable change. Waddington 
and Goodman (1994, p. 165) note that: 
"In the 1980s the argument went like this. [ ... ]. For the money available, 
vaccinations can save more lives than most other interventions. There 
is thus a moral imperative (as well as an economic logic) to vaccinate 
as many people in the target age groups as possible, as quickly as 
possible. [ ... ] Substantial amounts of resources were devoted to single 
issue mass vaccination campaigns. [ ... ] The 1990s question 
is rather 
different. It is concerned with health as a whole, rather than merely 
with vaccine-preventable diseases, and the timeframe is longer. The 
question is 'what does a cost effective health care system look like? ' 
More particularly 'What role does vaccination play in this system'. " 
If the outcome is to be the improvement in quality of life for the general 
population, a number of public health measures with different target 
groups may be compared. Vaccination compares favourably with other 
measures in terms of cost-utility-ratios. The study by Jameson and 
Saxenian (1994) compares UNICEF's Expanded Programme of 
Vaccination (EPI plus) with measures such as tobacco and alcohol 
control. Together with AIDS prevention, vaccination belongs to the 
programmes which achieve the greatest health effect per dollar spentlo. 
1ODALYs (disability adjusted life years) used in this study are based on the same idea as 
QUALYs outlined above, i. e. they adjust life years saved for any reduction in the quality 
of life (degree of disability). 
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Figure 2-7 
Estimated effectiveness of public health packages in low- and middle 
income countries, 1990, annual cost ($) per DALY 
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Cost-effectiveness measures, which allow comparison of treatments and 
other public policy measures", are popular in the economic literature and 
practice. However, measures of that kind do not give an indication 
whether the measure is actually affordable to the health service 
concerned, and what the financial incentives are of using a particular 
health intervention. Only cost-benefit figures can reveal that in most 
cases an immunisation campaign saves money as well as lives. The 
literature justifying immunisation on the basis of favourable cost-benefit 
figures is vast and can only be outlined briefly at this point. It is a 
reasonably accurate simplification that the benefits of any of the 
childhood vaccines exceed the costs of immunisation, sometimes up to 
more than tenfold. 
11 Many cost-effective measures to improve people's health are found outside the realm 
of the health service. The quality of nutrition, housing and the prevention of alcohol and 








Measles 10.0: 11 Albritton 1978 
11.9: 1 White, Koplan, Orenstein 1985 
Mumps 6.7: 11 White et al. 1985 
Rubella 7.7: 1 White et al. 1985 
Combined MMR 14.4: 1 White et al. 1985 
Pertussis 2.61 Koplan, Schoenbaum, Weinstein, Fraser 1979 
11.11 Hinman, Koplan 1985 
Polio 10.0: 1 Fudenberg 1973 
Source: Hinman, 1988, p. 597 
This is why the emphasis today has shifted away from justifying 
immunisation in general towards the evaluation of incremental cost- 
effectiveness in form of improvement of existing childhood vaccines, 
combination of vaccines or the development of entirely new vaccines 
against so-far unpreventable, diseases. 
2.7 Candidate vaccines for development - success stories and 
shortcomings 
UNICEF's Expanded Programme of Immunisation is one of the most 
successful public health campaigns of the Twentieth century. Since its 
establishment in 1974 the programme had managed to raise 
immunisation rates against the six most common childhood diseases 
from an initial 5 per cent in 1974 to up to 80 per cent by its target date of 
1990. 
In 1990, the World Summit for Children did, however, express concern 
about the lack of new and improved children's vaccines. Shortly 
afterwards, the Children's Vaccine Initiative (CVI) was established. Its 
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prime aim was to promote the development and implementation of new 
and improved children's vaccines for use in developing and industrialised 
countries. The CVI was based at the WHO headquarters in Geneva with 
a small number of permanent staff. The CVI had a three-fold mission 
according to its Executive Secretary Dr. Jong-Wook Lee (CVl Forum 
9/1995, p. 8): 
"First to build consensus among its many collaborators over vaccine 
needs, opportunities and priorities. It will do this through a number of 
mechanisms, in particular its strategic plan and its Consultative Group 
meetings. Second, to provide cohesion and co-ordination for the work 
of its collaborators so as to speed the development and introduction of 
priority vaccines. Third to play an advocacy role for the CVI's goals. 
This it will do through its communications and public awareness 
activities, which include the newsletter and other publications, media 
seminars, the creation of national CVI committees and so on. " 
An identification of candidate vaccines for development was undertaken 
by Shepard et al. (1995) to help the CVI to achieve its goal of new and 
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To measure health outcome in quality adjusted life years (QALYs) allows 
selection among a wide range of possible investment and more 
importantly to compare the incremental effect of an investment against 
the 'do nothing and stick to the old tech nology'-option. The QALYs in this 
model are discounted meaning that individuals prioritise immediate over 
future health gains. 
Measles vaccines clearly rank among the three most urgently required 
improvements. According to a CVI-Forum (4/1993), measles causes 
more deaths in children than all other diseases preventable by 
vaccination taken together. The fatality rate in developing countries 
ranges from 3% to 15%, depending on age, being highest when 
contracted early in life. Many deaths at little extra cost could be prevented 
if only vaccination could be administered before the age of six months. 
According to the World Bank (1993), vaccines with costs below the $50 
per QALY mark are considered a good buy even for the poorest 
countries. If developed, they should be included in the Expanded 
Programme of Immunisation. Vaccines between the $50 and $2000 mark 
are considered moderately cost-effective and suitable for adoption in 
most of the middle income countries and most developing countries. 




Combination and single-shot vaccines 
The CVI aims to develop a single heat-stable 12 vaccine which can be given orally soon 
after birth and which would protect children before the age of highest risk of infection 
and reduce vaccination programme costs by reducing the number of contacts needed to 
complete the vaccination schedule (Cutts, 1992, pp. 274-275). Views differ about how 
long this is going to take; 10 years is the most optimistic and 25 years the most 
pessimistic estimate. Steps towards this goal would involve the combination of an 
increasing number of vaccines in one shot following today's DTP example, one vaccine 
against three diseases - Diphtheria, Tetanus and Pertussis. The CVI believes that DTP 
could be the backbone for all the future combination vaccines (CV1 Forum, 10/1995). 
Combination vaccines based on a new acellular DTaP (less impure and therefore 
causing less side effects than the old Pertussis component in DTP, which consisted of a 
crude preparation of the whole Bordatella Pertussis organism) have already been 
launched in the US. They now combine DTaP and Haernophilius influencae type b and 
may soon link hepatitis B and an injectable polio vaccine to the DTaP component. In the 
future a multi-antigen vaccine could link Hib, HepB, and even HIV and pneumococcal 
antigens to the DTP vaccine. 
However, some concerns are expressed about the economics of such a powerful 
vaccine (Cutts, 1992, pp. 275-276). Would such a vaccine be affordable for developing 
countries, and if not, would the old and therefore affordable vaccines still be available 
once the single shot vaccine was launched? And would such a new vaccine not 
discriminate against diseases in the developing world since those countries are unlikely 
ever to be able to afford it? Not necessarily. According to the CV1 (CVI Forum 5/1993) 
about 60 to 70% of DTP used in developing countries is manufactured locally. A 
technology gap could however occur whereby developing countries, through lack of 
resources, are forced to hold onto their old technologies. Whether the encouragement of 
these countries to adapt to new technologies and transferring such technology to 
developing countries is a good idea remains to be seen. It might well prove to be an 
obstacle to further investment into R&D if developed country innovators could not keep 
the sole right to manufacture and sell new technology vaccines at large volume. 
12 Vaccines which remain active in hot conditions are particularly important for 
developing countries. Many of today's vaccines need to stored below a certain 
temperature and the 'cold-chain' needs to remain intact during transport to guarantee 
effectiveness. 
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The current EPI includes vaccines against six diseases: measles, tetanus 
pertussis, diphtheria, polio, and tuberculosis. One of the lessons learned 
from the selection of candidate vaccineS13 above, is that improvements in 
vaccine technology would reduce multidose vaccines to a single dose, 
improve heat stability, simplify administrative requirements (greater use of 
oral vaccines as compared with injections for example), create 
combinations of vaccines to reduce patient contacts, integrate new 
vaccines into EPI and allow vaccination at an earlier stage in life to 
reduce deaths of very young infants (see measles as an example). 
Six years into the launch of the CVI, questions were raised again as to 
how industry could be encouraged to develop vaccines. In the past 
vaccines developed by industry were not necessarily the most cost- 
effective or the most urgently required by developing countries. Based on 
the new vaccine launches anticipated by the Institute of Medicine (1985), 
Shepard et al. (1995) compared the predicted number with the cumulative 
number of vaccines actually licensed by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). The results are shown in Figure 2-9. 
13 see also World Bank 1993, p. 153 
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Figure 2-9 
New vaccines important for developing countries predicted/ 











86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
11 
source: Shepard et al (1995) 
Among the vaccines which were licensed and expected was Hib in 1987, 
HBV (recombinant) in 1989, typhoid in 1990, Japanese acellular pertussis 
(for booster doses only) and Japanese encephalitis in 1992. These five 
vaccines represent only 50% of the ten vaccines expected to be licensed 
by the FDA through 1993. Shepard et al. (1995) cite low immunogenicity 
(affecting four vaccines), licensing delays due to uncertain benefits (three 
vaccines), excessive side effects (two vaccines), inadequate demand to 
justify investment (two vaccines), problems in large scale development 
(two vaccines) as the major factors responsible for the difficulties. 
The United State's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
(2000, p. 131) concedes that: 
"by early 1998 it had become apparent that there were serious 
limitations in global vaccine programs. Immunisation coverage had 
plateaued at about 80 per cent in 1990 and, in some countries, was 
actually dropping [ ... ] the World Bank, having identified vaccines as the 
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most cost-effective public health tool, was doing very little to help 
immunisation [ ... ]. Research into vaccines of interest predominantly to 
developing countries was lagging and in clinical trials was proving 
increasingly difficult to finance". 
In two subsequent meetings in 1998 and 1999, all major stakeholders in 
world vaccination, i. e. WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, the five largest 
vaccine manufacturing companies and big donor organisations such as 
the Rockefeller foundation, agreed to wind up the CVI and to replace it 
with a Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) supported 
by a small secretariat and a number of working groups, one of them 
concerned with research and development issues. 
GAVI was officially launched at the January 2000 World Economic Forum 
in Switzerland. What really made GAVI possible was a substantial 
donation of $750 million by the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation. These 
$750 million are designated for the purchase of non-traditional EPI 
vaccines, such as hepatitis B, and are supplemented by smaller 
donations by the same foundation for the accelerated development of 
malaria and HIV vaccines and the assessment of disease burdens in 
developing countries. Eventually GAVI will raise more money from a 
variety of individual and institutional donors to achieve four broad aims: 
the global eradication of polio, the improvement of the infrastructure and 
equipment currently available in countries participating in EPI, the 
introduction of newer vaccines into EPI routine use, and the promotion of 
research and development of new vaccines (National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Disease 2000, p. 133). 
Assessing the global needs for vaccine research and development was at 
the centre of a GAVIMHO conference held in November 1999 in 
Geneva. The conference proceedings (WHO 2000b) distinguish between 
'impeded' and 'developing market' vaccines. The former are vaccines 
which have substantial markets but are not prioritised for investment by 
the industry for reasons of scientific, ethical or public perception obstacles 
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such as the fear of adverse reactions. Developing market vaccines are 
lacking substantial markets in industrialised countries and therefore 
dissuade industry from making investments. GAVI agreed that its initial 
effort should focus on developing market vaccines and "GAVI's 
involvement in championing the development of vaccines against AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis is specifically instructed in its charter' (WHO 
2000b). 
GAVI's research and development taskforce will undertake a systematic 
analysis to select candidate vaccines for development. Although large 
gaps exist in the quality of disease burden data, it was agreed that 
"at least for tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS, current disease 
burden data were sufficient to validate their high priority as a focus for 
GAVI. Diarrhoeal diseases, acute lower respiratory infections and 
parasitic infections have been recognised as important public health 
targets for intervention" (WHO 2000b). 
Two approaches are seen as exemplary for future economic appraisals 
and identification of candidate vaccine for development and will form the 
base for GAVI's own methodology for the selection of candidate vaccines: 
Kotloff et al's (1999) calculation of the global burden of diarrhoeal 
diseases and dysentery caused by Shigella and the work undertaken by 
the Institute of Medicine (2000) to prioritise vaccine development in the 
Unites States. 
Research efforts currently undertaken include the first large-scale human 
trial of a HIV vaccine in the United States and Thailand. If these efficacy 
trials are successful, a similar vaccine could be developed to protect 
against HIVIAIDS in Africa (WHO 2000a). 
Pneumococcal vaccines already exist but they are not effective in 
children under two, which is the highest-risk group. At the same time the 
low-cost drugs available to treat pneumonia are becoming less effective 
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due to drug resistance and not all children can get treatment when it is 
needed. To date four manufacturers are carrying out clinical trials on new 
pneumococcal vaccines (WHO 2000a). 
A large number of malaria vaccines are also under development and 
being tested in Asia, Africa and the United States although so far no 
breakthrough has been announced. 
A detailed review of vaccine research currently undertaken is provided by 
the annual Jordan Report published by the National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases (2000). 
What has happened to the vaccines initially targeted for development by 
the CVI and identified by Shepard (1996)? Already in 1996, the CVI (CVI 
Forum 11,1996, p. 18) had sensed a "renewed buoyancy and vitality of 
industry's vaccine development activities. [ ... ] The industry has all reason 
to believe that the vaccine market is taking off. " The industry's 
development efforts were certainly rewarded with respect to the three 
new vaccines against Hepatitis B, Hib and Hepatitis A which have 
outperformed all other vaccines in terms of annual sales. Hep B alone 
accounts for 20 % of the world vaccines market. This hardly comes as a 
surprise since Hep B is not only one of the most innovative products, it is 
also pate nt-p rotected and has for a long time been the most expensive 
product on the market. Only recently has the price declined far enough for 
the vaccine to be considered part of immunisation campaigns in the 
developing world. These vaccines do however not belong to the group of 
vaccines which were initially identified as the most cost effective (such as 
a single dose measles vaccine, a heat-stable OPV, a slow release 
tetanus toxoid or typhoid vaccine) and therefore do not seem to 
emphasise the most urgent needs of the developing world. Indeed, 
research for a early dose measles vaccine is today conducted primarily in 
the public sector, according to the CVI (CVI Forum 10,1995). 
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The public sector project to make the oral polio vaccine more heat-stable, 
originally very high on the CVI agenda, was brought to a standstill in 
1995. WHO experts expressed reservations about the necessity of such a 
vaccine since the existing vaccine seems to have done such a good job 
and there appeared to be no real need for a more stable OPV. 
A public sector working group was formed in 1994 to undertake 
development of a single dose tetanus vaccine (CVI Forum, 10,1995). 
The involvement of the public sector in the development of these 
vaccines does not come as a surprise. Many of the most cost effective 
vaccines are variations of older vaccines which were never, or are no 
longer, patent-protected. Any investment in these vaccines could not be 
safeguarded against copying and is therefore unattractive for the industry. 
Compounds in the current vaccine pipeline do at least contain one 
modern or entirely new vaccine, whose technology can be effectively 
protected and promises some return on investment for the industry. 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
This section has outlined how vaccines could help avert millions of deaths 
in the developing world as well as fight newly resurgent diseases in 
industrialised countries. Vaccines do that in a very cost-effective manner 
with the benefit in terms of saved treatment costs almost always 
outweighing the costs of purchasing and administering the vaccine. 
Despite this, the most cost-effective new vaccine projects have not 
attracted the funds necessary for their development. Public sector 
organisations, most notably the Global Alliance of Vaccines and 
Immunisation, have recently accelerated their efforts to promote the 
development of the most urgently needed vaccines. 
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The following chapter will look more closely at what kind of market 
imperfections could lead to the alleged underinvestment in vaccine 
products, whether these imperfections justify government intervention at 
least on theoretical grounds, and what is currently proposed to correct the 
outcome of this market. 
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3 Market failure and qovernment's role in promotinq vaccine R&D 
3.1 Background 
The material discussed so far suggests that there is a strong economic 
rationale to use vaccine technology as an overall cost-saving measure 
available to health services worldwide. If the economic rationale is strong, 
what keeps market forces from allocating funds towards new vaccine 
projects? One possible reason could be market failure as a result of lack 
of information or uncertainty among the actors in the market. Another 
cause of market failure could be positive externalities, and goods which 
are underprovided or not provided by the market at all due to non- 
excludability and non-rivalry in consumption: vaccines might be so-called 
public goods. Each of these characteristics may play a role in the market 
for new vaccines. 
Some market failure arguments appear very straightforward in the 
context of vaccines and government intervention readily accepted as is 
indeed often the case with products of an 'ethical' nature. However, 
whether government intervention will move the market anywhere closer 
to a socially optimal level, what'socially optimal' actually means, and how 
much and what sort of intervention is required are questions far more 
difficult to answer. 
An analysis of market failure in innovative industries should probably 
have Kenneth Arrow's (1962) article on 'economic welfare and the 
allocation of resources for invention' and Demsetzs (1969) response as 
a starting point and a brief review of their arguments will be presented 
here. Once a framework for the analysis of market failure is laid out, the 
question arises whether an optimal level can be determined with 
reasonable accuracy and what means society has at its disposal to move 
towards this, if not optimal but possibly more desirable, level. Later on in 
the Chapter the occurrence of market failure in the vaccine market will 
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be investigated before the Chapter finishes with a brief summary and 
outlook over the rest of the thesis. 
3.2 Issues in resource allocation: the Arrow-Demsetz debate 
Arrow's (1962) argument is based on three reasons for possible 
misallocation of resources for invention: uncertainty, indivisibilities', and 
inappropriability. 
Uncertainty in Arrow's view is an impediment to the allocation of 
resources to inventive activity because inventive activity is a risky activity 
with uncertain returns, and the economic system has only limited devices 
to insure against the risk of failure. Arrow describes how the outcome of a 
particular production decision is uncertain and depends on a particular 
state of nature (e. g. weather conditions in agriculture). In the ideal 
system, commodity options would be traded in which the buyer agrees to 
pay a certain sum for a certain quantity only if a certain state of nature 
has occurred. The revenues of the firm are completely determined and 
the firm can choose its inputs so as to maximise profits. In the absence of 
commodity options, firms will make input decisions and outputs are 
produced depending on the state of nature. Prices will be set to clear the 
market and these prices are a function of the state of nature. Should 
firms be unwilling to bear the risk of not knowing which state of nature will 
occur and hence face uncertain returns, then, according to Arrow, the 
allocation of resources will not be optimal. 
Arrow admits that optimal allocation could be achieved if insurance 
against any conceivable event was available. Individuals could also shift 
their proprietary interests among a large number of firms or large firms 
could internally spread risk across a large number of projects. Insurance 
does however change the incentives of the insured and could cause a 
1 More often referred to as public goods 
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decrease in the technical efficiency of the project undertaken, people 
simply won't try as hard once they are not bearing the consequences of 
failure (moral hazard). 
Interestingly Arrow claims that risky activities of any sort, including 
investments in innovative products, are characterised by a suboptimal 
allocation of resources. As it turns out, Arrow's article seems concerned 
not only with inventive activity but leads -taken to its ultimate conclusion- 
into a general critique of the incentives to invest, produce or indeed 
undertake any risky economic activity in a free enterprise system. 
Besides uncertainty, inappropriability of information is the second reason 
for the misallocation of resources for invention. Arrow (1962, p. 614) 
claims that if the cost of transmitting a given body of information is zero, 
then optimal allocation would call for an unlimited distribution of the 
information because it has the character of an indivisible commodity 
(public good) and the owner should not extract the economic value. 
Arrow admits that this would not present any incentive for investment in 
research. 
But even if the inventor tried to charge a non-optimal positive price, "the 
inventor will in any case have considerable difficulty in appropriating the 
returns from information produced" (Arrow 1962, p. 617). Arrow outlines 
two reasons why selling information may not be possible. Any purchaser 
could undermine any monopoly power of the seller since he could 
reproduce the information at practically no cost. Also "no amount of legal 
protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of something 
so intangible as information" (Arrow 1962, p. 615). Even if it was possible 
to protect information with suitable legal measures such as property 
rights, demand for information would be difficult to establish because the 
"value for the purchaser is not known until he has the information, but 
then he has in effect acquired it without cost" (Arrow 1962, p. 615). This 
in Arrow's view is a good thing since the optimal allocation would require 
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a free distribution under some regime of centralised decision-making 
anyway. 
What is particularly relevant in the context of this study is Arrow's notion 
that basic research is especially unlikely to be rewarded. Arrow states 
(1962, p. 618) that information is not only the product of inventive activity 
but also an input into further productive activity or indeed the production 
of information. This however causes much greater appropriability 
problems and makes the value of its use much more 'conjectural' and 
likely to be underestimated. As a result basic research is "especially 
unlikely to be rewarded" (Arrow 1962, p. 618). 
Arrow concludes that "for optimal allocation to invention it would be 
necessary for the government or some other agency not governed by 
profit or loss criteria to finance research and invention" (Arrow 1962, p. 
623). This has of course already happened where it is most needed, in 
basic research, which is undertaken at universities or government 
organisations. But some more applied fields such as medicine or 
aeronautics have also received strong government support, Arrow claims. 
Although desirable in principle, two problems arise from government 
participation, "how shall the amount of resources devoted to invention be 
determined and how shall efficiency in their use be encouraged? " (Arrow 
1962, p. 623). Arrow suggests that equating marginal social benefits 
across all projects might prove impossible in the face of uncertainties but 
the estimation of future rates of return from those in the past and that 
investment allocated to those projects with a definitely superior rate of 
return could be achieved. 
Arrow is well aware that awarding research contracts on a cost-plus fixed- 
fee base is not encouraging to efficiency, even if contracts were only 
awarded if a firm has operated efficiently in the past. He admits that there 
is "clear need for further study of alternative methods of compensation" 
(Arrow 1962, p. 624), although the firm may not be so important after all 
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because "there is plenty of reason to suppose that individual talents 
count for a good deal more than the firm as an organisation", and "other 
forms of organisation, such as research institutes financed by industries, 
the government, and private philanthropy, could be made to play an even 
livelier role than they now do" (Arrow 1962, pp. 624-625). 
It must have been the general nature of Arrow's critique of the free 
enterprise system as an efficient allocator of resources which triggered a 
vehement reply from Demsetz (1969) whose response focuses not so 
much on invention but Arrow's critique of free enterprise as such. 
Demsetz (1969, p. 2) argues that even though free enterprise may not be 
able to allocate resources optimally, it does not follow that government or 
other non-profit institutions would necessarily achieve a superior outcome 
without actually examining how government would go about to achieve it. 
Demsetz refers to Arrow's reasoning as 'the grass is always greener 
fallacy' and proposes the following alternative formulation to Arrow's 
statement: "the previous discussion leads to the conclusion that for 
optimal allocation to invention it would be necessary to remove the non- 
optimalities" (Demsetz 1969, p. 4). 
Beside this fundamental critique Demsetz questions some of Arrow's 
more specific assumptions. Demsetz (1969, p. 4) believes that 
commodity options exist in the real world and quotes labour contracts 
linked to the Consumer Price Index as one of many examples. What is 
more important, the market may not use commodity options because 
they are not free. Adjustment to risk may be incomplete as a result, but 
incomplete and non-optimal are very different concepts. Non-optimality 
suggests that a situation can be improved upon while incomplete risk 
adjustment is an economic decision as a response to scarcity. 
Demsetz also disagrees with Arrow's understanding of the optimal level 
of risky investment in invention. Arrow believes that "inventive activities 
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should be undertaken if the expected return exceeds the market rate of 
return, no matter what the variance is" (Arrow 1962, p. 613). Demsetz 
believes that this understanding of optimality is flawed, at least in a 
Robinson Crusoe economy, since people are generally risk-averse and 
risk reduction is an economic good. People are prepared to pay the price 
of a lower return for a reduction in risk and a lower variance is a good 
indicator of risk reduction. Once it is accepted that people act 
economically when they try to avert or reduce risk it becomes clear that 
an efficient economy would allow people to reduce risk if the economic 
gains exceed the cost and that risk shifting can never be complete 
because it comes at a cost. 
In Arrow's view one important obstacle to risk shifting is moral hazard, 
people acting inefficiently in the presence of insurance. Demsetz argues 
that moral hazard is just another cost of producing insurance which is 
partly borne by people taking out insurance and the sellers of insurance. 
Moral hazard in Demsetz's understanding is no different from the 
decision of not bringing iron ore to surface because it is too costly to 
exploit (Demsetz 1969, p. 7). The fact that not all risks can be insured 
due to moral hazard doesn't make the market inefficient, it simply accepts 
that people tend to commit moral hazard and calling 'optimal' a world 
where moral hazard doesn't exist means in Demsetz's view to commit the 
'people could be different fallacy' (Demsetz 1969, p. 7). Assuming moral 
hazard away certainly doesn't answer the question as to what exactly the 
governing principles of the alternative and 'optimal' regime should be. 
Concluding the debate about the ability of the free enterprise system to 
shift risk and the ability of governments to take a risk-neutral attitude, 
Demsetz admits that government can be less risk-averse in some of its 
activity, as for instance shown in its attempt to send a man to the moon, 
although in other activities the political risk to be borne could make 
government more risk averse, for instance when some technical 
innovation causes the redundancy of workers. 
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Demsetz is equally dismissive of Arrow's analysis of the appropriation of 
the returns from knowledge. The detection of theft of knowledge may be 
more difficult compared to other commodities -after all the owner is not 
deprived of the use of knowledge after the theft has occurred- but it is not 
impossible since the subsequent use of stolen information will reveal it. If 
theft becomes detectable then "a harsher schedule of penalties always 
can be used to enhance the appropriability of knowledge" (Demsetz 
1969, p. 10). 
As far as Arrow's indivisibilities or public goods argument is concerned, 
Demsetz claims that the production and dissemination of information 
cannot be regarded separately. "Since one of the main functions of 
paying a positive price is to encourage others to invest the resources 
needed to sustain a continuing flow of production, the efficiency with 
which the existing stock of goods or information is used cannot be judged 
without examining the effects on production" (Demsetz 1969, p. 11). In 
other words it may well be optimal to disseminate existing information 
free of charge, but if as a result the pool of knowledge dries up, this 
cannot be desirable from the viewpoint of society. Government could of 
course take over the production of knowledge as well but whether 
decisions on resource allocation at government level would necessarily 
be superior compared to an enterprise system is again questionable in 
Demsetz's view: 
"He [Arrow] finds the capitalistic system defective. The socialist ideal 
however solves static allocation problems rather neatly. But this is only 
because all the dynamic problems of production are ignored. The 
comparison of a real capitalistic system with an ideal socialist system 
that ignores important problems is not a promising way to shed light on 
how to design institutional arrangements for the production and 
distribution of knowledge" (Demsetz 1969, p. 12). 
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The Arrow-Demsetz debate has been presented in some detail here 
because it is from a theoretical viewpoint the most thorough analysis of 
the market failure framework in the allocation of resources for invention 
and will as such help to develop a more structured approach to the 
analysis of the market for preventive medicines. There are however 
limitations to the applicability of this theoretical framework. According to 
Demsetz, Arrow is using a 'nirvana' approach to real world problems 
which was possibly influenced by the feeling at the time that America was 
failing behind the Soviet Union in the technology race. Some radical 
measure seemed required and Arrow delivered what must be one of the 
more substantial critiques of the enterprise system this side of the former 
Iron Curtain. By the time Demsetz published his critique, the belief in the 
suitability of the existing institutions to catch up with the Soviet Union in 
the arms race or the race to conquer space had probably been at least 
partly re-established. 
The following discussion whether or not the market for vaccine innovation 
fails is influenced by both authors' arguments, and will also expand some 
viewpoints and introduce new arguments. 
3.3 Market failure in vaccine innovation 
While Arrow and Demsetz are primarily concerned with -investment 
decisions concerning new products, Musgrove (1999) investigates public 
spending decisions on existing health interventions. The author 
distinguishes nine different criteria which could justify public financing of 
current health measures, and by analogy, could also guide public 
investment into new treatments or preventive medicines. These criteria 
are summarised in table 3-1. 
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Table 3-1 
Criteria for public spending on healthcare 
criteria I* Cost-effectiveness 
Catastrophic cost 
Externalities 
0 Public goods 
Equity or Ethical criteria 0 Poverty 
" Vertical equity 
" Horizontal equity 
" Rule of rescue 
o Public demands 
Source: Musgrove 1999, p. 209 
Efficiency criteria describe possible reasons for market failure in health 
interventions and show some parallels to Arrow's argument. Equity 
criteria are more concerned with the fairness of health care provision 
while political criteria are considering public demands which may or may 
not be guided by economic or equity considerations. Musgrove (1999) 
points out that none of the above criteria can be viewed in isolation from 
the cost-effectiveness criterion, which has already been discussed in the 
previous chapter. The remaining criteria for public spending on 
healthcare, such as externalities, the public good aspect of vaccines and 
equity and ethical criteria will now be discussed in greater detail. 
3.4 Externalities 
Possibly the most important argument for government intervention is the 
existence of externalities, not explicitly discussed in Arrow's work2. 
Vaccination of an individual carries a benefit for other members of society 
by protecting them against the disease as well. Therefore the total benefit 
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to society from a programme of vaccination will exceed the sum of the 
benefits to each individual. The existence of externalities implies that 
producers cannot capture those external benefits to society i. e. they will 
not be remunerated appropriately for their investment in a particular 
preventive measure. The fact that vaccination is a source of positive 
externalities could justify a public research effort in the development of a 
new vaccine, although Demsetz would argue that an inefficient 
government may not be able to improve the outcome of the market. 
Government intervention should ultimately depend on how large the 
potential social gain is and whether it justifies the cost (Musgrove 1999) 
which again shows the importance of cost-effectiveness as an intimately 
related criterion. There is indeed some evidence that cost-effectiveness 
of vaccines is compromised by incomplete vaccination. Phillipson (1993, 
p. 129) states that epidemiologists assume that vaccination even if 
incomplete (either because the vaccine is not one hundred per cent 
effective or because not everyone in the population at risk is vaccinated) 
reduces the prevalence of the disease. Prevalence, however, may fall 
much less than expected as a consequence of incomplete vaccination, 
because the reduction brought about by the vaccine in the probability of 
infection may increase the demand for risky activity by lowering its 
relative price. The prevalence of a disease may in an extreme case also 
rise due to the reduction in the relative costs of the disease to the victims 
(ibid., p. 129). There is, for example, some evidence that the existing 
AIDS drug treatments have led to a return to unsafe sex amongst some 
groups. The overall net welfare gain to society could thus become 
ambiguous. 
Externalities could, however, also be even stronger than expected. Dow 
et. al. (1995) show that the incentive to invest in the prevention of one 
2 Of course Arrow discusses the extreme case of externality: the Samuelson public good 
which is both non-rival and non-excludable. See point 3.5 for further discussion of the 
public good character of vaccines. 
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kind of disease positively depends on the level of survival from other 
diseases. Observing the effects of the Extended Programme of 
Immunisation (EPI) in Zaire, a one per cent drop in mortality was 
expected if tetanus vaccination simply avoided tetanus deaths. However, 
the effect measured was significantly larger. The authors suggest that 
99 mothers whose children are more likely to survive neonatal tetanus as 
a result of an immunisation campaign may have an incentive to 
increase other health inputs such as nutrition, now that such inputs are 
less likely to be wasted on children who otherwise would likely have 
died (ibid., p. 4)". 
Externalities from vaccination are certainly an important argument for 
government financing. People's behaviour as a response to vaccination 
is, however, just as important for the outcome of a preventive health 
measure and a government will thus need to carefully assess this overall 
outcome before deciding on financing a project. 
3.5 Are vaccines a public good? 
Quite closely linked to the externalities debate is the question whether 
vaccines are in fact a public good. This is certainly not so as far as the 
characteristic of non-rivalness in consumption is concerned, however 
consumption is at least to some extent non-excludable. The Institute of 
Medicine (1985, p. 52) states: 
"as the percentage of the population that is immunised increases, an 
individual's chance of contracting a particular disease lessens, but the 
ris o adverse reactions remains unchanged. Many individuals in this 
situation will be tempted to be 'free riders', hoping that others will 
choose to be inoculated but concluding that it is not in their own best 
interest to do so. " 
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People can only be free riders if they cannot be excluded from the benefit 
of avoiding disease due to other people's vaccination. Vaccination can 
therefore be seen as a partial public good in which case the market fails 
to provide the right quantity or in an extreme case does not provide any 
of the good at all. If demand becomes unpredictable then uncertainty is 
greatly increased which is likely to lead to a reduction in investment into 
vaccine products. 
Simply being a (partial) public good is of course not a good enough 
reason for government to intervene into the provision or development of a 
new vaccine product. Only if the product is cost-effective, as is the case 
with most vaccines, should government money be allocated, otherwise 
this money might be spent more effectively on another health 
intervention. The rationale for intervention is even stronger if there is no 
private market at all and hence no risk that government finance crowds 
out private finance (Musgrove 1999, p. 210). 
3.6 Public demands - uncertainty and underutilisation of vaccines 
The Institute of Medicine (1985, p. 34) blames underutilisation of 
preventive treatment as one of the causes of inadequate demand for 
vaccine use. The market size for a particular vaccine is substantially 
smaller than the population for whom it would be cost-effective to use the 
vaccine. Hence, the users do not send enough signals to producers that 
the development of a new vaccine would pay off. Three factors influence 
3 underutilisation: system factors, client factors and provider factors . 
System factors describe the impact of the health care system and 
reimbursement practices on the utilisation of vaccines. Health care 
professionals are said to be geared towards the use of therapeutic 
3 The description of these three factors is based on work by the Institute of Medicine 
(1985, pp. 34-40). 
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medicines rather than prevention, with the reason for this lying partly in 
medical education and attitudes. Health care systems generally provide 
relatively little information on the benefits of vaccination to clients or 
health professionals. Another important factor is that, much in contrast to 
therapeutic care, health insurance policies or national health services are 
reluctant to cover some preventive procedures. 
The second factor which causes underutilisation of vaccines is their 
undervaluation by individuals or'clients'. Becker et al. (1977) was the first 
systematically to outline factors of influence on the perceived threat of a 
disease independently of its actual threat. 
Figure 3.1 
Becker's Health Belief Model 
Demographic variables (age, sex, race, Perceived benefits of 
ethnicity, etc. ) preventive action 
Soclopsychological variables minus 
(personality, social class, peer and reference perceived barriers to 
group pressure, etc. ) preventive action 
Perceived susceptibility Perceived threat of Likelihood of taking No )c to Disease W disease W recommended preventive 
Perceived seriousness health action 
(severity) of disease'X' 
Cues to action 
Mass media campaign 
Advice from others 
Reminder postcard from physician or dentist 
Illness of family member or friend 
Newspaper or magazine article 
I source: Becker et al. (1977) 
Becker's model is based on the assumption that the willingness to use a 
vaccine depends on the individual's state of readiness to take action 
which is influenced by the individual's perception of the likelihood of 
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susceptibility to the disease and the perception of the severity of the 
consequences of contracting the disease. The willingness also depends 
on the individual's estimate of the vaccine's potential benefits in reducing 
susceptibility and/or severity weighed against perceptions of barriers to 
preventive action, such as financial, psychological and physical barriers. 
Cues to action determine the willingness to take preventive action and 
stimulate feelings about the disease. 
Demographic and sociographic variables are believed to influence the 
willingness to take preventive action, but only indirectly. Depending on 
the type of vaccination programme, factors in the health belief model 
affect the individual's willingness to prevent to a varying degree. 
This can be illustrated by the fate of the first Hepatitis B vaccine, an 
effective, plasma-derived vaccine which became available in 1982. Its 
acceptance in the targeted population of health workers has been quite 
low. According to the Institute of Medicine (1985, p. 261) this may be 
"because of costs concerns related to its source, i. e. plasma from donors 
who may be at high risk from other infections", most notably the HIV 
virus. Media coverage of possible adverse reactions and the general 
attention HIV received in those years has certainly contributed to an 
overtly cautious use of the Hepatitis B vaccine. Although safety 
procedures were elaborate, the vaccine had to be abandoned and a new 
vaccine which wouldn't be perceived to be quite as risky had to be 
developed. 
Another more recent example is the combined measles mumps rubella 
(MMR) vaccine whose alleged association with autism and irritable bowel 
syndrome in children has been widely reported in the press. Although 
these claims have yet to be scientifically substantiated, immunisation 
rates have dropped, not least because single vaccines against each of 
the diseases are not approved in the UK. 
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The case of preventive and therapeutic medicine alike is further 
complicated by the role of the provider of treatments. As already seen, 
the provider features in the health belief model as one of the cues to 
action, i. e. the willingness to take preventive procedures. But the provider 
itself, which could be the family doctor, the local health authority or 
UNICEF which purchases well over 100 million doses of vaccines a year 
has to decide whether or not to use an existing vaccine or signal the 
importance of a new vaccine. 
The theory (Institute of Medicine 1985, p. 36) suggests that three 
variables are important: the characteristics of the providers and their 
patients, the characteristics of the innovation and the norms, values and 
policies of the target population and health service. With regard to the 
characteristics of the provider, the role of the opinion leader has been 
stressed in the literature and efforts of persuasion once a new vaccine is 
introduced have to be concentrated on these opinion leaders. Innovations 
also possess characteristics which determine the speed of diffusion of a 
new vaccine. The following is a list of factors which will affect acceptance 
of a vaccine innovation based on the Institute of Medicine (1985, pp. 37- 
39) and WHO (2000b, p. 12): 
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Table 3-2 
Factors which aid diffusion of future vaccine 
Magnitude of disease burden 
Public perception of disease and need for its control 
Existence of alternative treatment or public health measure 
Relative advantage - the degree to which the innovation is perceived as being better 
than existing medication (Cost-benefit/ utility figures play an increasing role in that 
respect) 
Observability - are the results of vaccination visible to others and how long does it 
take until the benefits and risks can be assessed? 
" Compatibility - does the innovation fit in with existing procedures, e. g. in case of a 
vaccine which requires new skills and training from the personnel? 
" Maturity of science to generate the vaccine 
" Complexity of innovation - is it difficult to understand, in particular its mode of 
operation? 
" Risk - what are the risks involved for the vaccine users and is mode of delivery 
attractive to users (e. g. mucosal or transcutaneous, number of doses required)? 
" Ease of combination and delivery with other vaccines through existing immunisation 
services 
0 Suitability for pilot studies 
Source: Institute of Medicine (1985, pp. 37-39) and WHO (2000b, p. 12): 
Box 3.1 shows a fictional conversation which aims to outline some of the 
problems which an even extremely cost effective innovation might face 
before being adopted by a national health service. 
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Box 3-1 
- Does sound economics affect vaccination policy? 
The following (shortened) dialogue, taken from Waddington et al. (1994, pp. 167-168), 
illustrates the decisive role of the provider of treatments. An economist tries to convince 
the head of a national department of health service to adapt hepatitis B vaccination on 
the ground of excellent cost-benefit figures: 
E: I've just read a paper about hepatitis B vaccination. Evidence suggests that a death 
can be averted for between US$ 150 and $200. 
DHS: I suppose this is one of your cost-effectiveness analyses. They always seem to 
smooth over the practical difficulties. How much money are we talking about? 
E: The addition of the hepatitis B vaccine to the Expanded Programme of Immunisation 
(EPI) represents a 65% increase over total cost of the EPI programme. For us that 
means about $1 Million per year. 
DHS: I hope not all of it will be required in foreign exchange. 
E: Almost all of it. In fact, 82% of the additional costs is for the vaccine itself. 
DHS: So you are asking for money I haven't got in a currency I haven't got. But where 
there is a will there is a way. It sounds like the sort of thing donors might be interested in. 
But are you sure it is really that simple? We just add hepatitis B vaccine to the vaccine 
supplies? Won't our health workers need some training about hepatitis B and the 
administration of the vaccine? 
E: The paper doesn't consider that. But I bet it's technically very simple. We could 
probably just add on a1 0-minute lecture to existing training programmes. 
DHS. The person I was talking to before called himself a Pedagogical expert. We all 
know that the technical knowledge and skills of our primary health care workers are poor. 
He argued that we had to prioritise the messages we want to get across. He convinced 
me that if we concentrated on five to begin with, we might expect some real improvement 
within a year. How does knowledge about this hepatitis B vaccine compare with the skill 
of preparing oral rehydration solution, or administering measles vaccine, or prescribing 
rationally for malaria? Are those not all cost effective interventions that we haven't got 
right yet ? 
E: You seem to have a point. I'll look into it. 
DHS: If this hepatitis B vaccine is as good as you say, I can try to woo the powers that be 
with thoughts of fewer child deaths next year. That's always popular. 
E: Oh dear, I'm afraid it doesn't work like that. We are talking about averting adult deaths 
in 30 or so years time. 
DHS: And democracy is to be restored here next year? You do need to go away and do 
some more homework. 
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Most of the above factors correspond very closely to the health belief 
model. This does not come as a surprise since the provider's role is to 
understand the user's needs as objectively as possible, so when the 
provider decides upon the willingness to use an innovation the 
determining factors should in some respects come close to those of the 
end user. 
As far as the last factor, the norms and values of the health service and 
the target population, is concerned, religious beliefs or other attitudes and 
schools of medicine may also be opposed to a particular innovation. 
All these factors taken together simply increase the level of uncertainty 
faced by the potential innovator. An apparent health need may or may 
not be transformed into actual demand depending on the strength of the 
individual factors outlined above. What seems to make vaccine demand 
particularly unpredictable is the diffusion process of new vaccine 
technology and the extent to which a new technology gets accepted by 
the medical profession and the individual user (WHO 2000b, p. 24). 
Uncertainty can be an impediment to innovation and a certain degree of 
guidance of the innovation process from initiating research up to 
propagating the use of the finished product would reduce uncertainty 
significantly. 
3.7 Imperfect Information 
Besides factors influencing actual private demand, the perception of 
potential demand by the industry is just as important for the allocation of 
resources. The lack of certainty about future vaccine sales due to 
imperfect information increases the risk of investment with predictable 
consequences for vaccine research. CVI co-ordinator Roy Widdus, for 
example, claims (CVl Forum 10/1995, p. 6) that the CVI should "provide 
commercial vaccine manufacturers with an evaluation of Third World 
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markets for their vaccines and thereby enhance the predictability of their 
R&D investments in products destined mainly by such markets. " 
Information does play a major part in the R&D process and the clearer 
the information on the absolute size and purchasing power of a market 
the more precise will the R&D resource allocation decision be. What is 
most likely to happen is once knowledge of a potential market is 
established certain desirable vaccine projects will first of all become 
candidates for development. Secondly, more accurate information may 
correct a formerly underestimated market size, improve the ranking of the 
candidate vaccine and may eventually lead to its development. 
The World Bank (1993, p. 153) agrees that providing information on 
potential markets for new products, including epidemiological data about 
the disease, the target population, and technical requirements of 
desirable innovations, would help to make innovations more viable. The 
WHO (2000b, p. 24) concedes that industry needs to know that there is a 
credible market for the product it develops. Government or some other 
non-profit institution such as the CVI could reduce uncertainty in the 
development process by providing reliable information on future market 
size. Whether such information would be trusted when the providers are 
aiming to increase investment in vaccines is another matter. 
3.8 Equity and altruism 
The existence of catastrophic cost could normally be resolved by 
insurance which, if adequate 4, covers the cost of treatment and no 
4 Only in the case of insurance failure, resulting for instance from moral hazard 
problems, should government provide cover for the uninsured. This is for instance the 
case with public health insurance for the elderly and poor in the US (Medicaid and 
Medicare), while the rest of the population relies on private health insurance. In such a 
system universal coverage is however impossible to achieve, which led some countries 
to introduce either compulsory membership in health insurance funds or a tax financed 
National Health Service. 
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government intervention is needed. The absence of health insurance for 
certain groups of individuals and very high prices for cost-effective 
vaccines would however call for some form of government help. It also 
happens that 
"some though not all of the diseases which differentially affect the 
poor, are also diseases for which relatively cost-effective interventions 
exist [ ... ] because the non-poor either do not need those 
interventions, 
or would benefit less of them, or have already benefited, while the poor 
still suffer a reducible burden" (Musgrove 1999, p. 212). 
This does not imply that money spent on the poor is always the most cost 
effective, but is likely to have a greater impact on reducing the burden of 
disease. To mention just one example, measles disproportionately affect 
malnourished children and measles immunisation prevents more 
childhood deaths among the poor than the non-poor. 
Providing the poor with access to cost-effective health interventions also 
conforms with the principle of horizontal equity which implies equal 
treatment to people with equal health conditions. Unless the 
effectiveness of vaccination differs among children, all children should 
thus have access to the same immunisation package. 
The effectiveness of vaccination does however differ between individuals, 
as the measles example has shown. Giving preferential treatment to 
those most in need then becomes an issue of vertical equity. In its 
simplest form, the rule of rescue implies that those who will die without an 
intervention will receive treatment first. As long as the expense to save a 
life is justifiable and the person recovers fully, this principle seems to 
intuitively conform with efficiency. But what if the cost of saving a life are 
unacceptably high and the person does not recover fully? These 
considerations will lead straight to quality of life measures such as QALY 
and DALY and the original premise of vertical equity to do more where 
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the effects in terms of healthy life years gained are greater. The most 
efficient intervention is an intervention which helps most, ie. saves most 
healthy life years, per dollar spent. 
Musgrove (1999) discusses these aspects of vertical and horizontal 
equity at some length although the relevance for the decision on how to 
finance certain interventions is somewhat limited. The key question 
remains whether those affected are poor and cannot afford a cost- 
effective intervention, either because no insurance or other funds are 
available at all and/or the costs are 'catastrophic'. Only in these cases 
should the public finance the health measure. 
In the framework discussed so far, cost effectiveness is the litmus test for 
public finance. The most cost effective health measures by far involve 
very simple interventions mostly in developing countries which satisfy 
horizontal and vertical equity criteria. The money spent on projects in the 
developing world will, however, only to a small extent benefit the donors 
of that money, either raised through taxation in donor countries or 
voluntary donations by private individuals. Rotary International, the 
Rockefeller foundation, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Children's 
Vaccine Programme, for example, sponsor WHO's mass vaccination 
programmes and research on new vaccines important for countries in the 
developing world. 
Why are donors financing mass vaccination in the developing world? 
Three possible answers can be given. One is that the perceived risk of 
individuals in the donor countries is actually higher than the real risk of 
catching the disease. The recent outbreak of plague in India and Ebola in 
Zaire have sharpened the public mind and the perception of individual 
risk to an extent which doesn't reflect the actual risk. 
Secondly, the actual level of risk to donor countries arising from diseases 
prevalent in developing countries is increasing. Today's world is rapidly 
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'globalising' -with both legal and illegal migration and travel increasing 
continuously. This, inevitably, means a lot of people moving from the 
developing to the 'developed' world countries and vice versa. This raises 
the prospect of the re-occurrence of some eliminated diseases re- 
emerging in donor countries, Which might be at least partly controlled 
through an increase in vaccination rates in developing countries. A 
current case is Tuberculosis, which was thought to have been virtually 
eliminated by a variety of policies many years ago. Tuberculosis is now 
generally on the increase in most donor countries in particular among the 
prison population in the US and as an opportunistic disease among 
people suffering from AIDS. 
The third motive for donor financing is horizontal equity. The argument 
that no individual, regardless of income, should be denied access to 
medical care can be extended to individuals in other countries. Stiglitz 
(1986, p. 288) explains that "the view that there are goods and services, 
such as health care, whose availability to different individuals should not 
just depend on their income, is known as specific egalitarianism". Stiglitz 
also outlines the main criticism of that view. The relationship between 
medical care and life, according to some critics, appears to be weak, and 
other behavioural factors such as smoking, drinking, food, education and 
sexual behaviour play an equally important role in determining an 
individual's health. Few people would argue that food, perhaps as 
important as medical care in influencing a person's health status, should 
be provided free of charge. 
Today's vaccination policies provide a certain degree of prevention to the 
developed world (WHO's Expanded Programme of Immunisation, ER), 
although below the standard of the inclustrialised world. This seems to fall 
short of specific egalitarianism, but encompasses the view that everyone 
should have the right to a certain minimum of medical care in excess of 
what national health services in poor countries could afford to provide. 
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Motives to provide such care are perhaps best described as altruistic 
motives. Altruism has an increasingly important role to play in the 
provision of new vaccines, not least since the Bill and Linda Gates 
foundation kick-started the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunisation (GAVI) in Spring 2000 with the substantial donation of 
US$750m. 
Donors want to spend their money effectively and a considerable 
proportion of resources is spent on identifying good causes. The question 
remains whether altruistic behaviour can achieve a higher level of health 
provision than the market alone. If donors really were less risk-averse 
than private investors then one could expect more money overall to be 
invested in vaccine research because charitable money would invest in 
areas which are too risky for private investors. As outlined above, Arrow 
(1962) believes that charitable organisations are well equipped to take 
over that extra risk. The character of charitable funds may allow for more 
risk taking because people do not necessarily expect a market rate of 
return. 
Charitable institutions are, however, becoming ever more competitive and 
increasingly accountable for the cost-effectiveness of their programmes 
in order to attract money. Charities may worry even more about their 
donors than firms worry about their shareholders and as a result are 
more risk averse than firms. If this was the case, charitable money might 
simply chase similar development projects and replace some private 
funds. 
An overall increase in research funds might only be achieved, if 
investments go into projects with an expected private rate of return below 
the market rate but with a high social rate of return 5. Careful targeting 
and sound economic evaluation of new vaccine projects are required if 
these extra social gains are to materialise. 
Which, if the externality argument holds, would apply to many new vaccine projects. 
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3.9 Is government intervention justified in vaccine innovation? 
If there is market failure in inventive activity in general as Arrow suggests 
then there is also market failure in vaccine innovation. Even for those 
who do not subscribe to Arrow's view of systematic underinvestment in 
R&D there is ample evidence that vaccine markets are more prone to 
failure than, for instance, the market for therapeutic medicines. 
The Arrow-Demsetz argument really is an argument about the notion of 
'social optimality' as used in traditional economics. This is of course a 
very hard, if not impossible, criterion to make decisions by. As Demsetz 
(1969) rightly argues, the notion of social optimality emerged from 
welfare economics and assumed a static, certain world. Neither 
businesses nor governments operate in such a world and do not know 
what really is 'socially optimal'. In reality, both markets and governments 
are imperfect, but decisions still have to made using decision making 
criteria other than the optimality criterion. Decision makers then fall back 
on decision criteria such as cost-effectiveness, feasibility, social 
acceptability given that social optimality is elusive whilst random 
decisions are also clearly undesirable. 
Musgrove's (1999) decision tree, shown here in figure 3.2, provides a 
clear and unambiguous set of criteria, which can support the decision 
whether or not to publicly finance a particular health intervention in the 
world of real decision making instead of the static and certain world 
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Figure 3.2: Public resources for health care, source: Musgrove 1999, p. 
220 
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Positive externalities (although potentially weakened by incomplete 
vaccination), the impure public good character of vaccines, and the 
uncertainty of demand are part of a strong argument for government 
intervention. As outlined in Chapter Two, vaccines are considered one of 
the most cost-effective health measures which in the present scheme is a 
prerequisite for at least some public financing of existing or new vaccine 
projects. Even where significant externalities do not exist, the cost- 
effectiveness of vaccine products implies public financing where 
consumers are facing catastrophic costs, and are too poor to be insured 
to afford the purchase of vaccines via an insurance scheme. 
The above discussion also indicated that in the presence of market 
failure, government may potentially achieve a higher level of social 
benefit. Government action could, however, also have a negative effect 
on the delivery of new vaccines, depending on the way the health service 
and vaccination policies are administered. With a theoretical justification 
of government intervention in place, the effectiveness and focus of 
government policy will become a central issue in the latter part of this 
thesis. 
3.10 What is currently suggested to correct the outcome of the 
market for vaccine innovation? 
At a recent meeting of WHO, GAVI and industry representatives in 
Geneva it was acknowledged (WHO 2000b, p. 12) that: 
a although most of the basic scientific breakthroughs that made new 
vaccines possible were generated in the public sector (academic and 
government) research institutions, most of the cost for their clinical 
development, including the support of extensive phase 11 and phase III 
clinical trials, was borne by the 'big pharma' vaccine industry in 
industrialised countries". 
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These investments to bring a new vaccine to the market, which according 
to Wyeth-Lederle vaccines (WHO 2000b, p. 6) amounts to anything 
between 200 and 400 million US dollars, requires companies initially to 
charge a high unit price in order to recoup investments in those markets 
which can afford the product. Return on investment and the avoidance of 
unnecessary risks in doing so is undoubtedly influencing R&D decisions 
for new vaccine projects. 
However, as far as developing market vaccines are concerned, public- 
private partnerships seem to be of vital importance. The two typhoid and 
two cholera vaccines which have been licensed in the last 15 years 
underwent phase I to III clinical trials financed by the public sector, 
whereas vaccine companies provided formulations of the vaccines for the 
clinical triaIS6 . GAVI believes that at the 
least the very costly phase 11 
studies can be performed by public sector investigators at a fraction of 
the expense (WHO 2000b, pp. 16-17). 
GAVI will therefore consider two different approaches to synergise the 
development of new vaccines, a 'pull' mechanism which predominantly 
addresses the need of the industry to recoup investments, and a 'push' 
mechanism which emphasises the role of the public sector in partnering 
with industry to aid the development of high priority vaccines (WHO 
2000b, p. 21). 
The following table summarises the views expressed by representatives 
of the public and private sectors at the Geneva meeting on what push 
and pull strategies GAVI should employ to encourage industry to invest in 
developing market vaccines (WHO 2000b, p. 22): 
6 The manufacture of formulations for clinical trials (pilot lot formulations) is a very costly 
procedure due to strict Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) guidelines imposed by 
regulatory authorities. More about regulatory costs of vaccine development in chapter 5. 
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Table 3-3 
Ways forward to encourage industry to invest in developing market 
vaccines 
Push strategies I Pull strategies 
allow intellectual property coverage 
target vaccines which will also be 
purchased by tourists from 
industrialised countries who travel in 
developed countries 
public sector needs to quantify extent 
of future vaccine use 
shared costs of early pilot lot 
formulations (formulations for clinical 
trials) 
costs of phase I and 11 trials borne by 
public sector 
shared costs of phase III trials 
formation of joint public-private not- 
for-profit companies dedicated to 
specific vaccines 
increase access to pilot lot 
formulations for research teams 
stimulation of national demand 
developing guaranteed purchasing 
mechanisms 
providing realistic forecasts for vaccine 
use 
protection of intellectual property rights 
increasing government 
ownership/responsibility for national 
immunisation systems including the 
introduction of new vaccines 
availability of infrastructure for vaccine 
distribution 
advocacy of the vaccine 
demonstration that developing countries 
are credible and sustainable markets 
for new products 
vaccine prices that provide reasonable 
margin of profit 
Source: WHO 2000b 
Among the push strategies, access to pilot formulations and protection of 
property rights appear crucial for the successful development of a new 
vaccine. Public-private collaborations between academia and industry 
were also attributed a greater chance of success than industry effort 
alone to come up with a new formulation (WHO 2000b, p. 23). 
This view is shared by the US Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
(Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Research of America, 2001, p. 112), 
who, in a different context, stated that 
"we also need to keep the public-private partnership in pharmaceutical 
research strong. Attempts to harm this partnership- for example, by 
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putting restrictions on co-operative research agreements between drug 
companies and the National Institute of Health- should be rejected. 
[ ... ] Strong world-wide protection of pharmaceutical patents is 
essential to spur vigorous investment. " 
As far as 'pull' strategies are concerned the GAVI-industry working group 
states that "one of the central issues is credibility. Specifically, industry 
related its need to be able to demonstrate that there is a credible market 
for the new products that it develops" (WHO 2000b, p. 24). 
The importance of a guaranteed market for future vaccine has also been 
emphasised by Michael Kremer (2000) in a recent National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) publication. The author acknowledges that 
drug companies are sometimes forced to sell products at a price not high 
enough to cover R&D costs. The small market for developing countries 
vaccines which, as indicated earlier, amounts to no more than $200m a 
year, is not offering enough incentives to incur the huge costs of 
development. In Kremer's view a fund set aside for the purchase of a 
future vaccine would provide the right incentives, and, unlike R&D 
subsidies, public money would not be wasted should the industry's efforts 
to develop the desired vaccine not come to fruition. US$ 1 bn set aside 
by the World Bank for the purchase of future vaccines is currently 
awaiting approval by the bank's board. 
3.11 Concluding remarks 
This Chapter has outlined under which circumstances it makes possible 
economic sense for the public sector to promote the development of 
vaccine products. This results mainly from market imperfections, such as 
the existence of externalities, the public good aspect of vaccines and 
equity considerations. The issue of government failure was also briefly 
addressed, most notably in the context of incomplete vaccination which 
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could under certain circumstances lead to an overall increase of health 
care costs. 
The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation will be instrumental in 
encouraging industry to develop new vaccines for the developing world 
and a number of push and pull strategies will be employed which have 
been outlined above. 
Although these strategies were formulated in consultation with industry 
representatives, little is known about the likelihood of success of the 
individual measures. The relationship between property protection, 
market size and public-private cooperation, to name the most important 
factors, and firms' R&D behaviour in the field of biological products is, as 
yet, largely unexplored. 
This is, broadly speaking, the task of the following five chapters of the 
thesis. While Chapters Four, Five, and Six will be investigating 
relationships between market size, property right protection and other 
factors on the R&D behaviour of manufacturers of pharmaceutical and 
vaccine products, Chapters Seven and Eight will examine evidence on 
the question of whether public-private interaction in research in the 
specific area of biological products is more productive than private R&D 
alone. The related issue of knowledge flow and the associated mobility of 
scientists will be investigated in chapters nine and ten. 
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4 Innovation economics and R&D resource allocation in the 
Pharmaceutical industrv 
4.1 Background 
The literature on both innovation economics and pharmaceutical R&D is 
extensive, reflecting the fact that innovation is seen as one of the driving 
forces of economic growth. Further to that, pharmaceutical manufacturers 
are the biggest R&D spenders in some economies'. 
Compared to the aircraft and defence industries (two other R&D-intensive 
sectors), the vast majority of R&D investments in the pharmaceutical 
industry are financed by the industry itself with very little government aid, 
and are paid for primarily out of profit contributions from its current 
products. 
Pharmaceutical R&D is a very cost-intensive undertaking. It is estimated 
that today the development of a new molecular entity2 (NME) costs 500 
million US$ on average, which is largely due to the extremely costly 
screening process of newly synthesised compounds 3, and will take on 
average 14 years from the moment of discovery until market launch of a 
new drug (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
2001). 
'According to the Department for Trade and Industry (2000), the pharmaceutical sector 
is the most R&D intensive of all the main industrial sectors with average spending 
equivalent to 12.8 per cent of sales. The pharmaceutical sector carries out 40% of all 
corporate R&D in the UK with Astra Zeneca, Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham 
topping the table in 2000. 
2 The more familiar term New Chemical Entity (NCE) has been replaced with the term 
New Molecular Entity (NME) since new drug technology is no longer exclusively based 
on chemical processes but increasingly derived from the manipulation of living 
organisms (biotechnology). 
3 On average only one out of 6000 of these compounds are considered to be safe and 
effective enough to be brought to the market. 
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Contributions in the microeconomic branch of innovation economics, and 
pharmaceutical economics in particular, aim to explain the determinants 
of R&D spending by focusing on industry-specific characteristics, usually 
classified under the headings 'appropriability conditions', 'technological 
opportunities' and 'demand factors'. This literature is the starting point of 
the analysis since these three factors have inspired the debate on 
whether 'technology push' or 'demand pull' are responsible for bringing 
new vaccine products to the market (see chapter three). 
Before these specific microeconomic approaches are reviewed in greater 
detail, the section immediately following will give a brief overview of how 
innovation has entered both macro- and microeconomic thinking over the 
past 60 years. Later on, this chapter also reviews some contributions 
made by the finance literature which has lately influenced the work of 
pharmaceutical economists. 
The subsection 'resource allocation at the individual firm level' presents 
information on how individual companies allocate R&D resources. These 
case studies, although difficult to generalise, will help in assessing some 
of the assumptions made in industry studies. 
The chapter concludes with some reflections on the welfare effects of 
pharmaceutical pricing, trying to put allegations of 'unfair pricing of 
innovative drugs into perspective. 
4.2 The scope of innovation economics 
Innovation economics can be broadly separated into a microeconomic 
and macroeconomic approach. In macroeconomics, growth theorists use 
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the production function to explain economic growth 4. According to early 
Keynesian growth theory5 an economy's output and its rate of growth 
depends on the relative input of two factors of production: labour and 
capital. According to this view the transition from slow to rapid growth 
required a sustained rise in the rate of savings and investment. Use of 
this idea diffused rapidly to the planning agencies of newly independent 
countries. This model was also interpreted as: 
"consistent with the view that achieving sustained growth would be 
more difficult for capitalist economies than for economies in which the 
central planning apparatus would have more direct access to the 
instruments needed to force a rise in the savings rate and to allocate 
investment to its most productive uses6" (Ruttan 2001, p. 24). 
Solow (1957) introduced technical progress as a third factor into the 
production function. Whatever proportion of growth is not 'explained' by 
the conventional production function would then be picked up by that 
third factor, technical progress. This appears to be a useful explanation 
for differences in growth rates in periods with comparable relative factor 
inputs such as the post war surge in economic growth in the United 
States, where according to some authors only one third of the observed 
growth in output could be explained by the growth in the traditional inputs 
labour and capital (Beije 1998, p. 30). The remaining two thirds, 
sometimes called the 'measure of ignorance', were then attributed to 
factors which improved efficiency of the use of capital and labour, with 
technological change seen as the most important contributing force. 
The explanation of differences in growth rates and per capita income 
between countries was further pursued by what is now known as neo- 
4 See Dombusch and Fischer (1994, pp. 261-293) for a comprehensive introduction to 
the macroeconomics of growth and productivity 
5 See the work of Harrod (1939) and Domar (1947). 
6A view which proved rather far from the truth 
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classical growth theory. Considering diminishing returns in the production 
function then an increasing number of workers added to a given rate of 
capital will result in a declining growth rate. With the growth rate of capital 
depending on savings which in turn depend on income and income 
depending on the stock of capital this interdependence required further 
analysis. Neo-classical growth theory makes a number of important 
predictions. Once the economy has reached a so called steady state the 
growth rate of output is exogenous, i. e. independent of the savings rate. 
An increase in the savings rate increases the steady state level of income 
but not the rate at which income grows (Solow 1988). The steady growth 
rate of income per capita remains dependent on the rate of technical 
progress and the rate of population growth. Unless a new general 
purpose technology were to result in another spurt in the rate of 
productivity and output growth, the economy would remain at the steady 
state. This theory reverses the conclusions of the earlier Keynesian 
growth theories: technological change has replaced growth of capital 
equipment as the primary source of growth (Ruttan 2001, p. 24). 
Differences in growth rates between countries shouldn't persist in the 
long run according to this theory if each country has the same rate of 
population growth and access to the same technology. Although there is 
some evidence of convergence in growth rates between countries, this 
prediction proved unsatisfactory in the light of different growth 
experiences of different countries in the world over longer periods. 
Hence 'exogenous' neo-classical growth theory of the 50s and 60 was 
followed by a second period of research starting in the late 1980s 
creating neo-classical 'endogenous' growth theory7. In endogenous 
growth theory, the growth rate becomes determined within the theory. 
7 See Grupp 1998, p. 62 for a brief introduction into endogenous growth theory or original 
contributions by Romer (1986) and Romer (1994 ). 
78 
According to this theory the rate of technical progress is determined by 
the share of the economies' resources devoted to research and 
development, and the growth rate is determined by the savings rate via 
its effect on the rate of capital accumulation. 
What neo-classical growth theory does not attempt to explain, however, 
is what influences a firm's decision to devote more or less of its 
resources to innovation in any given year. 
Answers to this question are more likely to be found in microeconomic 
theory, and Joseph Schumpeter (1942) was one of the first economists to 
investigate factors influencing technological change at the firm level. In 
his work he emphasised the role of the entrepreneur in the application of 
knowledge and new technologies. Schumpeter also focuses on the 
relationship between innovation and market structure which confirms his 
position as the pioneer of the competition-theoretic branch of innovation 
theory. In Schumpeter's view, perfectly competitive markets are suitable 
for static resource allocation. Large firms operating in concentrated 
markets are however much more conducive to rapid technological 
change and long-run expansion of total output. Schumpeter challenged 
traditional antitrust ideology, claiming that welfare advantages derived 
from large firms operating in concentrated markets could outweigh 
welfare derived from perfectly competitive markets. 
Schumpeter's two main hypothesis, that a) innovation increases more 
than proportionately with firm size and b) innovation increases with 
market concentration, have been tested extensively. In a survey of the 
literature Cohen and Levin (1989, p. 1061) found that: 
"the empirical results bearing on the Schumpeterian hypothesis are 
inconclusive, in large part because investigators have failed to take 
systematic account of more fundamental sources of variation in the 
innovative behaviour and performance of firms and industries. " 
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More important in the context of research policy is Cohen and Levin's 
(1989, p. 106 1) statement that: 
"the more general task of identifying and evaluating other, perhaps 
more fundamental, determinants of technological progress in industry 
has received little attention relative to the effort devoted to exploring 
the effects of size and market structure. " 
One of these efforts came from game-theoretical contributions which 
offer some insight into interdependencies between firms' R&D decisions. 
Among others, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) have looked at patent races 
where the value of one firm's patent depends on how much another firm 
spends on R&D. In a deterministic setting8 the first firm to win a patent 
gets the entire market and the more money is spent on R&D the shorter 
is the time to develop the product. If two firms have the same research 
capabilities then it can be shown that in a Nash equilibrium only one firm 
will undertake R&D at all. If two firms spend the same amount they both 
have the same chance of winning the race and one firm is bound to be 
frustrated because it gets no return at all. In equilibrium a firm will spend 
exactly the amount it expects as a return on its investment. If the firm 
spent any less, the other firm could outspend it and win the patent race 
while still earning a positive profit. 
In a probabilistic setting an increase in R&D spending no longer 
guarantees that the firm will win the patent race but increases the 
probability it does win the race. The individual firm's decision by how 
much to increase its R&D spending will then depend on a number of 
factors, such as absolute R&D productivity, its productivity relative to that 
of other firms, the other firm's response to an increase in outlays and the 
total number of firms undertaking R&D. 
8 See Besanko, Dranove, Shanley (1996, pp. 589-593) for a brief, non-technical 
introduction into deterministic and probabilistic patent races. 
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Outside the realm of game theory the most encompassing approach to 
explaining firms' R&D behaviour is offered by Dosi (1982,1988,1997) 
who regards innovations as a problem-solving process which is initially 
built upon a key scientific principle, for example genetic engineering. The 
innovation process then follows along a 'technological trajectory', a term 
originally used in Nelson and Winter's (1982) evolutionary theory of 
economic change. 
Along the way, two factors influence R&D decisions, appropriability and 
technological opportunity. In Dosi's view these two conditions differ from 
industry to industry but also between firms within an industry. Hence his 
approach attempts to explain not only inter-industry differences but also 
intra-industry differences in technological innovation. This is of course 
relevant for the purpose of this study which aims to model R&D 
behaviour with regard to a product group within an industry. 
4.3 From technological opportunities to technological trajectories 
Explaining the role of technological opportunities, Dosi (1988, p. 1136) 
states that: 
"scientific knowledge plays a crucial role in opening up new 
possibilities of major technological advance. In this century, the 
emergence of major new technological paradigms has frequently been 
directly dependent and directly linked with major scientific 
breakthroughs; see for example the origin of synthetic chemistry... ". 
Clearly industries differ in terms of opportunities they face for technical 
advance. It is, however, difficult to make differences in technological 
opportunities a testable hypothesis. In his quantitative studies Scherer 
(1965,1982) has classified industries into a small number of technology 
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groups, such as chemical, electrical, mechanical, and was able to explain 
variance in patenting activity in these industries. 
One of the most extensive qualitative surveys measuring technological 
opportunities and appropriability9 conditions was undertaken by 
researchers at Yale University and discussed by Levin et al. (1987). R&D 
personnel in 650 firms in 142 sectors of activity were asked to rate the 
importance of variables representing technological opportunities and 
appropriability conditions on a semantic scale. Among the factors stated 
as having a varying but significant impact on innovative activity were a) 
the contribution of basic and applied science, b) contribution of other 
sources of technical knowledge, e. g. upstream suppliers or downstream 
users of technology, c) university research, d) institutional factors such as 
public agencies research (e. g. the military) and e) independent inventors. 
Subsequent studies have looked at each of these factors individually. 
Dosi (1988, p. 1136) emphasises the "nature and interest of bridging 
institutions" between pure research and economic applications, or 
technology transfer as it is often called, a factor which has become very 
influential in biotech industries, where a large number of today's firms are 
commercial spin-offs from university research departments. Also the role 
of government in financing or undertaking its own research has been 
widely acknowledged. 
Case study literature has further supported the notion of technologies 
developing along 'natural trajectories'. Cohen and Levin (1989, p. 1086) 
suggest, that "technological development proceeds along a relatively 
clear path, as if moving toward some physical limit. ... Engineers ... 
repeatedly focus on a particular class of engineering problems, drawing 
upon or strengthening a familiar method or solution. " 
A detailed explanation of appropriability conditions will follow in the next section. 
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This is what Teece (1988) refers to as a 'lock-in' phenomenon, doing 
what has been done in the past. David (1985) explains how the 
QWERTY keyboard arrangement became locked in through the forces of 
technical interrelatedness between a typist's memories and the typewriter 
design, economies of scale due to a decline in user costs once QWERTY 
becomes standard, and quasfiffeversibility of investment once typists 
have been trained on the specific keyboardlo. 
Nelson and Winter's Evolutionary Theory of Technological Change 
(1982, p. 14) also claims that behaviour patterns of a firm are replaced by 
'routine': 
gla term that includes characteristics that range from well-specified 
technical routines producing things, procedures for hiring and firing, 
ordering new inventory, or stepping up production of items in high 
demand to policies regarding investment, research and development 
(R&D) . ..... 
Ruttan (2001) claims that most technological trajectories will eventually 
come to an end. Once scale economies are exhausted and profits 
decline, pressure will focus scientific and technical effort on breaking 
technological barriers that lock technology into inferior or obsolete 
trajectories. 
This is called the S-curve effect in some accounts (Foster 1986). The 
standard hypothesis is that eventually diminishing returns set into a 
technical trajectory, yielding an S-curve like the one shown in figure 4.1. 
1c) Ruttan (2001, p. 112-116) points out that these characteristics are sometimes bundled 
under the rubric of 'positive network externalities' and gives further examples of what he 
calls the 'path dependence' of technical change. 
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Figure 4-1 
Performance of Discontinuity 
Technology * -------------- 00. 
time Source: Foster 1986, p. 102 
Foster (1986) also argues that we often see- S-curves coming along in 
succession, old sources of competitive advantage being replaced with by 
new ones as indicated in the above diagram. This, of course, 
corresponds to Schumpeter's creative destruction and more recent 
strategic management work, for example by d'Aveni (1994). 
This could cause the problem of an increasingly empty pool of knowledge 
and hence a historical decline in research efficiency identified by 
Grabowski in the case of the pharmaceutical industry. Grabowski quotes 
former FDA Commissioner Schmidt (Grabowski 1978, p. 139): 
"As the gaps in biomedical knowledge decrease, so do the 
opportunities for the development of new or useful related drugs. This 
does not reflect a loss of innovative capacity, but rather reflects the 
normal course of a growth industry as it becomes technologically more 
mature. " 
As shown by the declining number of new single entity drugs approved in 
the U. S., England, France and Germany, this is an international and still 
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ongoing phenomenon. According to the Centre of Medicines Research 
(CMR International News 19/2001, p. 10) the year 2000 witnessed the 
launch of only 32 new molecular entities, down from 41 in 1999 and the 
lowest number since 1979. In 1991, a total 53 new molecular entities 
were launched. 
The notion of an emptying pool of knowledge in medical research has 
been met with some criticism. Some have argued that the rate of 
development of significant and truly useful new drugs has remained 
stable over the years. Others claim that massive expenditure on basic 
biomedical research could indeed create a renewed pool of knowledge 
which could offset the trend toward a depletion of opportunities. Dosi in 
particular (1988, p. 1138) has shown that decreasing returns to research 
did not emerge historically. Especially in the pharmaceutical industry 
biotechnology has had great effects on the efficiency of search for new 
drugs. 
Margaret Sharp (1990) has investigated Dosi's notion of technological 
trajectories in the context of biotechnology. Sharp explains (1990, p. 94), 
that: 
"much innovation is continuous and incremental within the firm, 
resulting from a combination of demand and cost pressures, on the 
one hand, and learning by doing on the other. However from time to 
time radical innovations emerge, which ... far from being a part of a 
continuous stream of innovation, represent a major jump, or 
discontinuity in technological progress. " 
The former continuous process of innovation emerges along a 
technological trajectory while the latter technological jump establishes a 
new technological paradigm. Firms tend to undertake research along 
lines which are familiar to them and build in-house expertise in these 
areas and reinforce that expertise (ibid., p. 95). This continues until the 
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existing technological paradigm or routine is superseded by another one, 
which again offers a new set of technological trajectories to be pursued 
by firms. While firms are able to protect their competitive position in the 
process of building up expertise along an existing trajectory, the complete 
change of paradigm or the fundamentals of science offers an opportunity 
for new firms to enter the market. 
In Nelson and Winter's view (1982), in order to survive firms search for 
better techniques and those which succeed are 'selected' by the market, 
a process which, again, resembles Schumpeter's concept of creative 
destruction. According to Ruttan (2001, p. 116) once scale economies 
are exhausted and, as a result, profits decline, the "pressure of growth in 
demand will focus scientific and technical effort on breaking the 
technological barriers that lock technology into inferior or obsolete 
trajectories". 
In biotechnology Sharp (1990) identifies three of these distinct paradigm 
changes, the First, Second and Third Generation Biotechnology, here 
shown in figure 4.2.: 
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Figure 4-2 Three generations of Biotechnology and trajectories evolving 
from third generation Biotechnology (taken from Sharp 1990, p. 99) 
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While Second Generation Biotechnology led scientists to discover cures 
for life-threatening diseases caused by micro-organisms and prevention 
of diseases through vaccination, it is the Third Generation Biotechnology 
which has created the new technological paradigm of genetic 
engineering. 
The cuffing and splicing of genes has opened up a range of new 
trajectories in the fields of medicine, chemistry and agriculture. In 
agriculture, genetically modified plants and seeds, or GM crops, have 
caused considerable controversy. Despite the fact that these seeds or 
plants have certain desirable characteristics, such as resistance to 
particular herbicides or indeed the pest itself, the public (at least in 
Europe) has been reluctant to accept genetically-modified foods which in 
turn has severely hampered the commercial prospects of the new 
technology. 
It is the field of pharmaceuticals which is the most important new 
trajectory, because it offers the prospect of finding cures for diseases 
previously untreatable and as a result potentially large commercial 
rewards for those companies at the forefront of the new science. 
Historically, pharmaceutical firms' research capabilities consisted of 
large-scale screening of new substances for potential therapeutic 
properties. Piachaud and Lynas (2000, p. 11) outline how the process of 
discovery of new substances has changed with the advent of 
biotechnology: "New substances were instead identified through the 
examination of the basic function of cells. This then signalled the shift 
toward biology as the primary science as opposed to organic chemistry. " 
Identifying new drugs now required competencies well beyond the 
traditional skills of the pharmaceutical industry and more likely to be 
found in the vicinity of research-active university departments. 
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Gambardella (1993, p. 188) explains the importance of the new field of 
drug design: 
"The growth of basic information about the biology of the human body 
offers more solid knowledge about the nature of altered equilibria 
before developing an appropriate remedy. Scientists can then design 
an 'ideal' compound that is expected to counteract the undesired 
state. " 
Drug design in turn is greatly facilitated by development of recombinant 
DNA (rDNA), the ability to combine genetic material from different 
sources, e. g. from two different m icro-orga n isms, to create a DNA 
sequence with specific properties. The initial discovery of the rDNA 
technique by Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer" in 1973 started not only 
the foundation of commercial biotechnology but also a burst of scientific 
innovation (Zucker et al., 1998, p. 291). 
The discovery of monoclonal antibodies originally resulted in a separate 
technological trajectory (see chart) with important applications in the field 
of diagnostics. Monoclonal antibodies are derived from the fusing of an 
antibody with for instance cancer cells and can be used for in vitro 
diagnosis of diseases since the growth characteristics of one cell are 
combined with the specificity of the other (Sharp 1990, p. 100). 
Subsequently it was discovered that monoclonal antibodies also allowed 
drugs to be delivered to specific targets without harming healthy cells and 
tissues. The combined benefits of the two techniques (DNA and 
monoclonal antibodies) presented a new set of opportunities for 
medicinal research, and formed the basis for targeted pharmaceutical 
R&D (Piachaud and Lynas, 2000, pp. 5-6). 
11 Herbert Boyer founded in 1977 one of the first Biotech companies, Genentech, 
together with the venture capitalist Robert Swanson. 
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Certainly the discovery of rDNA techniques marks the beginning of a new 
era of drug discovery and a new technological trajectory. The extent to 
which genetic engineering has influenced innovative activity in firms is 
difficult to verify, at least empirically. Zucker et al (1998, p. 291) believe 
that: 
"at least for the first 10 or 15 years, the innovations which underlie 
biotechnology are properly analysed in terms of naturally excludable 
knowledge held by a small initial group of discoverers .... Ultimately the 
knowledge spread sufficiently widely to become part of routine science 
which could be learned at any major research university. " 
This view is shared by Sharp (1990, p. 101), who believes that "cloning 
genes is now regarded as everyday experience to such a degree that 
every graduate student in molecular biology knows how to do it. " From 
the above it becomes obvious that the new knowledge diffuses only 
gradually within the scientific community and any surge in innovative 
activity would be just as gradual as firms start to tap into the scientific 
community in search of personnel who can master the new technique. 
One well-known phenomenon has been the emergence of a large 
number of small biotech companies dedicated to the commercial 
exploitation of the new technological paradigm. To what extent the 
emergence of this new technological trajectory may have caused a surge 
in investment in the field of vaccines will be evaluated in greater detail in 
Chapter Six. 
No matter what opportunities or trajectories arise, the sole consideration 
of what is technically possible, i. e. supply conditions, would ignore 
another important determinant of commercial success, demand. Given 
any level of technological opportunity "the incentive to commit resources 
to their discovery and development will depend [... ] on the incentives that 
interested motivated agents perceive in terms of expected economic 
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returns", as Dosi (1988, p. 1139) pointed out, and the ability to 
appropriate these returns will depend on so-called appropriability 
conditions, which we turn to next. 
4.4 Appropriability conditions 
According to Dosi (1988,1997) and Dosi and Nelson (1994) 
'appropriability' concerns the properties of technological knowledge, 
technical artefacts, markets, and the legal environment that permit 
innovations and protect them as rent-yielding assets against competitors' 
imitation. 
As in other industries, the state protects the innovative activities of the 
pharmaceutical industry by granting patents so that the imitation of 
products is prohibited for the duration of the patent. Without effective 
patent protection, imitators could use the R&D efforts of the innovative 
firm without having to compensate the innovator for R&D expenses 
incurred. Investment in innovation would not pay off since any imitator 
could offer the same product immediately after the development at a 
lower price. 
Levin et al's qualitative survey (1987) suggests that patents are of varying 
importance for industry. In general patents have been quoted by R&D 
personnel as the least effective means of securing a competitive 
advantage achieved through innovation. Secrecy, the ability to move 
quickly down the learning curve, cost advantages and superior sales and 
service all score higher on industry average. Patents are, however, 
significant for the pharmaceutical industry, and some branches of 
mechanical and electrical engineering. These findings are confirmed by 
Mansfield (1986) who asked a sample of 100 firms from different 
industrial sectors about the percentage of innovations that would not 
have been developed over a given period without patent protection in 
place. According to this survey, 65% of pharmaceutical inventions would 
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not have been introduced in the absence of patent protection. The figures 
were much lower for the chemical industry (30%), petroleum, machinery, 
and metal products (10-20%) and less than 10% for electrical equipment, 
instruments, primary metals, office equipment, motor vehicles, rubber 
and textiles. 
In Europe patent protection is usually granted for 20 years. Inevitably a 
pharmaceutical company applies for a patent at a very early stage in the 
research process. The component will then have to undergo non-clinical 
and clinical trials and the final licensing procedure of the national drug 
administration so that on average another 14 years pass by until a 
patented NCE can finally be launched (Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America, 2001, p. 112). The effective patent protection 
during which the product is making valuable contribution to current R&D 
programmes is then only 6 years on average. 
Another feature of pharmaceutical innovation is the empirical character of 
research. An element of chance is highly significant in the process of 
pharmaceutical R&D since there is still only limited understanding of how 
drugs work. This causes problems when it comes to patent protection of 
New Molecular Entities (NMEs). Usually a large number of similar 
molecules are protected together with the molecule that proved to be 
effective. But there remains a number of molecules which also work but 
which are not covered by the patent. This makes imitation possible for 
the competitor and it is believed that patent protection alone is not 
sufficient to protect a newly developed product for the duration of the 
patent. Innovative manufacturers have to devise other means to protect 
their profit contribution at least for the duration of the patent, the most 
important one of which is the ability to move quickly down the learning 
curve. 
This role is fulfilled by the firm's R&D department which constitutes a 
dynamic barrier to entry into the market (Schellhaass 1986). The R&D 
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department is obliged to speed up technical progress to the extent that 
the imitator cannot catch up. Ideally the imitator will be unable to develop 
a copy of the original drug before the innovator has launched an 
improved follow-up product. The imitator should then be unable to 
develop the original product at the same pace as the innovator. The only 
way the imitator could match this performance is to have a similarly 
powerful R&D department at its disposal as the innovator. Due to the lack 
of experience and the concentration of knowledge in the scientific 
community, this is highly unlikely. 
A second advantage for the innovator results from this creation of a 
knowledge gap. Once the innovator is unchallenged for a number of 
years, a substantial proportion of the necessary profit contribution has 
already been generated. The imitator now faces a dilemma. Any 
investment in a powerful enough R&D department would incur cost which 
are potentially sunk in case of exiting the market. The imitator may also 
face the threat of a limit-pricing strategy by the innovator which could 
potentially drive the imitator out of the market. The R&D department is 
called a 'dynamic entry barrier', since it requires a continuous investment 
in R&D facilities by the innovator. Should it cease to do that the barrier 
will erode. But only static barriers (patents) and dynamic barriers together 
enable the innovator to pursue a pricing policy which is not primarily 
designed to fight off competitors but serves the purpose of yielding profit 
contributions significant enough to finance current R&D projeCtS12. 
The existence of patent protection (or the lack of it) is, however, not the 
only appropriability condition. Many attempts have been made to test the 
12 Whether an innovator has a 'first mover advantage' will not only depend on the 
strength of protection from patents and lead time, but also the uncertainty of the R&D 
project, the existence of network externalities and the need of the buyer to invest in 
complementary resources. Sometimes leaders do stumble: the IBM PC springs to mind, 
but also De Haviland's first commercial jet engine (the Comet) which proved to be 
unstable. The follower, Boeing (successfully launching the 707), dominated the market 
for commercial jet planes for many years subsequently. 
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impact of other regulatory measures on the pharmaceutical industry. 
Early studies date back to the 1960s, when the regulations imposed by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US were amended in 
1962. New drugs had previously been tested for toxicity alone; they were 
now required to show improved efficacy as well. The FDA was also given 
greater influence over the drug evaluation process 13 . The decline in new 
drug introductions which followed was widely believed to be a direct 
result of the amendments and provided valuable testing ground for the 
new discipline of pharmaceutical economics. 
Martin Bailey (1972) attempted to separate technological opportunity 
factors from regulatory factors using pre- and post- amendment data in 
his sample. His results supported both the research depletion and 
regulation hypothesis. Grabowski and Vernon's (1978, p. 143) re- 
estimation of Bailey's study is reproduced here (t-statistics in 
parentheses) as an example of an early model used to illustrate the 
effect of regulatory changes specifically in the pharmaceutical industry: 
13 The reason for this was a health scare resulting from an investigatory drug and more 
Importantly the belief that the US pharmaceutical industry over the years had used its 
monopoly power to keep prices well above cost of goods sold. Furthermore the 
commission which led the inquiry argued that little of social value arose from industry 
research. Molecules were simply manipulated and the resulting new drugs presented 
little therapeutic advantage over the old ones, but could however be sold at higher prices 
due to patent protection. 
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Log (Nt/Et) = -0.88 (2.40) - 2.26Dt (8.63) - 0.003Pt (0.23) 
R2=0.88 DW = 1.60 
Nt number of NCEs introduced and discovered by US firms in year t 
Et average industry deflated R&D expenditure for ethical drugs in the US in 
years t-4, t-5, and t-6 (assumed fixed five year lag form R&D outlay to 
introduction) 
Dt =a zero-one dummy variable representing the effect of regulation (=I after 
1961) 
Pt = 1/7 EM t-v v ranging from 7 to 13, where Mt is total number of new drugs 
Introduced from all sources (seven year moving average of past introductions 
as proxy variable for depletion) 
While Bailey could show that R&D productivity (expressed as NCEs per 
dollar of R&D invested) was statistically significantly related to proxy 
variables for regulation and research depletion, Grabowski and Vernon's 
re-estimation (ibid. ) using additional and more recent data finds that the 
depletion variable becomes statistically insignificant. 
Wiggins (1983a) examined the effects of the 1962 drug amendments on 
the level of research spending in the pharmaceutical industry. His 
findings indicate that regulation had a major impact on new drug 
introductions in the US. Regulation influenced new introductions directly 
and indirectly via its impact on research spending. Wiggins estimates that 
introduction rates have been reduced by as much as 60% due to the 
1962 amendments. In another study Wiggins (1983b) shows that the 
response of pharmaceutical research expenditure to regulation is not 
immediate but lagged by a number of periods. 
In a subsequent study, Wiggins (1984) used disaggregated data to show 
how development in different therapeutic classes has been affected by 
the 1962 amendments. The decline was significantly more pronounced in 
the areas of anti-infectives and drugs affecting the Central Nervous 
System (CNS) than in other therapeutic classes although these two areas 
were not more strictly regulated than other classes. Wiggins argues that 
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about half of the decline in new introductions could be explained by 
regulatory factors. 
Grabowski (1997,2000) has subsequently expanded this basic 
framework and introduced cost of finance effects; these models will be 
discussed further below, in Section 4.6. and Chapter Six. 
4.5 Demand factors 
Griliches (1957), Schmookler (1962), and Vernon (1966,1979) 
emphasise the importance of demand factors in explaining technological 
change. 
Schmookler (1962) showed that output of capital goods and capital 
expenditures led output of relevant capital goods patents, Griliches 
(1957) demonstrated the role of demand for the invention and diffusion of 
hybrid maize, while Vernon (1966,1979) attempted the same for 
consumer durables. 
This set off the debate whether 'demand pull' (or demand for innovation), 
or 'technology push' (or supply of innovation), was the driving force 
behind technical change. 
The view behind Schmookler's demand pull hypothesis is that a common 
pool of scientific knowledge and technological opportunity is available at 
any time and that it takes large and growing markets for industry to start 
investing in applied research and the exploitation of this pool. 
In response Cohen and Levin (1989, p. 1080) argue, that Schmookler: 
"never attempted to test the maintained hypothesis that the supply 
conditions for innovation (technological opportunities) were uniform 
across industries. Schmookler's proposition that demand almost alone 
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determines the rate and direction of technical change has not survived 
empirical scrutiny. The consensus, after dozens of case studies, is that 
the Marshallian scissors cuts with two blades. " 
Scherer (1982) found in comparing technology and demand variables 
that both were significant in four different industries. Technology 
variables however explained more of the variance. 
The relationship between market demand and innovative activity, which 
seems to have at least some significance, needs further clarification. 
Demand for an innovation would be estimated before the product is 
actually developed. The relationship is likely to be stronger where an 
innovation would substitute an existing product or process for which data 
about market size is available. Entirely new products, such as a cure 
against a previously untreatable disease, would be developed in the 
knowledge that a 'need' exists and that a market could be created. 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1979, p. 140) point out that demand-pull 
hypotheses must base themselves on the precise concept of a 
systematic relationship between prices and quantities i. e. demand, 
devolving from the constellation of consumer preferences and income. In 
their view most empirical studies rarely make a distinction between 
'needs' and 'demand' "as a result of which the relationship of the need 
recognition category to market demand as a motivating or controlling 
influence is tenuous indeed" (ibid., p. 140). The authors also point out 
that the most radical of innovations were the least responsive to needs 
and that the demand-pull case is weakest for the most significant 
innovations. 
This is not necessarily at odds with the demand-pull hypothesis. It is the 
less dramatic innovations, replacing already existing products in the 
same category, for which reasonable demand estimates exist and which 
are plausibly developed as a response to expected demand. Dramatic 
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innovations by comparison are scarce. They are often unexpected, 
discovered by accident, and life-changing to an extent that consumers 
may not even have expressed a need because they were unaware that 
such a need existed. Think for instance of the Personal Computer, and 
the VCR. The fact that demand-pull cannot be established for the most 
dramatic innovations (which would create their own markets) does not 
mean that is has no influence on the majority of minor ones. 
Mowery and Rosenberg's criticism does, however, indirectly address the 
real shortcoming of the demand pull/supply push framework, the lack of 
recognition of the role of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur foresees 
demand, and then creates an entirely new product that does not yet exist. 
Both are entrepreneurial acts of visualisation and implementation. The 
Sony Walkman is an often cited example of sheer entrepreneurial 
persistence to meet potential demand in the face of tremendous technical 
difficulties. 
Another conceptual criticism of the demand-pull hypothesis is the 
identification problem raised by Mowery and Rosenberg (1979). Demand- 
pull would assume a rightward shift in the demand curve. The resulting 
observed increase in the quantity may of course have been a result of 
that shift but could also have been caused by a shift of the supply curve, 
e. g. because technological improvements or cost reductions in general 
make it possible to sell the product at a lower price. In other words, any 
empirical study establishing a relationship between the quantity 
demanded and R&D investment may mistakenly interpret the quantity 
increase as a result of a demand shift, when in reality it has been caused 
by technology push. Most quantitative empirical studies (Schmookler's for 
example) are looking at changes in revenue, and an increase in revenue 
can of course be associated with a shift in demand, a decrease in prices 
resulting from a shift of supply, or both. 
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4.6 The R&D investment decision and capital market imperfections 
Outside the realm of innovation economics, conventional investment 
theory has acknowledged that investment is influenced not only by the 
expected future profitability of a project but also the cost of capital. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) maintained that real firm decisions are 
independent of purely financial factors such as internal liquidity, debt 
leverage, or dividend payments. In line with this argument, neo-classical 
investment theory postulates that firms' investment decisions are 
influenced by the cost of capital as set in centralised securities markets 
that does not depend on the financial structure of the firm. More recently 
Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hubbard (1998) have highlighted information 
imperfections in credit markets, which has led some authors to argue that 
problems of asymmetric information (in particular in the case of smaller 
and less established firms), leads to a gap between the cost of external 
and internal financing. As Hubbard (1998) points out: 
"in the presence of incentive problems and costly monitoring of 
managerial actions, external suppliers of funds to firms require higher 
return to compensate them for these monitoring costs and the 
potential moral hazard associated with managers' control over the 
allocation of investment funds". 
The extent of what is essentially an agency problem, will depend on the 
degree of newness of the product and the size of the firm. Consider the 
matrix of possibilities in table 4.1: 
99 
Table 4-1 
Large/established firm Small/entirely new firm 
Well-known, existing Modigliani-Miller low Hubbard. higher 
product monitoring costs monitoring costs 
Entirely new product e. g.: Sony Walkman; e. g.: Dotcoms; 
UMTS mobile phones Small Biotech firms 
Hubbard attributes monitoring costs mainly to small or new firms. 
Monitoring costs could also be high if an established firm launches 
entirely new products. Large firms have in the past introduced some 
disastrous new products; the Ford Edsel is the classic example. More 
recently, mobile telephone companies have seen their credit ratings 
reduced after their successful bidding for fou rth-gene ration mobile 
telephone licenses. As a result, the cost of external finance is likely to go 
up since a lower rating reflects a higher probability of the firm defaulting 
on its debts. 
The case of small firms launching entirely new products is perhaps the 
most interesting and applies particularly to small biotech firms and 
Internet start-up companies. Banks could be backing complete failures or 
the next Microsoft, and expected returns are extremely difficult to 
estimate. 'Bubbles' -as well as bursting bubbles- in the stock of such 
companies are particularly likely. For some of these firms debt finance 
will be prohibitively expensive or is simply not available and they rely on 
venture capitalists to provide the necessary equity capital. 
Empirical studies of firm investment support the link between changes in 
net worth and investment due to information problems in financial 
markets, as for instance Auerbach (1984), Fazzari et al. (1988) and 
Hubbard (1998) have demonstrated. This is consistent with a difference 
in cost of external and internal funding and a positive relationship 
between cash flow and investment spending given investment 
opportunities are constant. 
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Grabowski has, for the pharmaceutical industry, expanded his earlier 
empirical work and introduced such cash flow effects alongside demand 
effects. In a recent study Grabowski (1997) estimated the following 
equation for the period 1974 - 1989 using a sample of 11 US 
pharmaceutical companies (t-statistics in parentheses): 
R= -0.20 (-7.00) + 0.741marg (6.58) + 0.27 Cashfl (9.88) + 0.005 
Pcpharm (4.57) 
R2/F = 0.71/140.8 
R= Companies' R&D expenditure deflated by sales 
Imarg = Industry margin, average pre-tax profits as percent of sales 
Cashfl = profits after taxes, plus depreciation, plus R&D costs, divided by sales, 
lagged by two years 
Pcpharrn = percentage of total firm sales accounted for by pharmaceutical sales 
All coefficients are significant and support the hypothesis that a firm's 
research intensity is sensitive to expected returns (expressed as the 
industry's profit margin and the relative importance of pharmaceutical 
sales) and the relative cost of funds expressed as cash flow. 
In a further study, Grabowski (2000) demonstrated that research 
intensity, defined as R&D divided by sales, also depended on past sales 
of new introductions as a proxy for expected returns, besides the industry 
profit margin and cash flow as a proxy for the availability of internal funds. 
Grabowski's model will be used in a modified form in the empirical 
section in chapter six and is hence referred to in greater detail further 
below. 
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4.7 Allocation of R&D resources at the individual firm level 
Although these empirical studies make some reasonable and often 
statistically significant assumptions about the determinants of R&D 
spending in the industry, relatively little is documented about how 
individual firms organise the process of R&D allocation. 
One industry representative explains that at Pfizer pharmaceuticals the 
"decision making process is based on epidemiology, on medical need 
and scientific do-ability. The therapeutic areas we wish to focus on are 
those with high populations and high medical need, based on the 
burden to the patient and/or to the health service by virtue of there 
being no adequate treatment" (Samuels 1997, p. 16). 
This confirms the importance of demand/need and technological 
opportunity in the innovation economics framework discussed above. 
The following chart illustrates how Pfizer has set priorities at the time. 
Except for an AIDS vaccine and Hepatitis no other vaccine-preventable 
diseases are listed. The HIV vaccine is however ranked higher than a 
cure for HIV, simply because the number of people vaccinated would 
exceed the number of people treated. This however also illustrates the 
importance of market size. While undoubtedly the number of people in 
need of vaccination is a significant proportion of the world adult 
population, most of these would be found in countries unable to pay for 
an expensive vaccine, i. e. result in insufficient demand for the product. 
This may partially explain why anti-AIDS drugs have been marketed 
successfully and are already administered in the developed world while 
an effective vaccine is still years away from commercialisation. 
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Figure 4-3 
Medical need and patient population as driving forces of R&D allocation 
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At Pfizer, investment projects will compete for funding internally and 
multidisciplinary groups (including scientists, marketing and market 
research personnel) will allocate resources to specific research 
opportunities which will be reviewed regularly. Cockburn and Henderson 
(1997) have found this kind of peer review process for resource allocation 
in other pharmaceutical firms as well. 
Projects are no longer pursued when the science proves 'too difficult' to 
master or when a competitor's research makes the pursuit of the 
company's project irrelevant (Samuels 1997). Industry representatives 
also emphasise the importance of partnerships with the science base, 
such as universities, the heavily research-oriented biotech sector and 
institutions such as the National Institute of Health in the US or the 
Medical Research Council in the UK. 
The second case is Glaxo Wellcome, which uses six criteria to select a 
development portfolio (Sully 1997). The first three address the 
commercial opportunities of a product; they are: net present value, unmet 
need (derived from market research with opinion leaders) and what is 
referred to as "strength of value proposition", a preliminary assessment of 
cost versus income profile, and as such a rough indicator of profitability. 
Another two criteria correspond to Pfizer's notion of scientific do-ability. 
Glaxo Wellcome uses the terms strength of scientific rationale and 
development probability, assessing the ability to meet the defined product 
profile for the former, the latter attributes a probability of successful 
development to each stage of the development process. Measure 
number six assesses the extent of strategic fit with the current portfolio 
and general strategic direction of the company. 
A computer spreadsheet will then create an overall score and a rank 
order of individual projects. Different weightings are used for different 
stages of the development process. While early stages are more likely to 
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be driven by scientific rationale, during later stages net present value 
becomes more important. This also reflects the fact that the quality of 
commercial estimates increases in the later stages of a project. Unmet 
need, for instance, is a more reliable proxy for market size during the 
early stages, than an estimate of income streams. As the project moves 
towards market launch more market research is undertaken which in turn 
improves the quality of cash flow estimates. Another important aspect is 
the overall balance in the research portfolio. The relatively few high- 
return, high feasibility projects must be complemented with high- 
feasibility, low-return projects (such as variations on existing products) 
and high-risk, high-return projects, such as promising new compounds at 
very early stages of the development cycle. 
Glaxo Wellcome finds that returns to R&D projects are diminishing (Sully 
1997). This is illustrated in the following figure: 





Cumulative development costs 
Source: Sully (1997), Glaxo Wellcome 
Sully (1997) notes that if the above curve should ever start to dip, this 
would be a logical point to cut back on R&D spending. The notion of 
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diminishing returns to R&D is important because once costs of finance 
are taken into consideration, the cut-off point for further funding would be 
where the cost of the last project is equal to the return of the last project. 
This kind of marginal analysis is proposed by Shepherd (1990), here 
presented in figure 4.5: 
Figure 4-5 
Rate of return expected on R&D expenditures in % 
AL 
Fixed R&D budget 
Marginal rate of return 







RI Level of R&D expenditure 
Source: Shepherd (1990, p. 147) 
In Shepherd's view all R&D projects (131, P2, P3 etc. ) are listed from left 
to right according to the expected return on investment. Firms will spend 
money on additional projects as long as the return on investment is 
positive and up to the point until either the fixed R&D budget is exhausted 
or the cost of funds are equal to the return on the last R&D project, in the 
latter case resulting in the level of R&D expenditure R1. 
While Shepherd assumes constant cost of funds, Grabowski's (2000) 
marginal analysis of the R&D spending decision shows a rising cost of 
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funds curve, reflecting the higher cost of external finance when compared 
to internal sources of finance (see section 4.6 above). Grabowski's model 
will be referred to in greater detail in the empirical part of this thesis in 
chapter 6. 
4.8 Some comments on 'excessive' returns on R&D and welfare 
The ability to appropriate returns on R&D investment will also depend on 
whether the innovator is able to set prices freely or whether a regulator 
sets a limit on drug prices. 
14 Prices are regulated in most countries, except the United States . 
Possibly resulting from that the United States has one of the most vibrant 
and R&D intensive pharmaceutical industries in the world, shortly 
followed by the British, which is allowed a substantial return on capital on 
its business with the National Health Service. 
Those countries with stringent price regulation, such as France and Italy, 
are believed to offer too few incentives for pharmaceutical R&D and, as a 
possible consequence, have a smaller and less innovative national 
pharmaceutical industry. This, in a simplified form, is the picture 
presented by some industry representatives. Although plausible, the 
effect of regulation is difficult to verify, since there are so many more 
contributing factors to industry success than the price level of prescription 
medicines in the domestic market'5. 
14 Most European countries operate a system of price regulation, where new drug prices 
will have to be approved by a regulator, Britain operates a system of profit control, while 
the United States allow manufacturers to set the price for new drugs freely. 
15 Most countries allow free pricing of Over-The-Counter (OTC) medicines and price 
differences are common between the domestic and increasingly important overseas 
markets. 
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On a theoretical level, the impact of price regulation can be demonstrated 
quite easily: An innovator would need to determine the priceloutput mix of 
his products so that research and development costs are covered. In 
order to do that, prices must exceed marginal costs of production. The 
question is: how great should this excess be and should it vary from drug 
to drug? 
From society's point of view common costs, or R&D cost in this case, 
should be allocated so that social losses resulting from prices being 
higher that variable costs are minimised. The Ramsey pricing rule" 
implies that in order to minimise excess burden in a two-product 
environment, tax rates should be inversely proportional to price 
elasticities of demand, Le.: 
Equation 4-1 tX = 
Cy 
tYCX 
Since t., and ty are percentage increases in the prices of the two goods, 
by analogy the total welfare loss will be minimised if the mark-ups on 
marginal costs follow the rule: 







P, - MCI 
Equation 4-3 PI -62 P2 - MC2 -01 
P2 
which indicates that in order to minimise excess burden in a two-product 
environment, mark-ups on marginal cost should be inversely proportional 
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to price elasticities of demand, i. e. the less elastic the demand the higher 
the mark-up should be. This means that the more innovative and often 
more urgently required product should be sold at a higher price. 
Another form of the Ramsey rule, where: 







shows a constant k whose value depends on the amount of common 
fixed costs that must be covered. This formula corresponds to the Lerner 
index of market power, where k=O when the market is competitive and 
k=l when the market is monopolised, because: 
Equation 4-6 P-MC =I p 
states that the price/cost margin of the profit maximising firm should be 
equal to the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand. The similarity between 
the welfare loss-minimising and profit-maximising rules implies that 
structurally the same decision rules apply, i. e. a firm which aims to 
maximise contributions to R&D would price their products in a way that 
welfare losses are minimised. If prices are above the level necessary to 
cover R&D costs, a regulator would aim to reduce mark-ups to the point 
where these costs are covered. Rather than applying the same price 
16 See for Instance Cullis and Jones (1998) for mathematical proof of the Ramsey pricing 
rule 
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restriction across all products Ramsey prices imply that the percentage 
change of the quantity demanded of the two goods as a result of a price 
reduction must be equal, since substituting c in 4-2 gives: 
dQI 
Equation 4-7 P, - MCI Q, 
mc P -MCI II 
MCI 
dQ2 
P2 -MC2 Q2 





Ql = Q2 
must hold for a welfare loss minimising regulation, i. e. the quantity 
change in per cent must be equal in the two markets. 
Exact cost and demand schedules are often not known to the regulation 
authorities, and without such information imposing optimal pricing 
behaviour will prove futile (Reekie 1997). Rather than legislating for 
uniform mark-ups on all products, the authorities should allow for price 
discrimination, i. e. higher prices on the less price-elastic product. The 
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system best suited to allow this is a profit regulation system, , which 
would limit the maximum amount of recoverable R&D costs, rather than a 
uniform price limit which, as could be shown above, would result in a 
higher welfare loss than necessary. 
Cocks (1975) expands Clemens' (1957) analysis to introduce a 
multiproduct firm in a dynamic environment, here shown in figure 4.6.: 
17 The British PPRS (Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme) is in fact a profit 
regulation scheme, which allows for a fixed profit margin to be generated with drugs sold 
to the NHS. Most European countries would regulate individual drug prices, while the US 
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Source: Cocks (1975) 
This model can be interpreted as follows: most firms would start off as a 
single product firm with idle capacity at a point where marginal cost 
equals marginal revenue. At this point the firm increases production 
seeking new markets where demand exceeds marginal costs. A firm 
would explore new markets in order of their profitability. Equilibrium will 
be reached if there are no more markets where demand is greater than 
marginal costs. 
The above graph shows five markets. Profits will be maximised where 
production is allocated along the five products so that marginal revenue 
is equal in all markets and equal to marginal costs. The EMIR line is the 
line of equal marginal revenue. Each market has its own output axis 
which is the origin of its demand and marginal revenue curve. The 
markets are lined up according to their profit potential, shown by the 
extent of profit (falling from left to right) and/or the elasticity of demand 
(increasing from left to right). It can be seen that markets on the inside 
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make a larger profit than the markets on the outside since the mark-up 
on marginal costs is higher on these inside markets. 
Cocks (1975) looks at this model over time: Recently-launched highly 
innovative products start on the inside markets and gradually move 
outside being replaced by new more recent innovations in the process. 
These products start off with a high price and relatively low volume and, 
facing increasingly tough competition in their life cycle, will gradually 
lower prices and expand on volume not dissimilar to a skimming pricing 
strategy. The firm will attempt continuously to create new inside markets 
to replace the products which are moving outside towards higher volume 
and higher elasticity. This process would move towards an equilibrium 
which embodies a price close to marginal cost at least for some of the 
older products (Reekie 1997). Scherer (1980) argues that this process is 
not unlike a tendency towards Paretian optimality, where the monopoly 
rents on the inside markets are sources of funds for the R&D which 
develops new products in the future. For any individual existing drug 
these contributions are transitory as prices are eroded over time, and 
new products must be introduced continually in order to provide R&D 
funds on a continuing basis (Reekie 1997). 
Linking this to the initial hypothesis that mark-ups should, be inversely 
proportionate to elasticities the model can make some predictions about 
the rate and direction of innovative aCtiVity18 . 
The initial high price of 
innovation at the beginning of the product life cycle secures the current 
level of innovative output by the firm. Should highly innovative products 
not be able to yield sufficient return on R&D the direction of innovative 
activity may change towards me-too products which are less risky, less 
prone to intervention by regulatory bodies and cheaper to develop. 
Should the firm anticipate a price intervention in its highly innovative 
market segment it could also attempt only to gradually improve products 
in order to justify a price rise which seldomly represents a real increase in 
'a See also Schellhaass (1982) 
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the value of the product. The implications of this dynamic model are the 
same as the earlier static analysis. Price regulation should neither be 
uniform, nor should it target the particularly profitable products. In order 
to minimise welfare losses and guarantee a constant stream of new drug 
innovations, the most profitable products must be allowed to contribute 
more to R&D than older products with a higher demand elasticity. 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
The microeconomic branch of the innovation economics literature lists 
three determinants of R&D spending, technological opportunities, 
appropriability conditions and demand factors and much of the debate is 
related to the relative importance of these factors. 
Some authors attribute technical change to the supply of innovation 
(technology push), others argue that demand induces industry to 
innovate (demand pull) while at least some empirical evidence suggests 
that both factors are equally important. 
Most empirical studies will however be compromised by the unclear 
distinction between need and demand which reflects the lack of 
consideration of the role of the entrepreneur to foresee potential demand. 
Pharmaceutical economists believe that regulation can once and for all 
alter the rate of innovation in the industry, either negatively through more 
stringent drug approval regulation, or positively through improved patent 
protection, both affecting what is referred to as appropriability conditions. 
Appropriability conditions will also be improved, if companies can set 
prices in such as way, that R&D expenses in excess of cost of production 
will be covered. It could also be shown, at least on a theoretical level, that 
the practice of setting higher prices for products with a low elasticity of 
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demand will conform with the social objective of welfare loss 
minimisation. 
At the firm level companies are believed to face diminishing returns to 
R&D and would aim to equate the return on the last R&D project 
(marginal return) with the cost of funds. Once the rising cost of funds 
(due to differences in the cost of internal and external finance) is taken 
into consideration, the optimal level of R&D spending is where marginal 
return to R&D equals marginal cost of R&D. 
The following Chapter will aim to identify those technological 
opportunities, demand and appropriability factors specific to the vaccine 
industry before developing and testing a model of R&D spending in 
Chapter Six. 
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Vaccine industrv anaivsis 
5.1 The global vaccine market 
As explained in more detail in chapter two, vaccination may effectively control 
or even completely eradicate a disease. This makes vaccination one of the 
most powerful and widely used health interventions available today. 
If all diseases could be completely eradicated through vaccination, then 
vaccines will no longer be needed. Epidemiological data indicate, however, 
that despite a few such total success stories -the eradication of smallpox for 
example- many diseases continue to circulate making it essential to 
continually vaccinate young children and people newly exposed to these 
diseases. The European Vaccine Manufacturers (1994, p. 12) identify four 
factors which influence the demand for vaccines: 
1) The nature of disease against which the vaccine is required: Only viral and 
not bacterial diseases can be eradicated'; and some vaccination 
programmes are more difficult to administer than others; whilst achieving 
herd immunity2 requires different effort (e. g. the number of doses 
necessary) for different viral diseases. 
2) The importance of vaccination for national or supranational health policy, 
most notably the existence, or prioritisation of immunisation programmes. 
For example, even under given existing immunisation programmes, falling 
birth-rates could reduce the demand for a vaccine. 
3) The successful transformation of epidemiological data into actual demand 
and which crucially depends upon the existence or quality of the data itself. 
1 Bacteria survive outside the human body and can therefore never be fully eradicated. 
2 Herd immunity denotes a situation where"the population susceptible to a disease falls below 
the critical threshold required for the disease to perpetuate itself (European Vaccine 
Manufacturers 1994, p. 12) 
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4) The market for vaccines is often split into a private segment, where prices 
are established by market forces, and a public segment, which is 
characterised by a government agency buying large volumes at 
comparatively low prices. 
The most comprehensive and most recent study on the vaccine market has 
been undertaken by Mercer Management Consulting in 1995 and was 
commissioned by the US Department of Health and Human Services. 
According to this study the world-wide vaccine market generated 2.73 billion 
US$ in 1992 3 of which paediatric vaccineS4 accounted for 77% or 
approximately 2.11 billion US$ as can be seen in figure 5.1. 
Figure 5-1 
1992 Worldwide Vaccine Market In US$ million 
Basic Pbdiatric Vaccines/all major 
producers 
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Source: Nlercer 1995, p. 7 
Basic paediatric vaccines, such as Diphtheria, Tetanus and Pertussis (DTP), 
Polio, BCG (vaccine against Tuberculosis) and Tetanus Typhoid (TT) account 
3 In its 1996 annual report SmithKline Beecham expects the worldwide vaccine market to 
reach $7 bn by the year 2001 (SmithKline Beecham, 1996). 
4 Vaccines for children 
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for about 30 per cent of the market. In general there are multiple suppliers of 
these products. The above chart (Fig. 5.1) indicates that more than 80% of the 
total turnover ($832 million) of basic paediatric vaccines is generated by major 
vaccine producers, which are all located in Europe and the United States. 
Roughly 10% of turnover is generated by local producers outside Europe and 
the US and under 10% are purchased by UNICEF tender mainly for use in the 
least developed countries. 
The technology of making basic paediatric vaccines is well known. Most of 
these vaccines were developed more than thirty years ago and are no longer 
or never have been protected by patents. They are often sold at prices near 
costs of production. National suppliers dominate the markets for these basic 
paediatric vaccines, not because their quality is superior but because they 
enjoy privileged relationships in their home markets (Mercer 1995, p. 8). 
There is little incentive to penetrate export markets since prices for basic 
paediatric vaccines are generally very low. One notable exception according 
to Mercer (1995, p. 7) is the Measles Mumps Rubella vaccine (MMR) 
produced by the US manufacturer Merck, which is thought to be the safest 
and most effective of its kind and therefore enjoys a significantly higher price 
and market share than other MMR vaccines on the market. 
The market for basic paediatric vaccines can be further segmented: Besides 
UNICEF purchases and local producers (which have no international 
exposure), figure 5-2 breaks down the 'major producer' category into major 
producers winning government tenders, the OECD market (without the US), 
and the US market. 
Although UNICEF purchases and local production account for a very small 
share of the basic paediatric vaccine market in revenue terms, figure 5-2 
shows that the volumes associated with these two groups are far more 
significant. 42% and 23% respectively of paediatric doses used world-wide 
are either locally produced or purchased by UNICEF. The large-revenue US 
market accounts for less than 2% of paediatric doses used world-wide. 
Revenue is mainly generated in industrialised countries markets supplied at 
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relatively higher price by major European and American vaccine 
manufacturers. 
Figure 5-2 
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source: Mercer 1995, p, 8 
Figure 5.1 also shows that in 1992,41% of the global vaccine market is 
represented by the more recently introduced new paediatric vaccines such as 
Haernophilius Influencae Type B (Hib), Hepatitis B (Hep B), Hepatitis A (Hep 
A) and Varicella. These vaccines are still patent protected and their prices are 
higher than for basic vaccines since considerable investment in R&D is still to 
be recovered. These products are sold in an increasing number of overseas 
markets and their market share is growing compared to the older paediatric 
vaccines. 
Baudrihaye (1992) further emphasises the importance of UNICEF, PAHO 
(Pan American Health Organisation) and WHO purchases in volume terms, 





Estimated world usage of vaccines in 1990 (millions of 
doses) 







BCG 5 160 20 
DTP 40 170 50 
Hepatitis B 15 35 
Influenza 75 - 10 
Measles and comb. 15 120 30 
Meningitis - 10 20 
Polio 60 450 190 
Rabies 1 - 3 
Total 211 910 358 
% of total 14 62 24 
source: Bauddhave. (1 992. D. 894) 
These numbers emphasise that the developing countries account for a large 
percentage of doses sold each year, but considerably less in revenue terms 
as was shown before. 
On the supply side seven private European companies share the vast majority 




Vaccine suppliers to UNICEF 








0 0 0 0 67 
Eastern Europe 0 0 0 
Japan 0 0 33 
Others 0 0 
USA I I I 
Source: Baudrihaye 1992, p. 894 
The discrepancies described above between market volume and revenue also 
reflect differences in the strategies of American and European Manufacturers. 
As can be seen from figures 5-3 and 5-4, US manufacturers generate large 
revenues with relatively low volumes whereby European manufacturers sell 
large volumes generating relatively smaller revenue. 
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Figure 5-3 
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Figure 5-4 
1992 Major Worldwide Vaccine Suppliers - Adult] Paediatric 












Source: Mercer 1995, p. 11 
US manufacturers concentrate almost entirely on their home markets while 
European manufacturers operate on a much larger scale selling large 
quantities of vaccine in overseas markets. The following section investigates 
further European vaccine manufacturers' export trade. The subsequent 
121 
0.2 'r 2 
ýx cu :: 1 r- 
CL 2 1: 2 
section also explains why American vaccine manufacturers are reluctant to 
export their products. 
5.2 European vaccine trade 
The European vaccine industry, unlike its US counterpart export a large share 
of shipments, as demonstrated in the following figure: 
Figure 5-5 
European Vaccine Manufacturers' shares of shipments: 









39% of all European vaccine manufacturers' shipments (expressed in volume) 
are purchased by UNICEF and destined mainly for developing countries' 
markets. Half of all shipments go to countries other than the EU or US and 
only a very small number of doses is exported to the US. 10% of shipments 
remain in Europe. 
The large volumes generated by European suppliers are mainly basic 
paediatric vaccines included in the EPI (Expanded Programme of 
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Immunisation). Up to 90% of exports in volume terms is supplied to non- 
OECD countries at very low prices and usually tendered out by organisations 
such as UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), WHO (World Health 
Organisation) or PAHO (Pan American Health Organisation). 
Table 5-3 









Pasteur Merieux 7% 80% 13% 100% Flu, Hib, Rabies, 
Hep B 
SKB 2% 86% 12% 100% Hep B, Hep A 
Hoechst 8% 89% 3% 100% Flu, Hib, Rabies 
Sclavo 4% 90% 6% 100% Flu 
I Medeva 120% 161% ig% 100% 1 Flu 
source: Mercer 199U), p. 1 1 
In value terms the share of UNICEF and other countries' export tenders is 
much smaller since prices in this segment are considerably lower than for 
shipments to industrialised countries. Table 5.4 shows the shares of major 
markets for EC vaccine exports in value terms: 
Table 6-4 
Shares of major markets In EC exports of vaccines: 1992 
Market export share (by value) 
intra-EC 33.9 
EFTA 4.0 
Eastern Europe 1.6 
US and Canada 24.6 
Japan and Australia 0.65 
other countries 35.2 
source: turostat iuvtj 
The above table shows the importance of intra-EC trade in vaccines and also 
confirms that in revenue terms the US market is an important destination for 
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European vaccines. The US market is attractive for European manufacturers 
because the price level is higher than in Europe. Especially novel vaccines 
such as IPV (intravenous Polio Vaccine), Influenza and Hepatitis B are 
exported to the US. Although Europe is potentially a huge market for US 
manufacturers, with the exception of MMR, Hepatitis B and Hib, they largely 
abstain from exporting to Europe. 
6.3 Regulatory impact on export behaviour 
One of the reasons why US manufacturers are reluctant to export outside the 
US is that prices in Europe are generally lower. Even if US manufacturers 
wanted to export some of their vaccines at a lower price in order to generate 
economies of scale then elements of the US government (such as the Anti- 
Trust Division of the US Justice Department, if not Congressional Enquiries) 
would probably take a 'very critical' look at prices charged in the US. 
Congress has decided to challenge the high domestic prices of US 
manufacturers on the grounds of much lower export prices. The US industry 
thus probably prefers not to set a precedent, and avoids supplying low-price 
markets altogether. However, US manufacturers sometimes try to circumvent 
interference by Congress by entering foreign markets through a range of 
alliances, as was the case with Connaught and Pasteur Merieux -respectively 
an American and French vaccine manufacturer- and which subsequently 
merged. 
Other regulatory procedures may also be held responsible for low US exports 
of vaccines. The FDA licensing-process in the US requires not only the 
vaccine itself to be validated but also the plant that will be used for 
commercial production. Strict GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice) regulations 
require the preparation of pilot lots already for phase one clinical trials in a 
GMP approved facility (Gupta 1997, p. 1). So already before the product is 
licensed a decision has to be made about the scale of production. The costs 
of building the production plant are therefore incurred already at the 
development stage of the product. These costs are sunk, should the American 
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firm not be able to sell the envisaged capacity. Any organisation without a 
GMP-approved facility will find it impossible to conduct the phase one trials 
and is thus discouraged from undertaking development of the product. 
According to Mercer (1995, p. 13) it is precisely this licensing procedure which 
discourages manufacturers from entering other markets. Lack of 
harmonisation and country-specific requirements make it far too costly to 
obtain multiple licenses. In the case of US manufacturers it appears that 
concentrating on their large, unified domestic market alone has been more 
attractive than incurring the risk and uncertainties of building plants which 
could supply international markets. Matters are further complicated by the 
plant relicensing requirements for vaccines. Once a US manufacturer has 
decided on the plant size sufficient to serve a particular market, it is not viable 
to consider expansion since resizing the plant requires a costly plant 
relicensing process (Mercer 1995, p. 9). 
In Europe too, manufacturers claim (European Vaccine Manufacturers 1994, 
p. 14) that increasingly stringent quality control and GMP rules, the latter 
introduced with EC directive 91/356, have a damaging impact on 
competitiveness. They fear that manufacturers in other regions with less 
stringent rules could obtain a cost advantage in the cost-sensitive segment of 
international procurement. 
As far as the licensing of new vaccines is concerned, Europe has recently 
undertaken steps to make sure that a new vaccine will only have to undergo 
one licensing procedure to be successfully marketed across Europe. 
Since 1995, there have been two EU procedures for obtaining marketing 
authorisation for medicinal products: the centralised procedure, and the 
mutual recognition procedure. The first one is designed for biotechnological 
products or high-tech products, the second one is for all other products. 
Vaccines can follow either one of these depending on their nature (biotech/ 
high-tech or not). In the centralised procedure companies submit new 
products to the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
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(EMEA), which can grant a European marketing authorisation by the 
Commission. The decision is assisted by a scientific advisory committee, the 
Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP). 
Under the decentralised (mutual recognition) procedure applications are made 
to the Member States of the EU selected by the applicant and the procedure 
operates by subsequent mutual recognition of national marketing 
authorisations. Where this is not possible, the EMEA is called on to prepare a 
binding arbitration again based on recommendations or 'opinions' by the 
CPMP. These new procedures should lead to a faster process of registration 
and reduce the cost of repetitive tests and paperwork under the old system. 
Although a system of mutual recognition existed before CPMP, opinions were 
not binding under the old procedures. 
New vaccines are likely, increasingly, to fall into the category of biotechnology 
products. Two directives, 90/219 and 90/220, the former referring to the use of 
genetical ly-mod ified organisms, the latter governing the deliberate release of 
genetically modified organisms (GMO directives) are applicable to vaccines. 
European Vaccine Manufacturers (1994, p. 64) believe that both directives 
"represent major constraints to the development of sophisticated vaccines, 
especially if they use recombinant technology and genetically modified 
organisms. New constraints could limit the development of vector vaccines, 
either at the level of contained use in the laboratory or at the level of 
deliberate release for clinical trials. Such constraints must not become 
barriers to their development or to trade, thus placing manufacturers in the 
US or Japan in a more advantageous position". 
Once a product has received marketing authorisation, in Europe as well as the 
US, each individual batch of a vaccine is required to undergo quality and 
safety testing before being released on the market. Since 1993, once a batch 
control follows guidelines published by the Commission, the batch is accepted 
for sale within the Common Market without further testing. This procedure is 
however not mandatory and some countries, most notably the UK, France and 
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Germany have continued to submit all vaccine imports to a second batch 
testing (European Vaccine Manufacturers 1994, p. 76). This double control 
incurs further costs and is time- consuming for the manufacturer. The CPMP 
has now introduced a new procedure covering some vaccines. Seven 
appointed control authorities within the EU have the competence to issue 
batch release certificates for vaccines to be marketed on a EU-wide base, 
which are then subject to mutual recognition without further testing. 
Single-batch testing within the EU is, however, accepted by UNICEF and 
Eastern European countries partly because their authorities do not possess 
the required equipment, and partly because further testing would increase the 
costs of price-sensitive UNICEF tenders. The US still requires additional tests 
to be carried out. 
A further harmonisation in regulatory requirements regarding plant licensing 
and marketing approval would allow manufacturers to exploit economies of 
scale and improve profitability which would attract additional resources into 
vaccine R&D. Quite why scale economies are so important for vaccine 
products will be explained in the following section. 
5.4 Scale economies and contributions to R&D 
The vaccine industry's value chain can be broken down into five main cost 
categories: production, distribution, product returns, sales marketing, and 
administration. In the table below, the difference between the price of the 
product and these costs will contribute to covering the costs of R&D, interest, 
















-pick and pack 
-materials 
Returns of faulty products costs 
Sales and Marketing costs 
-sales force 
-promotional discounts 




Source: Mercer 1995, p. 25 
Price/dose 
The costs and contributions of six different childhood vaccines produced in the 
US (MMR and OPV are combined in the original report for reasons of 
confidentiality) varies significantly as shown in figure 5-7. 
Figure 5-7 
US Vaccine prices and contributions 
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Differences in production costs are down to differences in complexity and 
scale; royalties are also high especially for the newer vaccines. DTP, being 
the oldest and simplest vaccine among the six, and being produced at a large 
scale, has predictably the lowest production costs. Royalties account for a 
high percentage of the costs of production for the newest vaccine in the field, 
Hep B (13-15 % of sales according to Mercer, 1995, p. 27). Since they are 
calculated on a percentage base of sales revenue, royalties double when 
revenue doubles. In the case of Hep Ba number of organisations hold a total 
of 14 different patents. Owners of intellectual property could be educational or 
research institutions, private companies (e. g. a biotech firm) or both. 
Sales and marketing costs depend on the number of suppliers in the market. 
MMR and OPV are supplied by two single suppliers and hence do not need 
the same promotional effort as DTaP and Hep B, the latter reflecting 
substantial investment in sales force. Mature products such as DTP are 
marketed less heavily since prices and contribution are already low. As the 
relatively young products Hep B, DTaP and Hib are still penetrating the 
market, sales and administration costs are high. 
Surprisingly the old products MMR and OPV yield the highest contribution in 
the field. These two vaccines hold a monopoly position in the US due to their 
high safety and efficacy. Prices are therefore high while at the same time 
relatively low sales and marketing costs are incurred for a well established 
product. 
Contribution does vary between private and public sector sales. The above 
figures are blended figures. Lower sales, marketing and distribution costs do 
not offset much lower prices in the public market segment compared to the 
private market. The OPV/MMR contribution in the private market, for example, 
is more than three times higher than in the public market, $8.40 compared to 
$2.90 respectively (Mercer 1995, p. 31). 
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Contribution is therefore determined by costs, which vary considerably 
between vaccines, and price, which in turn depends on market structure, i. e. 
competitive forces, and the degree of government interference. 
What is true for all vaccine products is that lower volumes result in significant 
cost disadvantages since economies of scale are important in vaccine 
production. Production cost for OPV (oral polio vaccine) in Europe, for 
example, is 16% of US costs; 36% of the cost difference is attributed to scale 
economies (Mercer 1995, p. 13). Whitehead (1997) finds that on average only 
10% of production costs are variable, the remainder is fixed, 19% of them 
R&D, 31% selling, distribution and overheads, 16% site costs, and 24% batch 
fixed costs. 
In Whitehead's (1997) study the costs of a high volume European and a low 
volume US producer both producing the same unnamed vaccine are 
compared. 
Figure 5-8 - Cost differences of a high volume and low volume vaccine 
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Source: Whitehead (1997, p. 3) 
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Figure 5.8 Can be interpreted as follows: The high volume vaccine 
manufacturer operates at a cost level equivalent to 19% of the cost level of 
the low volume manufacturer. About 43 % of the cost advantage are attributed 
to being a low-scale manufacturer. Other cost differences result from the 
higher cost of labour and supplies in the US plus the cost of complexity due to 
what Whitehead (1997) describes as a stricter regulatory environment in the 
us. 
However, a cost advantage alone will not result in greater profitability. It also 
depends on the ability to charge an adequate price for the product. Despite 
the confidential nature of exact pricing information, vaccine prices are 
believed to be higher in the US than in Europe. What is more important is that 
European suppliers are facing a large price difference between European and 
export markets, in particular for export tenders to WHO and UNICEF. The 
following figure shows the typical vaccine market profile for a European 
supplier having in its portfolio a proprietary product such as Hepatitis B and a 
standard EPI vaccines such as OPV. For reasons of confidentiality the name 
of the supplier and products have been omitted in the original study. 
Figure 5-9 
Vaccine market for a typical European supplier 
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The above market profile shows how contributions to individual vaccines are 
driven by elasticities of demand which in turn depend on where a product is 
sold. Proprietary products are skimming the domestic markets for high 
returns. Mature products are marketed internationally, typically at a relatively 
higher price in industrialised countries -compared to UNICEF prices which are 
near marginal cost. The above also represents the life cycle for any of today's 
new vaccines. Starting as a proprietary product with a single high price it will 
penetrate the market and finally reach maturity. While the technology gets 
diffused, capacity increases and prices will come down and become tiered 
across markets. Many of the EPI vaccines are sold at low average prices and 
can only be marketed profitably due to significant scale effects. 
This is certainly the case with the Hepatitis B vaccine, which when it was first 
introduced in 1986 cost US$ 25 per dose. Since then the price has come 
down to under $US1 today (GAVI 2000). In 1998, Latin American health 
authorities were purchasing the new Hib vaccine for $US 8.50 per dose. Two 
years later the vaccine is available at about $US 3.00 per dose. 
The above analysis shows how US and European vaccine manufacturers 
have chosen two very different dynamic pricing strategies to maximise 
contribution. US manufacturers focus on their core markets which allows them 
to earn relatively high prices per dose. At the same time they cannot exploit 
any significant economies of scale over the life cycle of the product. Premium 
prices in their domestic markets however allow them to earn sufficient returns 
on R&D and hence sustain their profitability through continuous innovation. 
European manufacturers have chosen to exploit economies of scale by 
maximising total demand through globalisation. The two-tier pricing system 
allows them to sell large volumes at very low cost. European manufacturers 
are, however, making themselves very vulnerable to downward pressures on 
prices since their investment in large-scale capacity is already undertaken by 
the time they negotiate export tenders. 
132 
Which of the two pricing strategies contributes more to R&D and therefore 
results in greater innovative activity is difficult to assess. Besides the specific 
scale/price trade-off outlined above, vaccine products are often developed 
alongside pharmaceutical products in the same companies and compete for 
funding with a product group with an often superior marketing potential. 
Historically, the US vaccine industry experienced a very difficult phase in the 
1970s when some major manufacturers such as Pfizer, Lilly and Dow left the 
vaccine industry for good. This was due to a number of factors: The world 
market for vaccines was small compared to pharmaceuticals, margins were 
tight and many vaccines were selling as commodities (Galambos and Sewell 
1995). 'National champions', such as Behringwerke in Germany and Pasteur 
Merieux in France, were firmly controlling their respective domestic markets. 
By contrast many of the new antibiotic drugs developed at the time were 
assured patent protection and significant market share abroad. 
The 1970s were also marred by a number of technological and commercial 
setbacks. Merck's new vaccine against Meningitis for example, was soon after 
its launch confronted with competition from generic vaccine producers, 
encouraged by the US government's efforts to reduce vaccine prices. Merck 
decided to leave the market within a year after the launch of the new product. 
Another example was Merck's new swine flu vaccine introduced in 1976, 
which raised liability concerns when deaths among elderly recipients were 
linked to Merck's vaccine. 
Today, these problems have been largely overcome and, for those 
manufacturers who remain in the industry, contributions of vaccine products 
(defined as prices minus sales, administration and manufacturing costs) 
match contributions of pharmaceutical products at least in the case of the US 
industry (Mercer 1995). This is largely the result of profits generated by new 
patent protected recombinant vaccines launched since the mid 1980s, as 
suggested in figure 5-10. 
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Figure 5-10 
US Vaccines Suppliers Value Added Chain Versus 
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Despite the similarity in contribution, there are big differences in the cost 
structures of vaccine and pharmaceutical manufacturing. Production and 
distribution costs are significantly higher in the vaccine industry (more costly 
process control and sterilisation standards; higher distribution costs because 
many vaccines require an uninterrupted cold-chain during transport; smaller 
shipments to individual physicians). Sales and marketing costs are, however, 
much lower in the vaccine industry, mainly because well defined sales to 
government -usually on a longer term base- incur less promotional costs than 
pharmaceuticals. 
Judging from the findings above it is not clear whether the US vaccine 
industry, which in general charges higher prices but also operates at higher 
costs than its European counterparts, has the higher contribution and 
therefore better incentives to undertake R&D in the vaccine field. No data are 
available on the profitability of European manufacturerS5. 
5 Because of the integration of the vaccine business into pharmaceutical and other divisions, 
profitability figures for vaccine operations can generally not be obtained through company 
reports. For the United states this was only possible because Mercer (1995) and Whitehead 
(1997) gained access to confidential information at company level. 
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Vaccine Industry Pharmaceutical Industry 
What appears to be clear is that a decision about the scale of a vaccine plant 
is taken very early in the development process. Any manufacturer will face a 
low-scale/h ig h-p rice versus larg e-sca le/low-p rice trade-off. Once the 
manufacturer is tied into a large-scale operation, the capacity has to be used 
since exit costs are huge. Because of these sunk costs, manufacturers are 
facing a potential hold-up problem. Export tendering may bring prices down to 
an extent which leaves very little or no return on the initial investment and may 
discourage further R&D investment. US manufacturers who have opted for the 
low-scale/h ig h-p rice option experience less pressure on their contribution due 
to a supportive domestic market. 
US innovations will in some instances be licensed out to European 
manufacturers which will eventually supply them to developing countries. The 
delay until an innovative product can be priced competitively6 by the licensee 
and subsequently introduced into immunisation schedules such as EPI will 
have to be accepted as an integral part of the diffusion process. 
However, for the reasons explained above, US innovations are highly likely to 
be targeted at their home market and diseases prevalent in the United States. 
The development of some of the most cost-effective modified and new 
vaccines such as early-dose measles, the single shot tetanus, Malaria; or 
against certain subtypes of the HIV virus, may not be pursued by these 
manufacturers because there is no lucrative home market. The Guardian 
newspaper writes (Guardian, 21/6/99, p. 21) that "drug companies have 
developed expensive anti-HIV treatments for the rich western markets but 
argued that the failure of cash-strapped developing countries to buy vaccines 
for diseases such as hepatitis means they would not be able to recover the 
high cost of Aids drugs. " 
r' Such as the Hep B vaccine whose price has only recently fallen sufficiently to be included in 
developing countries' immunisation programmes 
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Specifically, the pharmaceutical (especially vaccine) industry needs to be able 
to believe that there is a credible market for the new products that it develops 
(WHO 2000b, p. 24). The importance of a guaranteed market for future 
vaccine has also been emphasised by Michael Kremer (2000). The author 
acknowledges that drug companies are sometimes forced to sell products at a 
price insufficiently high to cover R&D costs. The small market for developing- 
country vaccines -which amounts to no more than $200m a year- is not 
offering enough incentive to incur the huge costs of development. In Kremer's 
view a fund set aside for the purchase of a future vaccine would provide the 
right incentives. The World Bank has recently pledged to set aside $US 1 
billion for the purchase of future vaccines. 
What the World Bank needs to take into consideration though, this 
dissertation suggests, is that besides the need to cover R&D costs, 
manufacturers are facing a potential hold-up problem if they commit capacity 
to the large scale production of such a vaccine. Large-scale production will 
make the manufacturer vulnerable to price pressures in the high-volume 
segment of the market. Any attempt to offset the downward pressure on 
prices through tiered pricing may induce regulatory authorities to push for 
lower prices in home markets which in turn undermines contributions to R&D. 
All this presents a considerable risk which some manufacturers may not be 
prepared to take. 
6.5 Property rights and new technological opportunities 
One aspect of dynamic pricing has not been fully explored in the above 
analysis: the longer a manufacturer can command prices above the cost of 
production, the higher the contributions will be. The duration of this time 
period will depend on the length of patent protection and whether patent 
protection is complete. 
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In the case of vaccines, property rights were weak until in 1980 the US 
Supreme Court ruled that biological prod UCtS7 are a patentable subject matter. 
Until then process patents were more common than product patents and a 
large proportion of vaccines were not covered by patents at all. The 
availability of patent protection coincided with a new phase in technological 
opportunities based on new developments in DNA technology, which made it 
possible for researchers to use fragments of DNA to produce specific antigens 
in microbial cells (Galambos and Sturchio 1998). With the transformed cells 
dividing, antigens could now be replicated. This recombinant DNA technology 
may well explain the surge of new vaccine projects with the world's first 
recombinant vaccine against Hepatitis B launched in 1986. 
All the modern vaccines launched since then are in effect patent protected. 
This is particularly 'good news' for the biotech industry which plays an 
increasing role in vaccine R&D and whose main source of income is 
generated through royalties or the sale of innovations to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and which undertakes little or no production and distribution 
activity in itself. 
Some countries could, however, decide to disregard a patent and produce a 
patent protected vaccine or purchase a generic vaccine from a country which 
does not respect patentS8 . As Francis E. Andre, SmithKline vice-president 
claims (CVI Forum 11/96, p. 19), "we have several patents on our hepatitis B 
vaccine but of the 140 million children born every year, only about 15 million 
of them are born in countries that respect our patents. " And as a legal adviser 
on patents points out (CVl Forum 11/96, p. 19), "without adequate protection 
for intellectual property in developing countries, there has been no financial or 
other incentive to devote scarce resources to developing new technology. " 
7 Vaccines are based on living organisms and hence classified as biologicals. 
a One case widely discussed in the media in the first half of 2001 was the South African 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association's attempt to prevent the South African 
Government from purchasing cheap generic versions of patent protected anti-Aids drugs from 
India. The lawsuit was subsequently dropped after some of the US-based pharmaceutical 
companies, whose patents were infringed, withdrew their support. 
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R&D investment which could be of any, or possibly exclusive, use for these 
countries is impeded. 
While vaccines enjoy patent protection in principle, the ability to appropriate 
returns on investment can also be compromised if patent protection is 
incomplete. This may be the case if a product has seen significant public 
sector input during the development stage. According to the CVI Forum 
(10/1995) this is becoming increasingly common: "In pre CVI days, for 
example, the organisation never dreamed it would be taking on vaccine 
development from basic research of candidate molecules right up to the 
almost finished product stage. " The interest of such an involvement is to make 
the vaccines widely available at low costs, which could not be achieved if a 
firm has to recoup its R&D costs through high prices for a considerable period 
of time. 
Although public-private collaborations between academia and industry are 
attributed a greater chance of success than industry effort alone of coming up 
with a new formulation (WHO 2000b), extensive public sector research effort 
may also crowd out private sector investment. Many new vaccines or 
combination vaccines, which can be effectively patent protected since they 
include at least one new compound, are developed in the private sector. For 
'old' vaccines however, which urgently require modifications (e. g. early single 
dose measles vaccine) research is limited in the private sector, since it 
appears unlikely that a new compound which has seen heavy public sector 
input would ever gain effective protection. Multiple patents simultaneously 
held by public and private institutes also create practical difficulties for access 
to patents and processes (EVIVI 1994, p. 14). Obtaining licenses may be 
significantly delayed and at the same time innovators may shy away from 
undertaking R&D when the commercialisation of the results is uncertain. 
Above all, the industry receives little respect for its attempts to protect 
property rights and hence investments. Intellectual property rights are 
sometimes made responsible for the limited access to new technology 
developed by the biotechnology industry. According to the CVI (CVI Forum 
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11/96, p. 19), "[property rights] increase the unit cost of new vaccines and 
delay their introduction into the third world immunisation programmes. " This 
problem, the CVI believes, can be solved by a tiered royalty system, bulk 
fillingg of vaccines by developing countries and joint private-public venture 
arrangements. A tiered royalty system would be acceptable since it may pay 
off for the firm to sell at lower prices in mass markets. However, filling of 
vaccines in developing countries would raise concern of easy property right 
violation. Countries advanced enough to run a vaccine filling plant might also 
be capable of imitation. Public-private joint ventures could create some 
crowding out and could be discouraging particularly for biotech manufacturers 
which depend to a much larger extent on the commercialisation of 
innovations, than the traditional pharmaceutical industry. In any case, should 
new technology be licensed out, a secrecy- or a non-disclosure agreement 
included in the licensing contract is absolutely vital (European Vaccine 
Manufacturers 1994, p. 64). 
As figure 5-11 shows, overall patenting activity has increased remarkably 
since the late 1980s, which may reflect the increasing importance of 
biotechnology in the vaccine arealo. A closer look at vaccine patents held by 
the public sector compared to the total number of patents" in figure 5.12. 
reveals an increase from around 17% in 1976 to 35% in 1999 with some 
variation over time. 
9 Bulk filling implies that the vaccine is produced elsewhere and then shipped to a developing 
country where it is filled into smaller containers and distributed to the end-user. 
10 Biotech and vaccination alike are based on the manipulation of living organisms for 
therapeutic or preventive use. 
11 All US patent grants since 1976 are available on-line (www. uspto. gov) and can be 
searched by key word such as 'vaccine. All vaccine patents over this period were separated 
into two groups: patents exclusively held or co-owned by public sector institutions and vaccine 
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5.6 Liability and Vaccine Pricing 
As outlined above, potential liabilities for vaccine injuries have for many years 
hampered innovation in vaccines. The number of product liability cases filed 
against manufacturers were sharply on the increase since the early 1980s. 
Manufacturers chose either to leave the industry or to charge a risk premium 
in vaccine prices (Institute of Medicine 1985, p. 53). In 1986, Congress 
passed the National Vaccine Injury Compensation (NVICP) Act to shift the 
burden of vaccine liabilities away from companies to the consumer. Persons 
injured by a childhood vaccine (primarily DTP, Measles Mumps Rubella - 
MMR, and Polio) can since 1988 receive payments through the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Trust Fund. The fund is financed through excise taxes also 
implemented in 1988. 
The effects of the imposition of an excise tax will not necessarily place the 
burden of the tax on the consumer. The tax incidence literature suggests, that 
as long as the demand curve slopes downwards and the supply curve of the 
commodity slopes upwards the imposition of an excise tax will both raise the 
price paid by the consumer and lower the price received by the producer - in 
both cases by an amount less than the amount of the tax. How the burden of 
the tax is distributed between the consumer and the producer varies 
according to the elasticities of demand and supply for the commodity. 
Further complications arise in the case of this particular kind of excise tax: We 
are not comparing an excise tax regime with a zero-excise tax regime but 
rather a pre-existing situation whereby those harmed by vaccines sued 
through the courts for compensation. 
From the above follows that it is difficult to decide prima facie where the 
burden of the post-1988 regime falls, compared to the pre-1986 regime. When 
observing the actual development of vaccine prices the NVICP Act appears to 
have resulted in significant downward pressure on nominal vaccine prices in 
both the private and public segment of the market. Fig. 5-12 shows the 
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resulting price development in the private and public sectors of three 
important childhood vaccines from 1985 to 1996 in the USA. 
Figure 5-13 
Private catalog and public contract prices for children's 
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This is in line with the objective of the NVICIP Act. Since the passing of the 
NVICIP Act the number of DTP suits filed against manufacturers has declined 
from its peak of 255 cases in 1986 to 4 in 1997 (Department of Health and 
Human Services 1999) and hence government could argue that a risk 
premium was no longer justified. The impact on profit contributions is 
somewhat ambiguous. The reduction in law suits may well have compensated 
manufacturers for lower prices. 
A second important development in the vaccine market has been the 
Vaccines for Children programme (VFC) which started in the US in October 
1994 and its impact on the industry is likely to be significant. The scheme 
provides publicly purchased vaccines to eligible children 0-18 years of age 
free of charge as long as they are either enrolled by Medicaid, without health 
insurance, American Indian or Alaskan native or for children with health 
insurance which does not cover immunisation. Because this scheme is 
increasing the proportion of doses purchased by the state, the resulting 
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downward pressure on prices could reduce the expected return on R&D and 
as a result R&D spending. 
5.7 R&D activity 
Until 1982 R&D investment in biological products (of which vaccines are the 
most important subgroup) as a proportion of total pharmaceutical R&D shows 
a steady decline (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
1997). The particularly unfavourable investment climate of the 1970s and 
early 1980s may be partly to blame for this decline. It took some time for R&D 
as a proportion of sales to pick up again, possibly triggered by new 
opportunities in the area of recombinant DNA technology and the availability 
of patent protection after the 1980 Supreme Court ruling. Uncertainty over 
vaccine injury compensation payments may well have delayed the recovery of 
vaccine R&D until well into the second half of the 1980s, as can be seen in 
Fig. 5.14. This positive trend was again reversed in 1990 which saw a 
temporary fall in R&D intensity which lasted until 1994. After 1995, R&D 
intensity has increased steadily to reach a new high in 1998, only to drop 
again in 1999. 
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Figure 5-14 
US domestic R&D spending on biological products as a 
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Whether the increase in R&D spending and patenting activity has fed through 
to new product development is unclear. As Fig. 5.15 shows, new vaccines 
have been introduced at an almost constant rate of two to three vaccines per 
year over the 1984-1997 period. 
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Figure 5-15 
There is of course a considerable time lag between the launch of a research 
project, the registration of a patent and the approval of a new vaccine product 
so it is quite possible that a significant increase in new vaccine approvals is 
yet to materialise. 
R&D investment is likely to be more immediately responsive to changes in the 
environment and was therefore chosen over the number of New Molecular 
Entities (NMEs) as the dependent variable in the following empirical 
investigation. To what extent R&D investment has been influenced by patent 
protection, new technological opportunities, market size and public sector 
research activities will also be examined in the next chapter. 
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6.8 Conclusions 
This Chapter has analysed the vaccine industry environment, with particular 
emphasis on incentives to undertake research and development into new 
vaccine products. 
The analysis was guided by concepts such as technological opportunities, 
demand and appropriability conditions which were discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
A number of tentative conclusions may be drawn from this analysis here: 
American vaccine manufacturers supply almost exclusively to their domestic 
market. The US vaccine market allows a return on investment similar to 
pharmaceutical products. This is partly due to a new breed of genetically 
engineered paediatric vaccines launched in the second half of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. These products gain market share very rapidly and are the first 
vaccines to enjoy full patent protection. US manufacturers also benefit from 
the NVICIP act which has relieved them of any liability for vaccine injuries. 
European manufacturers typically operate on a larger scale than their US 
counterparts and rely quite heavily on very price-sensitive export tenders. 
Although profitability data are not available, these manufacturers rely on scale 
effects which are very significant in vaccine production. 
R&D investment in vaccines as a proportion of sales by US manufacturers 
declined for most of the 1970s, which appears to reflect poor patent 
protection, uncertainty over liability for vaccine injuries and exhausted 
technological opportunities during this period. Some crowding out by public 
sector research may also have occurred. 
The early 1980s saw an increase in R&D intensity which may be attributable 
to biotechnology as a new technological paradigm with many new vaccines 
derived from genetically modified organisms. A 1980 US Supreme Court 
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ruling also granted patent protection to biological products for the very first 
time. In 1988 vaccine manufacturers were eventually relieved from vaccine 
injury liability with the establishment of the NVICP act. 
From the above description the relative importance of these factors cannot be 
assessed with any certainty. Building on the theoretical concepts introduced in 
Chapter Four, the following empirical investigation aims to identify those of the 
above factors which significantly influence R&D spending in the vaccine 
industry. 
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Modellinq investment in vaccines 
6.1 The model 
Grabowski (1997,2000) proposes an R&D investment model for the 
pharmaceutical industry which will be used here in a modified form. This 
model allows us to show not only the influence of differences in the costs of 
internal and external R&D funds, following work by Fazzari et al. (1988) and 
Hubbard (1998) in that area, but also the influence of technological 
opportunities, appropriability conditions and demand factors. 
In a similar way to the models of Shepherd (1990) and Metcalfe (1997), a firm 
lines up its alternative investment projects and, starting with the projects 
offering the highest return, only takes on new projects when the cost of funds 
decline. The resulting demand for R&D funds (D) can be interpreted as a 
marginal return to investment curve and is here shown in fig 6.1. 
Figure 6-1 
cost of funds 
new debt 
financing I new equity financing 
reduction in present cash flow 
lower expected future returns 
intemal funds 
4 change in R&D investment 





The supply of funds schedule depends on whether sufficient funds can be 
raised either internally, or in the form of debts, or on the capital markets as 
new equity financing. The supply of funds curve can be interpreted as a 
marginal cost of capital schedule and reflects the opportunity cost of 
alternative investments of the firm. As long as sufficient internal finance is 
available, the supply of funds curve is horizontal and reflects the user cost of 
capital. This segment of the supply of funds curve would be in line with 
conventional neo-classical investment theory. A rise in the user cost of capital 
would raise the opportunity cost of funds and shift the horizontal segment of 
the supply of funds curve upwards, thereby reducing R&D investment. 
Once the firm needs to raise external finance, it faces a rising segment that 
represents the costs of debt financing. As outlined earlier internal and 
external finance are not perfect substitutes in practice. Equity finance can be 
more costly, especially for small offerings and initial public offerings. Fazzari 
et al. (1988) blame underwriting discounts, registration fees and taxes, selling 
and administrative expenses, and a higher tax rate on dividends than capital 
gains. Further to this, if a firm exhausts all internal funds and requires external 
finance, investors cannot distinguish between the quality of firms. Hence they 
require a premium to offset losses from investing in 'lemons'. 
This rationale also applies to new debt financing. Agency costs and costs of 
financial distress, i. e. bankruptcy in the most extreme case, will increase with 
leverage, explaining the rising segment of the marginal cost of funds curve 
linking internal financing and new equity financing. 
Equilibrium is established where the return from the last R&D project is equal 
to the marginal cost of funds. Grabowski (2000) believes that this view of the 
investment process is particularly relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, 
where the problems of great uncertainty about the outcome of R&D, the 
length of the R&D process (12-14 years) and asymmetric information 
combine to make the difference between internal and external funds 
especially important. In addition, unlike fixed investment in plant and 
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equipment, the outcome of drug R&D is simply new knowledge, which may or 
may not have new value. 
The variable most likely to shift the supply of R&D funds schedule is cash flow 
of present products. The supply of R&D funds curve will shift to the left or 
right, determining when a firm would have to use the more costly debt or 
equity financing alternatives. 
This model can also be used to show changes in the environment affecting 
the demand curve for R&D funds. Cash flow, for instance, is expected 
simultaneously to affect the cost of finance and expected future returns. An 
increase in cash flow should shift both the supply and demand curve for R&D 
funds. Grabowski (1997) suggests that in an empirical investigation the cash 
flow variable should appear twice, once as an indicator of cost of funds, but 
also as a proxy for expected return. How the two effects are distinguished in 
this study is discussed in the following section. 
Other factors influencing expected returns and therefore shifting the demand 
for R&D funds curve are, for instance, an increase in the size of the market, 
changes in appropriability conditions (such as an extension in property rights), 
or any other changes in the regulatory environment. Any change in expected 
return to the project would affect the demand for R&D funds and the 
equilibrium level of investment changes accordingly. 
6.2 Empirical implementation 
This part will empirically evaluate the firm's R&D intensity as a function of the 
cost of funds and expected returns. The model concentrates on the three 
largest US vaccine manufacturers' over the period of 1976-1999. 
1 As indicated in chapter five, the US vaccine industry is highly concentrated and dominated by 
domestic producers. The three largest US manufacturers will therefore represent a significant 
share of the US vaccine market. 
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Using a specific to general approach the following 1st order autoregressive 
process forms the starting point of the investigation: 
Equation 6-1 
InRDt = po + PlInPROFMARGt + InRDt., +vt 
InRD: natural log of the ratio of aggregate R&D expenditure on biological 
products over sales of biological products in year t, i. e. In (R&D 
spending/Sales) 
InPROFMARG: natural log of aggregate company after tax profits plus depreciation 
plus R&D expenditure, deflated by sales, in year t, i. e. In (profit/sales) 
LnRD describes the natural log of aggregate R&D spending on biological 
prod UCtS2 deflated by aggregate sales of biological products, i. e. serves as an 
indicator of R&D intensity in the sample 3. Since R&D spending over a longer 
time period is strongly trended, the use of a ratio such as R&D intensity 
addresses the problem of spurious regression arising from possible non- 
stationarity. Data on R&D spending are published by the US pharmaceutical 
manufacturers association PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America) in their annual surveys. 
LnPROFMARG represents aggregate cash flow in the sample and, according 
to the original model, PROFMARG is expected to be positively related to R&D 
intensity through its influence on the cost of funds and expected return to 
R&D. 
2 According to Grabowski (1997) R&D spending on biological products is a close 
approximation to R&D spending on vaccine products. The US Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association's annual survey lists two subcategories of biological products: vaccines and 
blood/blood derivatives, but publishes data on biological R&D spending only. 
3 See figure 5.14 for a graphical representation and section 5.7. for a more detailed 
description of this variable 
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In order to compute InPROFMARG, depreciation and R&D expenditure were 
added to company after tax profits, following Fazzari et al. (1988) and 
Grabowski (1997). Other authorS4 prefer to use the market value of the firm 
as an approximation of cash flow. The market value of the firm is however 
more likely to be determined by expected future cash flows which are unlikely 
to have an immediate impact on the cost of funds. Data on annual profits, 
depreciation and R&D expenditure were taken from Datastream. 
Equation 6.1 also includes the log of the dependent variable RDt lagged by 
one year which follows a partial adjustment specification common to most 
theories of investment at the industry level (Berndt 1991). The assumption is 
that firms aim for some target level of R&D investment intensity RD*t such 
that: 
Equation 6-2 
RD*i = Po + PIPROFMARGt + ut 
Assume further that agents adjust towards this ideal using the following: 
Equation 6-3 
RDt - RDt-, =8 (RD*t - RDt. j) 
Where O< 5<1, (RDt - RDt-j) is the actual change and (RD*t - RDt. j) is the 
desired change and 8 the adjustment parameter. Rewrite equation 6.3 as: 
Equation 6-4 
RDt = 8RD*t - 8RDi-I + RDt-j 
From this follows that: 
See for instance Grunfeld's (1960) original study. 
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Equation 6-5 
RDt = 8RD*t + (1 -Po)RDt-j 
Substituting equation 6.2 into this gives: 
Equation 6-6 
RDt = 5po + bpPROFMARGt + (1-po)RDt-I + 5ut 
The logarithmic form of this equation will lead back to the original equation 6.1 
which can be estimated using OLS. 
6.3 Estimation results 
The following results have been obtained from the OLS estimation: 
Table 6-1 
Dependent Variable: LnRD 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1974 1999 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
c -0.113728 0.313250 -0.363058 0.7199 
LnPROFMARG 0.451696 0.168190 2.685630 0.0132 
LnRD(-I) 0.683964 0.119761 5.711050 0.0000 
R-squared 0.717366 Mean dependent var. -2.474906 
Adjusted R-squared 0.692789 S. D. dependent var. 0.341081 
S. E. of regression 0.189050 Akaike info criterion -0.385445 
Sum squared resid. 0.822017 Schwarz criterion -0.240280 
Log likelihood 8.010783 F-statistic 29.18860 
Durbin-Watson stat. 1.914844 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Both variables InPROFMARGt and the lagged dependent variable InRDt. 1 are 
significant at the five per cent level and have the expected sign. We can 
therefore reject the null hypothesis and support the view that an increase in 
aggregate cash flow will result in an increase in aggregate R&D intensity. This 
also supports the original hypothesis that firms' R&D intensity is responsive to 
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changes in the cost of funds. A one per cent increase in the ratio of cash flow 
over sales seems to result in just under half a per cent increase in R&D 
intensity. Likewise, an increase in the previous year's R&D intensity by 1% 
appears to be followed by a corresponding 0.7% increase in the current 
year's R&D intensity which also confirms the relevance of the underlying 
partial adjustment mechanism of allocating R&D resources, outlined above. 
The adjusted r2 of almost 70% and the significance of the F statistic indicate a 
good fit of the model. The above estimation seems robust despite the 
relatively small number of observations5. 
The discussion of the economics of the vaccine industry in Chapter Five 
suggested a range of other factors that may influence the firm's investment 
decision. Hence, a range of other variables reflecting these possible 
influences were subsequently introduced into the original equation 6.2. one by 
one. None of these variables, however, proved to be significantly related to 
the variable InRD. All variables were also tested for lagged influences but 
proved equally insignificant. These variables are listed in table 6.2: 
5A number of statistical test have been performed on the above specification: The White 
heteroscedasticity test does not indicate heteroscedastic disturbances, the Breusch-Godfrey 
Serial Correlation LIVI Test does not show serially correlated errors, neither does Ramsey's 
reset test indicate a functional mis-specification. The Jarque-Bera normality test suggests 
normally distributed residuals. 
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Table 6-2 
List of insignificant variables 
LnPATENTt Natural log of public sector research effort in the vaccines area, 
expressed as patent grants for public sector research institutions as a 
proportion of the total number of granted patents in same area6. 
Prod uct-oriented public sector research may have depleted the 
chances of appropriating patentable technology. Patent data are 
published on-line by the US patent office (www. uspto. org). 
LnSALESt Natural log of US vaccine sales relative to total pharmaceutical sales. 
An increase in the market size for vaccines relative to pharmaceuticals 
may have improved expected returns in the former sector and as a 
result increase vaccine R&D intensity. Sales data by pharmaceutical 
subgroup are published in PhRMA annual surveys. 
LnPROFITt Following Grabowski (1997) InPROFIT was created in an attempt to 
separate expected returns from cost of funds (variable PROFMARG). 
LnPROFIT is the natural log of the profit margin of the companies in the 
sample, calculated as pre-tax profits as a percentage of sales. A 
change in the profit margin changes expectations of future returns and 
may have increased R&D intensity. 
PREG Zero/one intercept dummy variable to distinguish the periods before 
and after the passing of the NVICP Ace. PREG is equal to one the year 
after the implementation of the Act in 1989. While the NVICP act has 
halted the price rise of most childhood vaccines which may have 
dampened expected returns, companies no longer had to calculate 
future compensatory payment into vaccine prices. The overall effect is 
therefore ambiguous. 
PROPREG Zero/one intercept dummy variable equal to one the year after a US 
supreme court ruling (1980) granted patent protection to biological 
products. The court ruling may have raised rate of return expectations 
on future vaccine developments. 
Although InPROFMARG reflects cost of funds effects, an increase in cash 
flow over sales will not only lower the cost of funds but simultaneously raise 
expectations of future returns. Ideally, the effect of a change in the relative 
cost of funds could be separated from the effect of a change in expected 
6 See figure 5.12 in the previous chapter for a graphical representation of this variable 
7 See previous chapter for details on the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Plan (NVICP) 
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returns to R&D. Introducing InPROFIT proved impractical, however, not only 
because the variable is insignificant; the correlation of the two variables, 
despite the differences in calculation, would also have presented problems of 
multicollinearity. 
A change in cash flow over sales appears to be positively related to R&D 
intensity, because it simultaneously affects the cost of funds and induces 
firms to spend more on R&D in expectation of higher future returns. 
6.4 Error correction model of R&D intensity 
Despite the robustness of the above partial adjustment model and the fact 
that both explanatory and dependent variable are expressed as ratios, it 
cannot be ruled out that the variables are non-stationary and that the 
observed relationship between the variables is spurious. 
A unit root test on InRD, and InPROFMARG reveals that they are integrated 
of order one, i. e. only become stationary after first differencing. 
In the presence of non-stationary time series Engle and Granger (1987) have 
suggested the estimation of an error correction mechanism. 
Following Thomas (1997, p. 383), the following equation 6.7 describes the 
long run equilibrium relationship between the two variables InRD and 
InPROFMARG: 
Equation 6-7 
InRDt = po + PlInPROFMARGt 




InRDt - Do - plinPROFMARGt 
The disequilibrium relationship between lnRD and InPROFMARG can then be 
expressed in the following general form: 
Equation 6-9 
InRDt = bo + blInPROFMARGt + b21nPROFMARGt-l +plnRDt-I +ct 
In equation 6.9 InRD takes time to adjust to variations in InPROFMARG which 
is consistent with the idea that InRD is not always in equilibrium relative to 
PROFMARG. Note that if b2ýO the equation will be a simple partial 
adjustment model such as 6.6 tested above, i. e. the partial adjustment model 
is nested within the general form 6.9. 
As discussed previously, the main problem in estimating the above model is 
that both variables are non-stationary series and classical techniques may not 
be applicable because of spurious regression problems. 
Following Thomas (1997), the above model can be converted into an error 
correction model which, given certain assumptions explained further below, 
contains only stationary series. 
Subtracting InRDt-j from both sides of the equation, equation 6.10 is obtained: 
Equation 6-10 
InRDt-InRDt., =bo+bilnPROFMARGt+b2inPROFMARGt-, -(l-p)InRDt-I +ct 
Adding and subtracting blinPROFMARGt-l from the right hand side of 6.10 gives: 
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Equation 6-11 
InRDt - InRDt-I = bo + blInPROFMARGt - blInPROFMARGt-l + blInPROFMARGt., 
b2lnPROFMARGt-l - (1-p)InRDt-I + ct 
or: 
Equation 6-12 
AInRDt = bo + blAInPROFMARGt + (b, + b2)InPROFMARGt-l - %InRDt-, + ct 
where X= 1-ýt. Further reparameterisation yields: 
Equation 6-13 
AlnRDt = bo + bjAlnPROFMARGt -%(InRDt-I - PlInPROFMARGt-, ) + ct 
having defined the new parameter p, = (b, + b2)/%. Finally po=bo/% is 
introduced as the second new parameter, which will give: 
Equation 6-14 
AInRDt = blAInPROFMARGt -%(InRDt., - po - PjlnPROFMARGt-j) + et 
which is the error-correction model version of 6.9. Note that the term in 
parentheses can be regarded as the disequilibrium error from period W. 
Therefore the current change in lnRD depends on the change in PROFMARG 
and the extent of disequilibrium in the previous period. Since the value of 
lnRD is being corrected for any previous disequilibrium error this 
representation is called a first-order error-correction model (Thomas 1997). 
This transformation could also be undertaken with second or higher order 
lags of the first differenced variables which leads to Granger's general 
formulation in 6.15 which shows the above error term simply as kut-1. 
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Equation 6-15 
AlnRDt = lagged (, &InRD, AInPROFMARG) - kut., +F,, 
In order to ensure that all variables contained in this model are stationary, 
Engle and Granger (ibid. ) suggest a two-step estimation procedure. In a first 
stage it is established that both variables are integrated of order one. As 
indicated above, InRD and InPROFMARG are both integrated of order one 
according to the Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root. After it is established that 
both variables are I(l), the long run parameters are estimated. OLS is used to 
estimate: 
Equation 6-16 
InRDt =cc+ PlInPROFMARGt + ut 
Rearranging 6.16, equation 6.17 shows the residual, which is easily 
recognizable as the error correction term from equation 6.14, except the term 
below is not lagged by one period: 
Equation 6-17 
Ut = InRDt -a- PlInPROFMARGt 
Now the residual from the static regression 6.16 can be tested for stationarity 
using the Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root. Stationary results imply that InRD 
and InPROFMARG are co-integrated. 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected at the 10% level8. It 
follows that the residual ut is a stationary series which, in turn, implies that 
InRD and InPROFMARG are co-integrated. 
a In this case the series seems to be fluctuating around a zero mean, so both intercept and 
time trend were excluded from the test regression 
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Engle and Granger (1987) showed in their article that if two variables such as 
InRD and InPROFMARG are both integrated of order one and the two series 
are co-integrated, equation 6.16 can now be used to obtain an estimate of the 
long run parameters of the relationship between the two variables. The results 
of this estimation are presented in table 6.3. 
Table 6-3 
Dependent Variable: InRD 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1974 1999 
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -1.298879 0.357207 -3.636213 0.0013 
InPROFMARG 0.796692 0.238948 3.334169 0.0028 
R-squared 0.316564 Mean dependent var. 2.474906 
Adjusted R-squared 0.288088 S. D. dependent var. 0.341081 
S. E. of regression 0.287787 Akaike info criterion 0.420610 
Sum squared resid. 1.987711 Schwarz criterion 0.517387 
Log likelihood -3.467936 F-statistic 11.11668 Durbin-Watson stat 0.574913 Prob(F-statistic) 0.002771 
LnPROFMARG (depicting cash flow divided by sales) is, as in the previous 
partial-adjustment model, significantly related to R&D intensity and the 
coefficient has the expected positive sign. The relatively low ý can be 
expected since, by definition, only long run influences were looked at, thereby 
omitting information on dynamic or short run relationships between the 
variables. 
Hence, in the second stage of the Engle-Granger two-step procedure the 
residuals from the co-integrating regression 6.16, can now be used as 
estimates of the disequilibrium error (the term in parentheses) in equation 
6.14. Since all variables are now stationary, equation 6.14 can be estimated 
using OLS without the danger of producing spurious results. 
Note from 6.14 that the disequilibrium error from period t-1 is expected to 
have a negative sign and needs to be lagged by one period. Further to that, 
lagged terms of the first level differences of all variables can be included in 
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the model and their inclusion will be determined by experimentation. Originally 
the first difference of both InPROFMARG and the dependent variable InRD 
lagged by one and two years respectively were included in the estimation but 
were subsequently omitted due to lack of significance. 
This left the lagged residual from 6.16, which is the short run error correction 
term shown as ECMRESID(-l) in the output table, as the only significant 
variable. The short run parameters obtained from the regression are shown in 
table 6A 
Table 6-4 
Dependent Variable: AInRD 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1975 1999 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
ECMRESID(-l) -0.447861 0.136790 -3.274076 0.0032 
R-squared 0.308726 Mean dependent var. 0.001204 
Adjusted R-squared 0.308726 S. D. dependent var. 0.223031 
S. E. of regression 0.185435 Akaike info criterion -0.493052 
Sum squared resid. 0.825263 Schwarz criterion -0.444296 
Log likelihood 7.163144 Durbin-Watson stat 1.571442 
The error correction term has the expected negative sign. Current change in 
research intensity will, in the short term, depend on the disequilibrium error 
from period M. The coefficient of -0.45 indicates that only about half of the 
disequilibrium error of the previous period is made up in the current period. 
Although the above specification seems robus?, the goodness of fit as 
indicated by the adjusted ý is somewhat disappointing. Unlike in the 
estimation of the long run coefficient, the above specification does contain 
information on both long and short run parameters (the error term in 6.14 
includes the lagged values of the level variables InPROFMARG and InRD). 
9 Stability, coefficient, and residual tests indicate no problems of heteroscedasticity, no 
evidence of serially correlated errors and show normally distributed residuals. 
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More problematically, Monte Carlo studies have shown that estimates of the 
cointegrating regression in 6.16 can have small sample bias (Kennedy 1994, 
p. 254), and it is suggested that the separate estimation of the long run 
parameter be replaced by estimation of the full error correction equation, i. e. 
to estimate the long run relationship together with the short run parameters 
rather than separately. There is some evidence to suggest that the small 
sample properties of the estimates obtained in this way are superior to those 
of the two stage Engle-Granger procedure (Thomas 1997). 
For the purpose of estimating the full error correction mechanism, 6.14 is 
multiplied out to obtain: 
Equation 6-18 
AInRDt = Xpo + blAInPROFMARGt -XInRDt-j + XplInPROFMARGt-l + et 
OLS can again be applied to 6.18. Further to lagged terms of InPROFMARG 
and InRD, differenced terms of other explanatory variables were also tested 
for short run influences on the change in research intensity (AlnRD). This, it 
was hoped, would improve the predictive power of the model. This is 
permissible as long as these variables are integrated of order one, again 
avoiding problems of possible spurious regression. Performing a unit root test 
on both InPAT and InSALE'O, both variables become stationary after first 
differencing and can therefore be included in the model. 
Which of the lagged changes in explanatory and dependent variables have 
been included in the final specification of the model, has again been decided 
by experimentation. The following results have been obtained: 
10 See table 6.2 for a description of InSALE and InPAT. 
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Table 6-5 
Dependent Variable: AlnRD 
Method: Least Squares 
Sample(adjusted): 1977 1999 
Included observations: 23 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.561119 0.323460 -1.734741 0.0999 
AlnRD(-l) 0.584177 0.256118 2.280889 0.0350 
InRD(-l) -0.601256 0.167442 -3.590839 0.0021 InPROFMARG(-l) 0.661029 0.206410 3.202511 0.0049 
AlnPAT 0.407197 0.155983 2.610526 0.0177 
R-squared 0.497722 Mean dependent var. 0.020185 
Adjusted R-squared 0.386104 S. D. dependent var. 0.214428 
S. E. of regression 0.168008 Akaike info criterion -0.539955 
Sum squared resid. 0.508078 Schwarz criterion -0.293109 
Log likelihood 11.20949 F-statistic 4.459177 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.073244 Prob(F-statistic) 0.011149 
All variables are significant at the 5% level and the usual diagnostics" 
indicate a robust model. According to the regression output, short run 
changes in R&D intensity depend on the following short run parameters: 
changes in the log of R&D intensity lagged by one year, and changes in the 
ratio of vaccine related patents held by the public sector as a proxy for public 
sector research effort in this area. 
These parameters indicate that almost 60% of the total change in R&D 
intensity is determined by previous year's changes while an increase in public 
sector research effort in the current year will result in a less than 
proportionate increase in R&D intensity, i. e. we would expect a 0.4% increase 
in R&D intensity as a response to a1% increase in research effort led by the 
public sector. Although this result has to be interpreted very carefu IIY12, there 
11 The following statistical test have been performed: Ramsey's reset test, White's 
heteroscedasticity test, Jarque Bera normality test, serial correlation LM test, none of which 
indicate a specification problem. The covariance matrix does not indicate any multicollinearity 
problem. 
12 The reader will have to bear in mind that the proxy used here to measure public sector 
research effort is quite crude. We have simply taken the ratio of vaccine related US patents, 
which have seen some input by public sector institutions (e. g. universities), as a fraction of all 
patents issued in a year. 
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is no evidence from the analysis in this dissertation of public sector research 
effort 'crowding out' private R&D, which would have resulted in a negative 
coefficient for AlnPAT. 
The negative sign of InRD(-l) is expected because this is in effect the 
adjustment parameter% (compare equation 6.18 and 6.14). The adjustment 
parameter indicates the extent to which any disequilibriurn in the long run 
relationship between InRD and InPROFMARG is compensated for in the 
current period. The coefficient of 0.6 indicates that firms will adjust to the 
extent of 60% of the disequilibrium. 
The long run coefficient of InPROFMARG needs to be retrieved through a 
simple transformation. We have estimated ypl=0.66 and the adjustment 
parameter y=0.60. That means that the long run parameter P, is equal to 
0.6610.60=1.1 This implies an almost proportionate increase in research 
intensity as a response to changes in cash flow divided by sales as a long run 
relationship. This is slightly higher than the long run relationship established 
through the Engle Granger procedure but, because of the small sample 
properties of the coefficient in this procedure, likely to be the more reliable 
estimate. 
The value obtained for ý is also higher than in Engle-Granger specification 
but still somewhat low. There is little in the literature to indicate, however, 
whether higher values of ý can be expected from this kind of model. 
6.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
A number of conclusions may be tentatively drawn: in a simple partial 
adjustment model of firms' R&D spending behaviour, changes in cash flow 
(deflated by sales) and past values of R&D intensity appear to impact 
positively on the intensity of research and development (defined as R&D 
spending divided by sales) in the vaccine industry. 
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Other factors, such as the size of the vaccine market relative to 
pharmaceutical products (as a proxy for 'demand pull'), or the share of 
vaccine related patents held by public sector institutions (testing for evidence 
of 'crowding out'), were not significantly related to research intensity, at least 
in the partial adjustment specification. Neither was there any evidence of a 
structural break after the extension of patent protection for biological products 
in 1980 or the implementation of the NVICP act in 1988 13, two events which 
were expected to have a positive impact on firms' R&D spending behaviour. 
Concerns over non-stationarity of the data series and a possible spurious 
regression led to the estimation of an error correction mechanism which, in 
the final form, confirmed the results of the partial adjustment model. 
More specifically, the results emphasise the long run relationship between the 
cost of funds and the allocation of R&D resources. This has implications for a 
range of policies to promote industrial research and development. Any such 
measures designed to lower the cost of funds seem likely to yield the desired 
response in private R&D spending. Such support often comes in the form of 
R&D tax credits which increases the firm's cash flow and hence lowers the 
cost of finance. The above investigation suggests that such measures can be 
effective. 
In the absence of government help, a capital market which is geared towards 
providing risk capital to innovators seems more likely to stimulate private R&D 
spending than a capital market which is risk-averse, and as a result makes 
the financing of 'risky' R&D activity prohibitively expensive. The extent to 
which the US venture capital market has contributed to the success of the 
national biotechnology industry is, of course, well documented. 
The literature suggests that firms will also increase R&D spending as a 
response to an increase in expected returns to R&D. This cannot be ruled 
13 See table 6.2 for a description of dummy variables PREG and PROP 
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out, since the variable used here as a proxy for the relative costs of fundS14 
will not allow the researcher to distinguish fully between cost of funds and 
expected-return effects. 
Further to that, the significant error-correction term indicates that firms will 
adjust to disequilibria in the long run relationship between the cost of funds 
and R&D intensity. The error-correction specification of the model has also 
revealed two factors influencing short term variations in R&D spending. 
Changes in R&D spending in the previous period is a good indicator of 
changes in current R&D spending. This pattern is expected since most R&D 
projects are longer term and require the firm to devote a continuous stream of 
resources over a longer time period. 
The model also suggests a positive short run influence of year-on-year 
changes in public sector research effort on changes in the firm's R&D 
intensity. It is difficult to envisage the short term dynamics of this relationship 
given the rather crude nature of the variable used as a proxy for public R&D 
effort. What can be stated from this investigation, however, is that public 
sector research effort does not appear to 'crowd out' or replace private sector 
R&D spending in the short term. 
The above investigation has obvious limitations. For example, the small 
number of observations has made it difficult to obtain significant coefficients. 
This is perhaps less of a problem since the researcher is less likely to commit 
a type one error, i. e. believe in the significance of a variable when in reality 
the influence is zero. On the other hand the influence of other variables may 
be neglected. What Gujarati (1995, p. 326) calls problems with 
'micronumerosity' will also make the OLS estimators sensitive to small 
changes in the data. This is, potentially, the more serious problem because it 
U Depreciation and R&D expenditure were added to company after tax profits in an attempt to 
distinguish the cost of finance from the expected return to R&D effect. Expectation are more 
likely to be influenced by a company's pre-tax profits, a variable which was tested but showed 
no significant effect on R&D spending. 
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reduces the reliability of the estimates, and coefficients may change or 
become insignificant when more data become available. 
There is little which can be done about the small number of observations as 
far as the above model is concerned, since at the time of writing all available 
data were included in the model and the number of relevant firms is very 
small. The exclusive focus on vaccine-producing manufacturers is probably 
justified in the context of this thesis. Given the more general relevance of the 
findings for science and technology policy, future research should perhaps be 
directed at the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. 
In the remainder of the thesis the scope of the investigation will, however, be 
extended to include firms in the biotechnology industry, which has recently 
become very important for vaccine innovation. Although it is too new an 
industry to consider an investigation over a longer period of time, the 
availability of individual firm level data over a short period of time will allow the 
researcher to pool time series and cross-sectional data and thereby obtain a 
larger number of relevant observations. 
Using research performance indicators of established biotechnology firms, the 
following section will look at another important aspect of the promotion of 
research and development, research co-operation and knowledge transfer 
between the public and private sectors. 
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PART TWO 
RELATED ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
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7 Public-private interaction and the impact on productivitv o 
biotech research 
7.1 Background 
The previous Chapter sought to demonstrate that companies, when left 
to their own devices, respond primarily to changes in overall profit 
contributions when allocating funds to R&D, but there was no indication 
that firms responded to changes in demand ('demand pull') in the vaccine 
segment of the market. Neither was there any evidence that public sector 
research crowds out private sector R&D. On the contrary, organisations 
such as WHO (2000b), which are aiming to improve incentives for 
vaccine R&D, now take the view that joint public-private research is more 
likely to produce successful research than private sector research. alone 
(the 'technology push' argument). 
The Chapter will look for evidence in the literature that joint public- private 
research produces superior research outcomes. Chapter Eight will 
continue the argument, with an empirical investigation of the impact of 
public-private cooperation on the productivity of research in both the 
biotechnology and the traditional pharmaceutical industry. 
7.2 The importance of biotech for vaccine innovation 
The total number of biotechnology medicines in development in 1996 
grew by 50% over the previous year (Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America 1996, p. 1). What makes biotechnology 
products so interesting in the context of this study is that vaccines are not 
only the second largest group of biotech products after monoclonal 
antibodies, vaccines also record the second fastest growth, up 44% over 
the previous year, after gene therapy (up 65%), but in total terms much 
smaller than vaccines as can be seen in figure 7-1. 
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Figure 7-1 
Biotechnology medicines/vaccines in development in the US 
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Source: Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 1996 
The 62 vaccines in development include vaccines for cancer, AIDS, 
rheumatoid arthritis and multiple sclerosis. If vaccines are becoming such 
an important subgroup of biotechnology medicines, an understanding of 
biotech companies' R&D behaviour may help understand the rate of 
vaccine-related R&D in pharmaceutical companies. 
Making a link between biotechnology employed and the biotech industry 
is, however, not as straightforward as it may seem (Financial Times, 
26/11/96, p. 11). Pharmaceutical companies often claim that there is no 
biotech industry as such, because they feel they have used 
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biotechnology all along, while some of the so-called biotech companies 
do not. This is true, in a strictly technological sense of the terms involved. 
Biotechnology involves the use of living material, as opposed to 
chemistry -traditionally employed by the pharmaceutical industry. Today 
many pharmaceutical companies employ biotechnology alongside 
chemistry and some of the so-called biotech companies employ 
chemistry alone. 
The term biotech is more often used in a commercial sense, describing 
start-up companies operating with venture capital. These start-ups 
maintain close links with the academic community' or were set up 
originally by university scientists. Biotech companies often pursue risky 
research activity and rely on big drug companies to market and distribute 
new drugs under a licensing agreement. 
This gives rise to the question whether the commercial biotechnology 
sector, which will be the focus of this investigation, is relevant to vaccine 
research. Over 60% of biotech vaccines in development did, however, 
come from newly established biotech companieS2 so not only the 
technology but the also the biotech industry itself are important for 
vaccine innovation. 
7.3 Joint research and networks of innovation 
There is a large body of literature evaluating the motives for co-operation 
in biotech research. One area of research, mainly coming from the 
Strategic Management field, focuses on partnerships between large 
pharmaceutical companies and so-called new biotech companies. 
1 More about the extent of these links follows in section 7.3. 
2 44 out of 66 biotech vaccines under development are owned by firms associated with 
the biotechnology sector (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
1996). 
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Although not strictly related to interaction between the private and the 
public sector, which is the interest of this study, this body of literature has 
highlighted the role of networks of innovation and knowledge spillover. 
This is a good starting point for any further research and helps to 
understand part of the motivation to co-operate in the field of 
biotechnology. 
From a theoretical perspective, collaboration in biotechnology lies 
between the 'extremes' of market exchange and the full vertical 
integration of all elements in the value chain within one company. 
Exchange of knowledge, which is at the core of most, if not all 
collaborative relationships, does however involve transaction costs. 
Technical information cannot be exchanged in anonymous pure market 
transactions because of appropriability problems and the added need to 
develop complementary tacit knowledge, skills and assets (Barbanti et al. 
1999). 
Collaboration may also avoid the inefficiencies of complete integration, 
which in the context of the relatively young discipline of biotechnology 
means unaffordably high R&D expenditure, lack of responsiveness to 
rapid technical change, and a multidisciplinary character of the 
knowledge pool. By collaborating, firms can tap into that knowledge pool 
without the costs and risk of integration (ibid., p. 14). 
On the downside, weak appropriability conditions make collaboration 
difficult and collaboration cannot be a substitute for building up strong 
technological capabilities in order to assess the value of information one 
is getting through collaboration (Arora and Gambardella 1994). 
There is some empirical evidence that biotechnology firms collaborate 
more than other sectors of industry: Kleinknecht and Reijnen (1992) 
review the R&D co-operation literature using a sample of manufacturing 
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and service firms representative for an entire country, in this case the 
Netherlands. Kleinknecht and Reijnen discard the widely held belief that 
R&D co-operation occurs mainly in high-tech sectors and between large, 
oligopolistic firms which typically operate in global markets. 
"R&D collaboration appears to be a much more widespread 
phenomenon than is generally suggested in the literature, [ ... 
] there 
are only weak indications that the high costs and associated risks of 
new technologies are an incentive to co-operate on R&D firm size 
has no influence on co-operation between firms, [ ... 
] and market 
concentration does not matter for cooperation with any type of 
partner. " (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992, p. 356). 
The authors confirm, however, that biotechnology is the only sector with 
more-than-average R&D cooperation, while other high-tech sectors show 
little evidence that high-tech is conducive to R&D co-operation. The 
authors also seek to demonstrate that government innovation support 
facilities positively impact on co-operation and that the existence of a 
formal R&D department is conducive to co-operation with three or more 
partners, i. e. forming networks of innovation. This seems to suggest that 
formal R&D departments are more capable of exploiting external sources 
of knowledge. 
Barbanti et al. (1999) suggest that collaborative relations could be 
considered a transient phenomenon, decreasing in scale and scope as 
the technology matures and the industry moves to higher degrees of 
vertical integration. On the other hand collaboration could also be seen 
as a new form of organisation of innovative activities reflecting the need 
to tap into to an increasingly complex knowledge base. 
Evidence for either of these scenarios is inconclusive: Haagedorn (1990) 
researches the fact that R&D co-operation is becoming increasingly 
important in the biotech sector. The total number of biotechnology co- 
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operation agreements between firms has been increasing steadily from 
the early 1970s, when biotech was still in a state of 'infancy', until 1987 
after which the rapid growth has slightly declined. 
The most recent available figures (Mytelka 1999) show that prior to 1979 
worldwide only 62 technological co-operation agreements were signed. In 
the period 1980-84 this figure rose to 222 agreements and between 
1985-89 to 398. Towards the first years of the 1990s there was a steep 
drop in the numbers of agreements signed, falling to just 50 agreements 
in 1991. This decline seems only temporary and coincides with the 
economic downturn of the early 1990s, rather than reflecting a trend 
towards vertical integration. The number of new collaboration 
agreements picked up again in 1993, exceeding the 1989 figure by 34% 
but not quite reaching the 1985 figure of around 160 agreements. 
Barley et al. (1992) investigate the structure of biotechnology co- 
operations in greater detail and find that the majority of organisations that 
form alliances with biotech companies are large diversified organisations 
such as drug companies. Geographically speaking, there is a tendency 
for European and Japanese corporations to become very heavily involved 
with US biotech companies, allowing them more autonomy than US 
corporations, while at the same time securing the funding of long-term 
research. 
Haagedorn (1990) also investigates types of co-operation agreements in 
biotechnology. Among the modes of co-operation, joint R&D agreements 
represent the most important group with nearly 30% of all co-operative 
agreements followed by direct investment (19%), customer-supplier 
relations (15.3%), one-directional technology floWS3 (15.1%), joint 
ventures (13.5%) and technology exchange agreements (6.9%). 
An example of one-directional technological flows would be licensing agreements. 
174 
This distribution is different from the Information technology sector where 
technology exchange (12.1%), joint ventures (16.9%) and one-directional 
technology flows (21.4%) are more important, whilst direct investment 
(13.1%) and customer supplier relations (9%) are markedly less so 
(Haagedorn 1990, p. 7). These differences confirm the special nature of 
biotech co-operations which are often between small biotech and large 
multinational companies, while the type of co-operations in the IT sector 
indicate partners of similar size and commercial strength. The more 
mature IT industry predictably shows a higher incidence of licensing 
agreements (which is here classified as one-directional technology flows). 
Haagedom (1990, p. 11) also investigates motives for undertaking the 
most important form of co-operation, joint research. Two motives clearly 
stand out: In the biotechnology sector, technological complementarity 
(38.1%) and the reduction of innovation time span (31%) are the two 
most significant reasons to undertake joint R&D, with the lack of financial 
resources coming a distant third (12.1%). As a motive for direct 
investment in biotech, technological competence of the partner comes 
top (36.7%). 
Haagedorn's study is revealing, in that it shows the importance of 
technology transfer in joint research as a form and motive of co-operative 
research in the biotechnology industry. The study is however limited in its 
focus on inter-firm co-operation which at least in the case of biotech is 
just one form of co-operation besides co-operation with universities and 
other research institutions. Also, the motives are too broadly defined; 
technological complementarity seems more like a prerequisite for co- 
operation than an actual reason. Firms with complementary technology 
really are competitors in the first place; what makes firms in 
tech nolog ica I ly-related fields co-operate rather than compete is the more 
interesting question to investigate. 
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A more detailed classification of possible forms of alliances is proposed 
by Forrest and Martin (1992) and presented here in table 7-1. 
Table 7-1 
Forms of alliances in the biotech industry 
Operating joint venture Independent third enterprise. Assets are 
contributed by both parties, who also share 
the risk 
Equity investment Investment by large established company in 
firm 
Client sponsored research contract Small company is paid to conduct research 
on particular products or processes 
Marketing/ distribution agreement Another company will market and distribute 
firm's pro uct 
Manufacturing agreement Another company agrees to manufacture 
product 
University agreement Firm pays university to conduct research on 
its behalf 
Research institute agreement Firm pays institute to conduct research 
Collaborative R&D Agreement with another company to 
collaborate on development of specific 
product or process 
Research and development limited Tax advantaged investment vehicle which 
partnership (RDLP) provides funding for new product R&D at no 
cost to company 
Technology licensing (inward) Firm is granted access another company's 
patents or technology for a fee 
Technology licensing (outward) Reverse from above, firm receives fee 
Source: Forrest and Martin (1992, p. 42) 
The authors also show the incidence of alliances in this sector reported to 
them in a questionnaire survey, as shown here in Table 7.2.: 
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Table 7-2 
Incidence of alliances reported by DBCs (Dedicated 
Biotech Companies) 
Rank Number Average 
number of 
alliances /firm 
University agreement 1 219 5.21 
Client sponsored R&D 2 179 4.26 
Marketing/distribution 3 168 4 
Technology licensing (inward) 4 133 3.17 
Collaborative R&D 5 116 1 2.76 
Technology licensing (outward) 6 86 2.05 
Manufacturing 7 73 1.86 
Equity investment 8 73 1.74 
Joint ventures 9 50 1.19 
Research institute 10= 22 0.52 
RDLP 10= 22 0.52 
Total (all types) 1146 
Source: Forrest and Martin (1992, p. 44) 
University agreements clearly come out top followed by client-sponsored 
R&D, Marketing/distribution and licensing agreements. This confirms the 
proximity to science of Biotech companieS4 and the nature of the 
relationship with large pharmaceutical companies which is characterised 
by either contractual R&D, licensing agreements or outsourcing of 
marketing and distribution functions, i. e., activities where the two partners 
complement each other rather than share the same expertise. 
This complementary nature of the relationship then helps firms to realise 
their principal aims of forming alliances which Forrest and Martin (1992, 
p. 45) list as 'facilitating rapid exploitation of new technology', 'generating 
short term revenues, 'sharing the risk of new product development, 
4 Large pharmaceutical companies by comparison have so few links to the university 
sector that they were not reported in this survey. 
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I gaining access to financing', 'gaining credibility' and 'gaining access to a 
partner's R&D facility', listed here in order of importance. 
Barbanti et al. (1999) use a mixed sample of pharmaceutical companies 
and biotechnology firms to investigate the structure of alliances over time. 
In their survey the number of agreements with universities has declined 
while collaborations with biotech firms have increased. These results are 
shown in the following figure: 
Figure 7-2 
The authors conclude from their findings that biotechnology is coming 
closer to commercialisation, which seems confirmed by the fact that 
research agreements have declined in importance. The sample is 
however heavily skewed towards the traditional pharmaceutical sector 5 
5 Although all 20 corporations are active in biotechnology, only two firms in the sample 
(Genentech and Amgen) are dedicated new biotechnology firms. 
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and it is problematic to deduce a change in the lifecycle of the 
biotechnology industry from the above findings. 
Forrest and Martin (1992) investigate changes in the life cycle of the 
biotechnology industry by analysing a number of case studies. The 
authors demonstrate that the reasons for alliance formation vary with the 
life cycle of the company. They quote the example of Applied 
BioTechnology, a small, young company in the R&D stage of its life cycle, 
which had already formed a variety of alliances at the pre-competitive 
stage of the process of innovation. The firm's founding scientists were the 
pioneers of the firm's technology and it aimed to augment this technology 
through a variety of technology development alliances. The authors 
explain that university alliances and inward technology licensing 
agreements were chosen to improve the firm's technology core, while: 
"dedicated biotechnology companies which had developed products 
further along the innovation process beyond R&D found that their 
reasons for alliance formation were changing. Allelix, lacking the 
expertise in product approval and knowledge of the marketplace, 
found that the expertise to speed up the commercialisation of its 
products must be obtained through alliance formation" (Forrest and 
Martin 1992, pp. 47-48). 
These findings are quoted because the notion of a life cycle of 
technology is very important for understanding the behaviour of biotech 
companies compared to larger pharmaceutical companies which are 
arguably at a later stage of their technological development. Biotech 
companies are more likely to seek contacts with science, e. g. 
universities, in order to strengthen their technology core, than larger 
pharmaceutical companies which aim to exploit commercially a more 
established technology. More mature Biotech companies would also 
become increasingly concerned about second round financing and a 
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strategic alliance with a larger company might be formed for the purpose 
of bringing in much needed funds. 
In a situation where a Biotech company tries simultaneously to develop a 
new technology from an early stage and commercially exploit another 
more mature technology, the company may enter a network of alliances, 
in this instance perhaps a science-oriented alliance with a university and 
a distribution alliance with a large drug company. 
Earlier research into network relationships has either focused on ties 
between biotech firms, e. g. Powell (1996), or between pharmaceutical 
firms and biotech firms (Arora and Gambardella 1994). Oliver and 
Liebeskind (1998) have later added 'interpersonal ties' to the possible 
forms of network relationships. 
Arora and Gambardella (1994) argue that the division of innovative 
labour, a necessary prerequisite to form networks of innovation, has been 
facilitated by the 'changing technology of technological change'. They 
point out that: 
"when innovations depended primarily on trial and error procedures 
based on physical experiments, much of the knowledge base of the 
firm was experience-based and tacit. The research process that was 
carried out based on such firm-specific knowledge produced 
information that was local and context dependent. Almost by definition, 
context-dependent information could not be used by an agent 
unfamiliar with the context within which the information was generated 
(Arora and Gambardella 1994, p. 526). 
As, for instance, the drug industry has been using computers to design 
new compounds and scientific understanding in molecular biology and 
the working of the human metabolism has grown: 
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"concrete information comes to be related to more general classes of 
phenomena, it becomes less context dependent, and can be codified 
and in ways that are more meaningful and useful for other firms as well 
making the production process of new technologies more divisible" 
(Arora and Gambardella 1994, pp. 527-528). 
The authors point out that although small firms were traditionally seen as 
more capable of innovating, largely because they could minimise 
problems of asymmetric information between innovators and resource 
allocators, they were in the past unable to delegate part of the innovation 
process to other entities for the reasons discussed above. With the 
division of innovative labour facilitated, the rate of innovation in small 
firms and networking activities between small and large firms can be 
expected to increase. 
Whether networking has indeed generally paid off for Biotech companies 
has been investigated by Powell (1996). Powell argues that collaboration 
is connected to the growth of a biotech company. In his view networks of 
collaboration provide "entry into a field in which the relevant knowledge is 
widely distributed and not easily produced inside the boundaries of a firm 
or obtained through market transactions. We argue that biotech firms 
grow by being connected to benefit rich networks" (Powell 1996, p. 139). 
Powell provides some empirical evidence for this view using a panel 
regression model on a sample of 225 Dedicated Biotech Firms (DBFs) 
over a five period, from 1990-1994. The authors found that experience 
gained through R&D or other alliances enables firms to enter further 
alliances, more diverse alliances and at the same time increases the 
degree of centrality within an alliance. It is this centrality coupled with 
network experiences which is statistically connected to internal growth of 
the company. In other words T&D ties and other types of collaborations 
are the admission ticket, while diversity, experience, and centrality are 
the main drivers of a dynamic system in which disparate firms join 
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together in efforts to keep pace in high speed learning races. " (Powell 
1996, p. 138). 
Oliver and Liebeskind (1998) categorise three different forms and 
associated functions of networks for sourcing intellectual capital in the 
biotech industry, intraorganisational networks that operate at the 
individual or interpersonal level, interorganisational networks that operate 
at the individual or interpersonal level and interorganisational networks 
that operate at the organisational level. 
As established above, Biotech firms would rely on a network of alliances 
with partners for different stages of the lifecycle of technology. In Oliver 
and Liebeskind's scheme, exchanges of new scientific knowledge, i. e. 
the earliest stage in the exploitation of knowledge, happens primarily in 
interpersonal networks, either inter- or intraorganisational. 
Interorganisational networks that operate at the organisational level are 
more likely to be used for the purpose of knowledge commercialisation 
and commercial development, i. e. at a later stage of the technology 
lifecycle. 
Oliver and Liebeskind also point out that it is a notable feature of biotech 
firms that they maintain a "large number of individual level research 
collaborations with scientists at universities and other research 
institutions" (Oliver and Liebeskind 1998, p. 83). The authors illustrate the 
importance of these types of networks over the biotech product lifecycle 
in the following diagram: 
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Figure 7-3 
The Product Development Cycle 
Discovery R&D Development R&D Testing and Trials Manufacturing 
and Distribution 
Within University: 
Scientist - Scientist 
Within University: Scientist- 
Technology Transfer 
Within New Biotech Firms (NBF): Scientist- 
Scientist 
Between University and NBF: ScientiSt-SCiE 
Between Universities 
Scientist-Scienl 
I Between NBF and Established Firm 
Type of Network Individual: Individual: Organisational: 
Ties: Intraorganisational7/nteroganisationaI Interorganisational 
Source: Oliver and Liebeskind 1998, p. 93 
Based on interviews and related literature the authors explain that 
knowledge is transferred to New Biotech Firms (NBF) or created within 
NBFs almost exclusively through interpersonal ties, either intra- or inter 
organisational; the number or interorganisational ties between NBFs and 
universities is, however, growing. At the same time, products flow out of 
NBFs via established firms and on to the market mainly through 
interorganisational ties. 
What has been established in this section is that joint R&D between 
universities and biotech firms is important as a free-standing 
collaboration but more often as part of a network of alliances. Social 
networks, often based on individual ties between researchers, contribute 
greatly to the transfer of knowledge from one sector to the other. The 
following section will investigate further what is understood by research 
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undertaken at universities as opposed to development work in the private 
sector, how co-operation between the two sector can be measured and 
to what extent co-operation between these two sectors positively impacts 
on research outcome. 
7.4 Interaction between firms and the public sector 
This section aims to distinguish between different forms of research and 
discuss whether the terms research, development, science and 
technology are still accurate depictions of the work undertaken at 
universities, research institutions and the private sector. 
'Basic research' or 'research' is seen as an attempt to advance the 
frontiers of human knowledge and it is not primarily directed towards any 
specific practical aim or application. It is carried out by universities, 
institutes, government establishments and sometimes the industry. 
'Applied research' according to an OECD definition (OECD 1970) is "also 
an original investigation in order to gain new scientific or technical 
knowledge, it is however directed towards a specific practical aim or 
objective. " In industry, this implies commercial objectives with respect to 
products or processes. 
'Development' or 'experimental development' is the use of knowledge 
gained through research directed towards the production of materials and 
devices. Although it is primarily applied research and development which 
is carried out in a firm's R&D department, industry does depend on basic 
research with many of today's products derived from the ingenuity of 
individual researchers. 
Since traditionally public sector research is concerned with the generation 
of fundamental knowledge which has no immediate commercial 
applicability, private sector funds are less likely to be invested in this 
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area. This may also help to explain why in the past pharmaceutical firms 
have undertaken little basic research. As outlined above the biotech 
sector seems to have changed this paradigm. Biotech firms are said to 
maintain closer links to the academic community and they are believed to 
rely to a greater extent on public-private interaction than traditional drug 
companies. Should intensive public-private interaction result in greater 
research productivity in the biotech sector then this has important 
implications on how to stimulate R&D and bring new products to the 
market. 
Science policy has for many years tried to stimulate science in general 
and knowledge transfer from science to technology in particular, often 
justified on the grounds of the strategic importance and competitiveness 
of an industry such as Biotech. Surprisingly there is consensus across 
the political spectrum that central government's discretion is desirable 
when it comes to the allocation of funds for the advance of science. As 
Dasgupta notes (1994, p. 488): 
"Perhaps because demands for closer management control over 
government funded science and engineering research to improve its 
social payoff do seem discordant when emanating from circles that, in 
other contexts, are instinctively doubtful of the public sector's capability 
to allocate scarce resources efficiently, the idea of bringing the work of 
academic researchers into closer connection with market-oriented 
industrial R&D projects has lately been gaining a remarkable degree of 
support. " 
Less consensus can be found over the question of how exactly this 
should be done. Should any nation choose to advance its own research 
into, for example, the human genome project or wait until the most 
advanced nation disseminates the results through the international 
scientific community? Does it make sense for a nation to catch up in 
biotechnology with the Americans or is a nation's competitiveness better 
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served if an alternative technology with a smaller knowledge gap is 
pursued 6? And, of particular relevance for this study, what is to be gained 
from closer co-operation between science and technology and how do 
we measure or even define these gains? 
The notion that something needs to be done to help science goes back to 
Arrow's (1962) idea of market failure in basic science and a systematic 
underinvestment in science 7. Arrow was the first to make the important 
distinction between the production and the transmission of information, 
the latter being easier, less costly and less risky than the former. This 
gave information the character of a public good. Arrow also pointed out 
that purchasers of information could not assess its value prior to 
purchase without the information being revealed which no seller in his 
right mind would do. Any market trading commodities with the properties 
of information would be liable to breakdown because the benefits for the 
user cannot be appropriated by the producer of information. Arrow (1962, 
p. 623) follows that "for optimal allocation to invention it would be 
necessary for the government or some other agency not governed by 
profit or loss criteria to finance research and invention" and hence that 
the market would systematically underinvest into basic research. 
Arrow's observations do not concern all types of R&D activity to the same 
degree. Dasgupta and David (1987 and 1994) argue that R&D activity 
differs in three aspects: First, the degree of uncertainty of research. The 
more applied the focus of research the greater the probability that some 
marketable product comes out at the end. Second, the difficulty of 
establishing property rights will determine the appropriability. The first 
and the second aspect will usually go hand in hand; the more applied the 
research the easier it is to gain property rights. Third, the attitude towards 
6 The issue of how to identify the competitive advantage of nations in certain 
technological key areas will be addressed in more detail in chapter 9. 
7 Arrow's work and Demsetz's critique has been discussed in greater detail in chapter 
three 
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communicating the results of research: the more inclined researchers are 
to communicate their results, the less likely it is that returns on that 
research can be appropriated. All three aspects manifest the distinction 
between science and technology. While science is more likely to be 
subject to market failure, technology can be organised within the market 
framework because it is prod uct-oriented hence patentable and often 
undertaken in the secrecy of corporate laboratories. For many years 
science policy was generally pursued on the premise that science 
needed state support and technology could well look after itself. 
Considerable attention was devoted to knowledge transfer to make sure 
that govern me nt-spo nso red basic research findings would eventually 
inspire industry and hence growth. 
Dasgupta and David (1987, p. 524), however, point out that: 
"an outside observer would be hard pressed to decide whether a 
research worker was a scientist or a technologist, merely by 
categorising the sequence of activities in which he or she was 
engaged, or examining the results obtained at any given point in the 
research programme. " 
Earlier Salomon (1973) had observed that modern scientific research can 
be treated as one continuous process which abolishes the gap between 
generalisation stages and application stages. Dasgupta and David (1994, 
p. 495) clarify that 
"what matters is the socio-economic rule structures under which the 
research takes place, and, most importantly, what the researchers do 
with their findings: research undertaken with the intention of selling the 
fruits into secrecy belongs unambiguously to the realm of technology. " 
Dasgupta (ibid. ) also believes that researchers in the realm of science 
aim for priority, to be the first to have published a particular discovery, 
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while technologists reap the benefits of their effort in the form of financial 
rewards through increases in pay, share options, bonuses or rapid 
promotion. 
This motivational divide is, however, not rigid. Many scientists see an 
initial employment in science and prolific publishing activity as signalling 
their qualifications to the potentially more rewarding technology sector of 
the economy. Dasgupta and David (1994, p. 514) believe that scientists 
could view their employment in academia as a preliminary step to a more 
rewarding employment in technology. Any change in the reward structure 
in favour of technology would explain scientists more actively seeking 
collaboration with, if not employment in, the technology sector8. This 
explains public private interaction in research as a scientist-d riven 
phenomenon. There is however ample evidence that the technology 
sector is pushing into science as well. 
Hicks (1995) analysed firms' motivation to publish across industry. She 
finds (p. 403) that in the US in 1991 companies produced 9% of science 
and engineering publications overall. In the biological sciences nine 
corporations had an average number of citations per paper that rank 
them among the top 25 US universities. Two companies -Cetus and 
Genentech- had average citations per paper that exceeded that of the 
top 25 universities. In other words some biotech companies' scientific 
publications are numerous and of a high quality. 
Despite the importance of knowledge transfer, firms' propensity to publish 
stands in an apparent conflict with the need to appropriate information 
rather than share it with potential imitators. However, firms manage the 
public/private distinction very carefully. Hicks (ibid., p. 408) explains, 
"although patents appropriate knowledge, they also make it thoroughly 
public. Secrecy also appropriates but it is alternative to rather than 
a Chapter Nine will provide some statistics on the movements of scientific labour 
between sectors of the economy. 
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compatible with patenting. In choosing between secrecy and patenting, 
companies manage the release of their knowledge. " Publication therefore 
depends on whether patenting is available; if information can be patented 
it can be published. 
Rosenberg (1990, pp. 170-171) provides the most comprehensive list of 
reasons why firms would undertake long term research as opposed to 
short term applied research, and is quoted in full in table 7-3: 
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Table 7-3 
To produce research results: 
1. basic research results are often produced unintentionally. 
2. In order to understand better how and where to conduct research of a more applied 
nature. 
3. essential for evaluating the outcome of much applied research and for perceiving its 
possible implications. 
Other reasons: 
4. as a ticket to an information network. 
5. to monitor and evaluate research being conducted elsewhere. 
Mana-qers' reasons for performinq basic research could be: 
1. because, who knows, we might come up with a fundamental breakthrough of 
proprietary value. 
2. because it is not too expensive on a modest scale and the efforts of one or a few 
scientists can provide a big pay-off in terms of entry into new fields or even possibly a 
new product. 
3. to improve basic understanding of the materials, processes, and phenomena with 
which we deal. 
Other reasons: 
4. to improve our image in the academic and scientific community. 
5. to give us a window into new areas of technology before they become widely 
disseminated. 
6. to help in recruiting high-grade technical people. Having some opportunity for doing 
'their own work' helps to keep basic research-oriented scientists happy; it is a fringe 
benefit. 
Source: Rosenberg (1990, pp. 170-171) 
Maxwell and Eckhardt (1990) confirm some of the above for 
pharmaceutical firms. They could show that science made a significant 
contribution to bringing products to the market. In a historic review of 32 
innovative drugs they conclude (1990, p. 395-396) that, "without these 
diverse non-industrial contributions, approximately 60% of the drugs 
would not have been discovered or would have had their discoveries 
markedly delayed. " Firms will therefore benefit from undertaking scientific 
research or collaborating with science by identifying useful scientific 
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knowledge and in the process acquiring a first mover advantage over 
their competitors. 
7.5 Public-private interaction and the impact on innovativeness 
If firms' interaction with science helps them to acquire a first mover 
advantage, then firms' ability to transfer knowledge from science to 
technology should have a measurable impact on their innovativeness. 
This hypothesis has initiated a number of empirical investigations. 
Gambardella (1991) looked at the 14 largest US-based drug firms 
between 1973 and 1986, trying to establish whether firms which organise 
their internal research along the lines of academic departments are 
significantly better at exploiting science than firms which do not allow 
their scientists to publish or pursue research projects autonomously. 
Using the number of US patents as a proxy for innovation and the 
number of scientific papers as a proxy for in-house scientific capabilitY9 
Gambardella (1992, p. 404) was able to show, that "innovation (patents) 
is correlated with measures of the in-house scientific capabilities 
(scientific publications) even after controlling for R&D. " 
Further than that, Merck, arguably the most successful US 
pharmaceutical firm, has introduced a quasi-academic system of peer 
review of internal research projects. Gambardella (1992, p. 393) finds 
that head scientists of particular research projects had to convince 
scientists on competing projects that an allocation of resources in their 
favour is justified. Cockburn and Henderson (1997) confirm that prior to 
about 1980 firms viewed publication as a distraction or a luxury but as the 
9 The author points out that looking at the number of scientific papers only cannot 
account for differences in quality of these papers. Many company publications are indeed 
clinical papers concerned with patients' response to medication which is applied 
research rather than science. However, if one considers publishing as a measure of 
connectedness to the scientific community the number of papers still seems a 
reasonable proxy. 
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rate of scientific advance increased in the biomedical sector more and 
more firms started to encourage publishing and hire leading academic 
researchers. Publishing was also recognised as a cost-effective means of 
monitoring the quality of research and as tool for screening future 
recruits. This wasn't always good news for research productivity as 
Cockburn and Henderson (1997, p. 15) point out: 
"Firms that stressed publication and leading edge science 'too much' 
gradually developed research groups that were much more like 
universities than anything else - and that shared the universities' 
failure to be able to produce an actual, commercial product. " 
The subsequent emergence of peer-dominated committees to allocate 
resources across projects sought to ensure that there were good papers 
and commercial drugs as a result. Interestingly Arora and Gambardella 
(1990) have suggested that one of the reasons for the failure of 
established pharmaceutical companies to enter the biotech sector was 
that they were lacking the necessary access to networks of scientists. 
A number of papers have empirically established the importance of 
scientific networks for the success of firms. Zucker et al. (1994) 
investigate how two Californian biotech firms source their scientific 
knowledge. The authors are particularly interested how social networks 
impact on learning and flexibility in the organisations. Social networks are 
defined as exchanges between legally distinct entities but without using 
competitive pricing or legal contracting. Firms could benefit from these 
networks "by sourcing scientific knowledge from a wide variety of external 
scientists and organisations" and by doing that "an NBF (New Biotech 
Firm) can increase the likelihood that it will be the first to gain access to, 
or knowledge about, new discoveries" (Liebeskind et al., 1995, p. 10). 
Sourcing information through social networks often manifests itself in 
collaborative research, which has the advantage that knowledge is 
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directly integrated into the R&D project of the collaborating firm. The 
authors measure the extent of social networking in terms of scholarly 
publications on which companies' scientists were named as authors. 
Using two Californian biotech firms the authors recorded the number, 
identity, and type of institutions at which collaborating scientists worked 
and at the same time the number of non-collaborative publications of the 
two firms. As a further variable, numbers of patents obtained by the two 
firms were gathered. Not only did scientists at both firms publish their 
research, a large number of publications were joint publications with 
authors from other institutions (Liebeskind et al. 1995, p. 18). Most of the 
external exchanges were undertaken with universities and other non- 
profit institutions and were not governed by contracts or other market 
mechanisms but rather by informal scientific social networks. Perhaps 
surprisingly, only a small number of shared patents were recorded, which 
means that the collaboration was largely of a basic nature with little 
commercial relevance. The authors remind us, however, that in the case 
of biotechnology basic scientific discoveries can be as valuable as 
products. Liebeskind et al. conclude that it is the existence of these 
networks which is critical for a firm's success, although they do not 
attempt to establish a causality between research collaboration and the 
number of patents. 
As a next step, the influence of 'star scientists' on a number of aspects of 
firm's success was investigated, most notably by Zucker, Darby and 
Armstrong (1994), Zucker and Darby (1 995a, 1995b), Zucker, Darby and 
Brewer (1998) and Zucker and Darby (1999). 
The authors showed that proximity of star scientists would generate 
knowledge spill-overs into the sector of new biotechnology firms and 
could explain the initial location as well as subsequent performance 
measures such as the number of products in development, products on 
the market and changes in employment. 
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The initial hypothesis postulates that information, rather than being a 
nonrivalrous good, should be analysed as excludable knowledge, held by 
the group of discoverers of that knowledge. After the 1973 discovery of 
the basic technique for recombinant DNA by Stanley Cohen and Herbert 
Boyer, it took 10 to 15 years for this knowledge to spread sufficiently 
widely and to become scientifically routine. These discoverers 
subsequently become scientist-entrepreneurs who often remained 
professor at a university faculty and ran businesses on the side. If this is 
the case, then the existence of 'star' scientists, defined as researchers 
discovering more than 40 genetic sequences until the early 1990s, will 
have an impact on where new biotechnology enterprises are created. 
That is, in close proximity to university sites. Zucker, Darby and Brewer 
(1998) show that beside the proximity of star scientist, the number of top 
universities in the region, the number of faculty with federal support, the 
number of venture capital firms in the region, total employment and 
average wages all positively influence the stock of biotech using firms at 
the beginning of 1990 by region. As far as causation is concerned, the 
number of star scientists most likely impacts on the availability of federal 
funding, venture capital and the academic reputation of the faculty itself. 
For the purpose of this study, the aspect of interaction must be explored 
in greater detail. The works cited above have explored proximity of 
science to the firm or scientific activity within a firm but not specifically 
interaction between firms and the scientific community, although 
interaction is clearly assumed to take place in all of the above 
approaches. 
In a non-biotechnology context Cockburn and Henderson (1997) have 
explored the traditional pharmaceutical industry and the extent to which 
public-private interaction, measured as co-authorship of scientific papers, 
has had a positive impact on research productivity, measured as 
important patents per research dollar spent. Cockburn and Henderson 
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confirm Gambardella's (1992) findings that pharmaceutical companies 
publish heavily. 
To compute the interaction variable, Cockburn and Henderson searched 
the Science Citation Index for a sample of 20 pharmaceutical companies 
over an eight year period. For each published paper they counted the 
number of addresses listed in the index. Where more than one address is 
listed, this is interpreted as a collaboration between institutions. Each 
authorship has then be classified into separate categories: No co- 
authorship, a co-authorship with a university, another private sector 
company, the National Institute of Health, other public sector institutions, 
not-for-profit organisations and hospitals. Counting the total number of 
authorships, no co-authorship (43%) was followed by university co- 
authorships (34%), hospital (10%), private sector (5%), not-for-profit, 
public sector (both 3%) and National Institute of Health co-authorships 
(1 %). 
Over time co-authoring rose sharply, with the fraction of university 
coauthorships rising from 24% in 1980 to 38% of the total in 1994 largely 
at the expense of no co-authorships which declines from 62% to 35% in 
the same time period. Coauthorships in other categories did not follow an 
apparent trend although hospital and private sector co-authorships have 
seen an increase, although from a small base. 
These figures are quoted in detail because they lead to the core question 
whether an increase in co-authorships has led to an increase in research 
productivity. Since there are significant variations in co-authorships 
between the twenty firms the hypothesis can be tested whether research 
performance differences can be attributed to differences in firms' linkages 
to the scientific community. Cockburn and Henderson were using a 
subset of 10 firms for which data on research performance were 
available. Research performance is measured as patents per research 
dollar. The fraction of co-authorships with universities is used as a proxy 
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for the degree to which the firm is interacting with the scientific 
community. As a second explanatory variable Cockburn and Henderson 
use publications per research dollar as a proxy for investment into 
capacity to absorb basic research results. 
Their OLS regression shows that the fraction of co-authorships with 
universities and papers per research dollar are both significant in a 
specification including a time trend and firm dummies. 
Despite the small sample these results may be carefully interpreted as 
showing a positive influence of a firm's interaction with the public sector 
(co-authorships with universities) and proximity to science (papers per 
research dollar) on research productivity (patents per research dollar 
spent). 
In other words, Cockburn and Henderson have shown that a firm benefits 
from undertaking joint research into science despite issues of 
appropriability and the public good aspect of basic research discussed 
above. 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has investigated the extent and motives of collaborative 
research in the biotechnology industry, an industry instrumental to future 
vaccine innovation. 
Collaborative research has grown in importance since the first 
biotechnology companies were established in the 1970S. Depending on 
the stage of the life cycle of the individual firm, a biotechnology company 
will either seek to strengthen its scientific base by collaborating with a 
public sector institution such as a university, or at a later stage 
collaborate with a larger pharmaceutical company in order to distribute or 
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market its products. Having products at different stages of development 
requires firms to enter networks of alliances. 
There is evidence that firms which maintain close links with the scientific 
community are more successful in terms of patents obtained. Cockburn 
and Henderson (1997) showed in an extensive bibliometric analysis of 
the traditional pharmaceutical industry that those firms which publish 
more overall, and in collaboration with universities, are more productive 
researchers in terms of patents obtained per research dollar spent. 
The following Chapter will expand Cockburn and Henderson's analysis to 
the biotechnology sector. If collaboration with science has a strong 
impact on the productivity of biotech research then it will have an impact 
on one of the most important subgroups of biotech research, vaccines. 
The results of this investigation could be of interest for the biotechnology 
industry, with the less productive firms aiming to improve the way they 
spend their R&D resources. 
This research also addresses issues in science and technology policy. A 
strong link between public-private interaction and research success could 
indicate that public money is typically effectively being spent on 
collaborative public-private projects, perhaps more so than on R&D 
subsidies for corporate research alone. 
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8 Modellinq Research productivity 
8.1 Background 
As the previous chapter has shown, basic science is no longer the 
exclusive domain of public sector research institutions. Pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology companies undertake more and more scientific 
activities, which manifest themselves in the rising number of research 
papers published under the company's name. Private sector companies 
also tie themselves to the scientific community through networks of 
collaboration, which can take different forms depending on the stage of 
the life cycle the product or company is at. 
Scientific activity and interaction with the university sector were shown in 
Cockburn and Henderson (1997) to be positively related to research 
success in the pharmaceutical industry. The contribution of this part of 
the thesis lies in investigating whether this is also the case for the 
biotechnology industry. This analysis will also allow comparisons 
between the two industries: the extent to which the two different sectors 
are exposed to the scientific community and whether the research 
productivity of the two sectors differs. 
The results of this investigation may be of interest to R&D managers 
within a firm and could have some wider implications for Science and 
Technology policy. If higher research productivity turns out to be 
associated with closer R&D collaboration between firms and the scientific 
community, one could argue that closer collaboration ought to be 
encouraged. Proximity to science does, however, not necessarily cause 
research success. Causality could run the other way round: successful 
companies may hire good people, who happen to publish more than their 
peers and keep closer links with universities. The policy lesson is then 
reversed: rather than pursuing basic scientific activity, firms ought to hire 
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good people and 'tolerate' their publishing and collaborating with 
university scientists. . 
The issue of causality is therefore important for the understanding of 
research success. Hence, in the concluding part of this chapter, a 
Granger causality test will be performed using a data set which observes 
a selection of three pharmaceutical companies from the original cross- 
sectional data set over a longer time period. 
8.2 Method 
The methodology is broadly in line with Cockburn and Henderson (1997) 
which will also allow comparisons with their results: The Science Citation 
Index is searched for publications of a sample of 10 Biotech firms and 5 
pharmaceutical firms over a three year period (1996-1998). Each 
publication is classified into SELF (no co-author), UNIVERSITY 
(university co-author), NIH (National Institute of Health as co-author), 
PUBLIC (public sector research institutions), PRIVATE (for profit 
organisation, mostly other pharmaceutical companies) NONPROFIT (not 
for profit, non government institutions, e. g. Wellcome Trust), HOSPITAL, 
and UNCLASSIFIED. It must be noted that a paper co-authored by a 
pharmaceutical company and two different universities would in the 
above scheme be recorded as two coauthorships, one with each 
university. 
1 Unlike Cockburn and Henderson (1997), this Chapter categorises teaching hospitals as 
hospitals rather than universities. This distinction is somewhat arbitrary. For the purpose 
if this study, however, the type of research undertaken at any of these institutions is 
relevant. Teaching hospitals are more likely to publish clinical studies, while university 
departments are more likely to publish basic science. Since this study aims to model 
interaction with the science base, teaching hospitals should probably be included in the 
hospital rather than the university category. 
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In the pooled OLS estimation the dependent variable 'Research 
Productivity' is measured as patents granted per research dollar spent in 
a particular year. Predictors include the fraction of coauthorships with 
universities as a proxy for the degree of interaction with the public sector. 
The regression equation also includes the variable total papers per 
research dollar spent, depicting whether a firm is generally publication- 
friendly or not. One zero/one dummy variable distinguishes between 
biotechnology companies and the traditional small molecule sector. 
The following equation has been estimated: 
Equation 8-1 
REPRODR = Pl + P2PUBFMENit + P3PUBINTERit + P4BIOCOMPit + ut 
where: 
REPRODit = patents per research dollar (in real terms) of firm i in year t 
PUBFIRIENit = papers per research dollar (in real terms) 
PUBINTERit = fraction of co-authorships with universities 
BIOCOMP = dummy variable, equal to 0 for a pharmaceutical company, equal to 1 
for a biotech company. 
8.3 The data 
Data on R&D spending were taken from company reports, where 
available, or from the compulsory company filings with the US Security 
and Exchange Commission accessible on the World Wide Web. Included 
in the sample are ten US members of the organisation of biotechnology 
companies ('Bio') with an R&D expenditure in 1998 in excess of $50 
million. Five of the largest US pharmaceutical companies were also 
included in the sample. Research expenditure has then been deflated in 
order to calculate REPROD and PUBFRIEN. 
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Individual patents granted per company can be accessed via the US 
Patent Office's database, searchable on the World Wide Web 
(hftp: //www. uspto. gov). 
Authors of scientific publications can be identified either by searching the 
author field of the Science Citation Index or in this case by searching the 
address field for the organisation a particular author is affiliated with. A 
typical reference would list more than one organisation in the address 
field. If for instance the biotech company Genentech was listed alongside 
the National Institute of Health, University Hospital Munich and the 
University of Manchester this would count as one paper and three co- 
authorships, one with the NIH, one with a hospital and one with a 
university. 
8.4 The extent of interaction in the sample 
Table 8.1 gives an overview of the sample and indicates the degree to 
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The total number of articles published in the two subsections of the 
sample is almost constant for pharmaceutical companies and slightly on 
the increase in the biotech subsample over the three years. 
Figure 8-1 
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Source: own calculations 
The number of coauthorships in the pharmaceutical subsample is almost 
constant over time while the biotech sector experiences a 30% increase 
in co-authorships over the three year period. This suggests that the 
sector intensified contacts with the science base over the period. 
Figure 8-2 
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Source: own calculations 
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The number of patents granted to the biotech subsample shows the most 
dramatic increase over the three year time period. 
Figure 8-3 
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Source'. own calculations 
The total number of patents granted in this sector has increased more 
than threefold from 1996 to 1998 underlining the biotech sector's growing 
importance in the race to find new cures for diseases. Given the fact that 
the companies in the sample are well established biotech firms this 
increase in patents obtained indicates that the industry has not reached 
the maturity of the pharmaceutical sector, where the number of new 
patents granted appears to stagnate. 
8.5 Structural differences in the sample 
Closer examination of the sample suggests that biotech companies are 
on average more productive in research than traditional pharmaceutical 
companieS2 , although not by a great margin as the boxplot in the 
appendix shows. The standard deviation is also much greater in the 
2 See Appendix to this chapter for two sample, two tail t-Tests on each of the three 
variables by subgroups biotech and pharmaceuticals. 
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biotech subsample. The sample mean is however statistically significantly 
different. This gives rise to the question whether the greater research 
productivity in the biotech sector is a reflection of the life-cycle of the 
industry, with research productivity eventually declining to the level of the 
more mature pharmaceutical industry. The greater variation in research 
productivity could of course also be a result of greater variations in the 
explanatory variables. 
Analysing the explanatory variables, biotech companies appear to 
publish more papers per research dollar spent than traditional 
pharmaceutical companies. The mean of the variable PUBFRIEN is 
significantly different (95% confidence interval) in the two subsamples 
with the mean for the biotech subsample (also shown in the box plot in 
the appendix as group 0) higher than the mean for the pharmaceutical 
sector (shown as group 1). In other words, the sample indicates that the 
proximity to science is greater in the biotech sector than in the traditional 
pharmaceutical sector. 
The sample mean of PUBINTER of the biotech subsample (group 0), is 
statistically different (at the 95% level) from the sample mean of the 
pharmaceutical subsample (group 1). This indicates that biotech 
companies in the sample have more coauthorships with universities as a 
percentage of total coauthorships than pharmaceutical companies. 
Summarising the above findings, biotechnology companies are on 
average closer to science and more productive researchers than 
pharmaceutical companies, although the variation among biotechnology 
firms is much greater in terms of research performance and proximity to 
science. 
Whether the variation in the explanatory variables is a meaningful 
predictor of research productivity of the individual firm will be explored in 
the following section. 
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8.6 Regression results 
Results from the pooled OLS regression 3 are shown in the following 
table: 
Table 8-2 
Dependent Variable: REPROD 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 44 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -2.29E-07 7.83E-08 -2.931477 0.0056 
PUBFRIEN 0.391642 0.046143 8.487654 0.0000 
PUBINTER 5.33E-07 1.96E-07 2.718628 0.0096 
BIOCOMP -1.39E-07 4.09E-08 -3.386268 0.0016 
R-squared 0.668408 Mean dependent var. 1.68E-07 
Adjusted R-squared 0.643538 S. D. dependent var. 1.50E-07 
S. E. of regression 8.95E-08 Akaike info criterion -29.53393 
Sum squared resid 3.20E-13 Schwarz criterion -29.37173 
Log likelihood 653.7464 F-statistic 26.87671 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.570264 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
These results indicate that both publication friendliness and interaction 
with the university sector are positively related to research productivity of 
the firms in the sample. PUBFRIEN, or publications per real research 
dollar spent, is significant at the 5% level. PUBINTER, the fraction of 
coauthorships with universities is also significant at 5%. Both variables 
have the expected sign. The sector dummy BIOCOMp4, significant at the 
5% level, supports the above descriptive statistics: biotech firms publish 
and interact more with universities and achieve on average a higher 
3 Note that one outlier has been removed, reducing the total number of observations 
from 45 down to 44. The company in question has in the year concerned produced an 
implausible number of patents when compared to the previous and following year and 
the rest of the firms of comparable size. 
4 BIOCOMP is an intercept dummy variable. In a separate specification two multiplicative 
dummies for PUBRIEN and PUBINTER were introduced, which take the value of the 
respective variables for all biotechnology companies. These did, however, prove 
insignificant. 
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research productivity. The above estimation has a reasonably high ý, a 
highly significant F statistic and seems robust overaI15. There is no 
evidence of multicollinearity due to a negligible correlation between the 
two explanatory variableS6. 
8.7 Preliminary conclusions and policy implications 
From the above the following conclusions can be drawn: Biotech 
companies undertake more scientific activities and interact more closely 
with science than traditional pharmaceutical companies. While showing a 
greater variance, the average research productivity of the biotech 
companies in the sample is also greater than that of the traditional 
pharmaceutical industry. 
Within each of the two sectors, companies which undertake more 
science or co-operate more closely with universities than their 
competitors are more likely to show a higher level ot research 
productivity. This indicates, that Cockburn and Henderson's (1997) 
findings for the pharmaceutical industry also hold in the biotechnology 
industry . 
What is however not clear from the above specification of the model is 
whether greater proximity to science does indeed cause greater research 
productivity. It may well be that, as is often suggested, the proximity of 
star scientists causes the firm to churn out more patents which would be 
in line with Zucker et al's (1999) point of view. 
5 The following statistical tests have been performed: White heteroscedasticity test, 
Serial correlation LM test, and Ramsey's reset test for specification error, all of which 
were satisfactory. The Jarque Bera normality test suggests normally distributed 
residuals. 
The correlation coefficient of PUBINTER and PUBFRIEN is 0.05 
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On the other hand, a successful firm may attract star scientists, who 
happen to publish a lot. Registering a patent will then allow the firm to 
publish results, otherwise the publication would give away the findings. 
Publication will also alert other firms to the patent and could act as a 
deterrent to undertake research in a similar area, although this may also 
invite other firms to invent around the patent. 
Hence, good scientists could follow research success rather than cause 
it. The implications for science policy and research strategy at the firm 
level would be somewhat different, since publications in this scenario turn 
out to be a necessary evil rather than a warrant for research success. 
Therefore, the issue of causality requires a closer investigation. This will 
be subject of the following section. 
8.8 Do biotech firms learn from universities or is it the other way 
round? 
Most of the literature reviewed in Chapter Seven argues the case of a 
knowledge spillover in order to explain differences in firm's research 
performance. Zucker et al. (1999) for example claim that proximity of star 
scientists or top university departments causes a spillover of knowledge 
into the biotech sector which as a result becomes better at researching 
new products. This view seems entirely plausible particularly for the early 
founding years of the biotechnology industry when many companies were 
effectively spun off successful university departments. 
It is, however, not clear whether this causality still holds. One could argue 
that the wealth of talent is now located in the biotech sector and that the 
more productive of these companies also attract the more gifted 
scientists from the university sector. This would be more in line with 
Dasgupta's (1994) and Rosenberg's (1990) view. Once talented 
scientists are being attracted to join the most reputable companies they 
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will push for publications which in turn shows up as proximity to science. 
In this interpretation it is the already productive biotech sector which 
causes interaction with the scientific community rather than the other way 
round. These days universities may well learn from biotech firms. Once 
the possibility of this reverse causality is taken into consideration the 
implications for science policy and research strategy do become more 
ambiguous. Should interaction with the scientific community be actively 
encouraged or is this interaction a necessary price successful firms have 
to pay if they want to get good scientists? 
8.9 Testing for causality 
This section will address this causality issue with a relatively simple test 
of causality, the Granger tese. Thomas (1997, p. 461) defines Granger 
causality as follows: "X is said to be a Granger cause of Y if present Y 
can be predicted with greater accuracy by using past values of X rather 
than not using such past values, all other information being identical. " 
More precisely, the Granger approach first investigates how much of the 
current Y can be explained by past values of Y and then examines 
whether adding lagged values of X offers a better explanation. Lagging 
explanatory variables by three years, the equation estimated would take 
the following general form: 
Equation 8-2 
Yt -ý CCO+CElyt-1 +a2yt-2+ (X3yt-3+ PI Xt-1 + P2Xt-2+ 
P3Xt-3+Ct 
7 See for example Gujarati (1995, p. 620) for a more detailed explanation of this 
technique or the help function of Econometric Views (Eviews version 3.1) for a non- 
technical description. 
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Equation 8.2. is estimated first, followed by a restricted form not including 
X. The null hypothesis is that P1 -ý P2 -"ý P3 ---: 0, that the lagged X does not 
belong into the equation. i. e. X does not 'Granger cause' Y. If the P 
coefficients in equation 8.2. are significantly different from zero then X 
does Granger cause Y. To test this hypothesis the F-test is used 
calculated from the residual sums of squares obtained from the two 
equations. 
Strictly speaking, Granger causality is not based on an acceptable 
definition of cause and effect (Judge et al 1985, p. 667), and "does not 
imply that Y is the effect or the result of X. Granger causality measures 
precedence and information content but does not by itself indicate 
causality in the more common use of the term" (Econometric Views, 
Version 3.1). Should Granger causality occur, i. e. the equation contains 
more information after the inclusion of a lagged regressor, changes in X 
effectively precede changes in Y so the likelihood of having found a 
meaningless correlation are somewhat reduced. 
Equation 8.2. uses a three-period lag, although a longer lag might have 
been used -depending on the assumption about the longest time over 
which one variable could reasonably predict the other. This is, of course, 
a problematic decision since the lag length can influence the outcome of 
the test or, as Gujarati (1995, p. 622) puts it, "the direction of causality 
may depend critically on the number of lagged terms included". 
Econometric Views (Version 3.1) suggests that more rather than fewer 
lags should be used since the theory is based on the relevance of all past 
information. Practically the number of lags will also depend on the 
number of observations, variables and resulting degrees of freedom. 
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8.10 Is there causality between research productivity and proximity 
to science? 
In the analysis above, the variable publication friendliness proved to be 
significantly related to research success and the question was raised 
whether proximity to science causes research success or whether 
successful firms attract successful scientists and later tolerate their 
propensity to publish. 
The Granger test could offer some insight into which of the two variables 
precedes or (Granger) 'causes' the other. No matter which way the 
causality runs, the relationship between patents and publications is likely 
to be lagged by a number of years. Critical data are available on a yearly 
base and for the time period between 1976 and 1999 which does not 
allow for much experimentation with the length of lags. Hence, three 
different time lags, three, four and five years, will be chosen here. 
Since there is theoretical underpinning for causality running from 
publication friendliness to research success and vice versa, two 
equations will be estimated for each of the three different lag 
specifications. These two equations will then be estimated for three 
different pharmaceutical companies which were also part of the original 
sample, over the period 1976-1 9998, first in a reduced form and then 
including REPROD and PUBFRIEN respectively. Starting with the 
following two equations the length of the lags will be increased to four 
and five years respectively. 
a Because the Granger causality test requires time series data, the number of periods 
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REPRODit = patents per research dollar (in real terms) of firm i in year t 
PUBFRIENit = papers per research dollar (in real terms) of firm i in year t 
The sample is restricted to three pharmaceutical companies (Pfizer, 
Warner Lambert, and Bristol Myers Squibb) since these were the only 
companies to release historic R&D spending figures. Biotechnology 
companies have not been around long enough to be included in the 
sample. 
For the calculation of REPROD, R&D spending has been deflated by the 
US GDP deflator. The variable PUBFRIEN is the same as in the previous 
section, also based on deflated R&D figures. 
The reduced form of equation 8.3. would exclude PUBFRIEN, while the 
reduced form of equation 8.4. excludes REPROD. Should the sets of 
PUBFIRIEN and REPROD coefficients in 8.3. and 8.4. respectively be 
significant, then feedback, or bilateral causality is suggested. If the two 
sets of coefficients are insignificant then both variables are independent. 
8.11 Granger test - empirical results 
Plotting the variables (see figures A 8-5, A 8-6 and A 8-7 in the appendix 
to this chapter) it becomes clear that research productivity has declined 
across all three companies in the sample over the 24 year period from 
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1976 to 1999, which means that pharmaceutical companies at the end of 
the 1990s get fewer patents out of every research dollar spent than in the 
previous two decades. 
The number of articles per research dollar spent has remained almost 
constant over the same period although there appears to be a distinctive 
surge in publishing activity in the first half of the 1990s followed by a 
decline since 1995. Two of the companies (Pfizer and Warner Lambert) 
reached an all time peak in publishing activity in the early to mid 1980s. 
Going back to what was said previously, the declining research 
productivity suggests that traditional pharmaceutical companies may 
have reached the end of a technological paradigm and new patentable 
innovations are now increasingly generated in biotechnology companies. 
The cyclical movements of publishing intensity may reflect the 
companies' desire to catch up with the new technologies, the all time high 
in the 1980s certainly coincides with a surge in scientific activity in 
biotechnology long before the first biotechnology drugs came to the 
market. 
Two problems present themselves when trying to establish whether 
Granger causality runs from REPROD to PUBFRIEN or vice versa. First 
of all, in two out of three cases (Warner Lambert and Bristol Myers) the 
relationship between REPROD and PUBFRIEN breaks down in the long 
run and only in one of the three companies (Pfizer) the variable 
PUBFIRIEN is significantly related to REPROD. This makes the Granger 
test somehow meaningless for the other two companies, since in the 
absence of a long run relationship between the two variables causality 
should not occur by definition. 
The Granger causality test results are presented in table 8.3 for all three 
companies, for each of the three lag specifications. As outlined above, 
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the test works with the null hypothesis that REPROD does not Granger- 
cause PUBFRIEN in the first regression and that PUBFRIEN does not 
Granger-cause REPROD in the second regression. 
Table 8-3 
Pairwise Granger Causality Test PFIZER 
Sample: 1976 1999 
Lags: 3 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFIRIEN 21 1.72864 0.20695 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 1.43678 0.27414 
Lags: 4 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFRIEN 20 1.60939 0.24044 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 0.53015 0.711636 
Lags: 6 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFIRIEN 19 3.44002 0.05916 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 0.57330 0.72014 
Table 84 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests Warner Lambert 
Sample: 1976 1999 
Lags: 3 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFRIEN 21 1.53598 0.24897 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 0.99926 0.42202 
Lags: 4 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFRIEN 20 1.80504 0.19815 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 3.62076 0.04063 
Lags: 5 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFRIEN 19 1.25541 0.36823 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 1.12177 0.42043 
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Table 8-5 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests Bristol Myem 
Sample: 1976 1999 
Lags: 3 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFRIEN 21 0.33636 0.79932 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 0.06111 0.97943 
Lags: 4 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFRIEN 20 2.30875 0.12286 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 0.25651 0.89967 
Lags: 6 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
REPROD does not Granger Cause PUBFRIEN 19 3.16143 0.07208 
PUBFRIEN does not Granger Cause REPROD 0.36400 0.85969 
The results for Pfizer lead us to reject the null hypothesis that REPROD 
does not Granger cause PUBFRIEN, but only in the five year lag 
specification. This corresponds with the results for Bristol Myers Squibb 
in the five year lag specification but contradicts the results for Warner 
Lambert in the four year lag specification which would lead us to reject 
the null hypothesis that PUBRIEN does not Granger cause REPROD. 
The results for Pfizer should carry far more weight since it is this 
company which shows a significant long run relationship between the two 
variables. 
Although the Granger causality test does not prove causality, these 
results indicate that at least in the case of Pfizer, values of REPROD 
have greater predictive power of PUBFRIEN than past values of the 
variable itself, i. e. it cannot be ruled out that companies' proximity to 
science is a scientist-d riven phenomenon, an idea more in line with 
Dasgupta's (1994) and Rosenberg's (1990) view. 
These authors postulate that successful scientists are attracted to 
successful (i. e. productive) companies and they will keep publishing to 
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signal their scientific excellence. This view would be at odds with 
Zucker's (1999) spillover theory, which postulates that the proximity to 
science causes the research success of the company. 
8.12 Concluding remarks 
Although evidence from the Granger causality test is quite weak, it 
cannot be ruled out that research productivity precedes the number of 
publications and the consequences of this for research strategy and 
science policy are quite important: 
It is far from clear that proximity to science will cause superior research 
outcomes. There are some indications that successful companies attract 
scientists and generate publications almost as a by-product. 
The preceding analysis suggests that companies which employ good 
scientists are still the more productive researchers, not necessarily 
because they interact with science or publish papers, but because they 
have good people which are also more likely to produce good medicines. 
This makes the promotion of scientific talent and the movement of 
scientist between the public and the private sectors an important issue to 
investigate in particular when it comes to designing an effective national 
system of innovation. This is the subject of the following Chapter of this 
thesis. 
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8.13 Appendix to chapter 8 
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Fiaure A 8-1 Testinq for differences in sample means 
Two-Sample T-Test and Confidence Interval: reprod pharma, reprod biotech 
Two-sample T for reprod p vs reprod b 
N Mean StDev SE Mean 
reprod ph 15 1.1310E-07 5.0993E-08 1.3166E-08 
reprod bio 30 2.0138E-07 1.7468E-07 3.1892E-08 
Difference = mu reprod p- mu reprod b 
Estimate for difference: -0.000000 
95% CI for difference: (-0.000000, -0.000000) 
T-Test of difference =0 (vs not T-Value = -2.56 P-Value - 
0.015 DF = 37 
Two-Sample T-Test and Confidence Interval: pubfrien pharma, pubfrien biotech 
Two-sample T for pubfrien ph vs pubfrien bio 
N Mean StDev SE Mean 
pubfrien ph 15 4.09OOE-07 1.0914E-07 2.8179E-08 
pubfrien bio 30 8.4813E-07 3.8920E-07 7.1059E-08 
Difference = mu pubfrien p- mu pubfrien b 
Estimate for difference: -0.000000 
95% CI for difference: (-0.000001, -0.000000) 
T-Test of dif f erence =0 (vs not T-Value - -5.74 P-Value 
0.000 DF = 36 
Two-Sample T-Test and Confidence Interval: pubinter pharma, pubinter biotech 
Two-sample T for pubinter ph vs pubinter bio 
N Mean StDev SE Mean 
pubinter ph 15 0.3420 0.0351 0.0091 
pubinter bio 30 0.4173 0.0853 0.016 
Difference = mu pubinter ph - mu pubinter bio, 
Estimate for difference: -0.0754 
95% CI for difference: (-0.1118, -0.0390) 
T-Test of difference =0 (vs not =): T-Value - -4.18 P-Value 
0.000 DF = 41 
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9 Research policy, centres of scientific excellence and movement 
of scientific persori'nell 
9.1 Background 
What has increasingly become clear from the discussion and research 
undergone in previous chapters is that the pharmaceutical/biotechnology 
industry, if left to its own devices, will allocate resources to where they 
promise the highest possible return. If governments wish to promote the 
development of certain medicines which do not attract sufficient private 
sector funds, joint public-private research appears to be a productive way 
forward. 
Although there is evidence that companies which interact with the 
scientific community are also the more productive researchers, the 
causality is far from clear. The previous chapter has raised some doubt 
that proximity to science itself is responsible for research success. 
Causality tests suggest that scientists may be drawn to successful 
companies and continue to publish in order to signal their scientific 
excellence. What becomes the focus of attention in such an environment 
is the movement of scientists and the knowledge they carry, or, as 
Bartholomew (1997, p. 7) puts it, "biotechnology innovation may be 
conceptualised as the product of the accumulation of scientific knowledge 
in research institutions and firms (stocks) and the diffusion of that 
knowledge between them (flows)". 
These insights gives further rise to the question how a national system of 
innovation should be designed to effectively further the accumulation and 
diffusion of knowledge, specifically in biotechnology, which is of great 
importance for new vaccine development. 
1 This chapter is a modified and updated version of Kramer and Shackleton (2001) 
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Bartholomew (1997) has identified several features of the national 
institutional context which can affect the stock and flow of scientific 
knowledge: the tradition of scientific education, patterns of basic research 
funding, linkages with foreign research institutions, degree of commercial 
orientation of academia, the venture capital system, national technology 
policy, technological accumulation in related industrial sectors, and the 
mobility of scientific labour. 
Some of these factors have been discussed in previous chapters, most 
notably the role of basic research, the patenting system, and the 
interaction between universities and biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
corporations. 
Sharp (1989) stresses the importance of the mobility of scientists in the 
process of technology creation and diffusion. She believes that the US 
competitive model, for instance, is fed by very substantial expenditures 
on basic research, which provides the life-blood of the system and so: 
"the failure to sufficiently support the basic scientific infrastructure 
remains a real concern in the UK, where the nation's strongest 
advantage -its superior pool of creative scientists- is increasingly 
drawn to other countries where scientific research is rewarded with 
financial support in addition to social respect" (Bartholomew 1997, p. 
19). 
Porter (1990) has recently revived the view that nations which produce a 
greater number of scientists per capita will also produce more leading- 
edge research which in turn positively impacts on the nation's competitive 
advantage. 
This chapter will focus on the tradition, of scientific education, basic 
research funding and labour mobility and aims to investigate the 
relationships between these factors. As the following analysis will show, 
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the relationship between educating scientists and research success is far 
from clear when individual countries' research performances are 
compared. 
Using the example of the British and German Higher education system, it 
can be shown that international scientific labour mobility can to some 
extent overcome shortages of domestic scientists. Further to that, 
maintaining low entry barriers into the academic community may produce 
better research than investing in home-grown talent and then sheltering 
academics through high entry barriers. 
The emphasis will often be on the science and technology sector as a 
whole which has to do with the limited availability of data. Where 
possible, implications for biotech nologica I research and the promotion of 
medical knowledge in vaccine products will be discussed in greater detail. 
9.2 Research Productivity: talent and technological capabilities 
The current paradigm of science and technology policy draws intellectual 
inspiration from endogenous growth theory. It holds that investment in 
higher education implies investment in technological capabilities with a 
multitude of positive growth effects on the economy. An increase in 
higher education funding is believed to improve the quantity and quality of 
research undertaken. Publicly-funded basic research will then create 
more knowledge, which is made available to others to exploit. A recent 
review of the literature (Salter et al. 2000) suggests that the social rate of 
return for public investment in research could indeed be upwards of 25 
per cent per annum. 
Another aspect of public investment in research and development is to 
build on the knowledge of academics working together with industry 
(Dasgupta and David 1994, Hicks 1995, Rosenberg 1990). A recent 
report suggests that public funding and investment by the private sector 
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are strongly correlated, in particular "UK industrial funding per member of 
staff returned to the RAE (the higher education funding body's Research 
Assessment Exercise) increases as total R&D funding increases" 
(HEFCE 2000a, p. 8). 
This knowledge spillover refers to the belief that a firm can benefit from 
the proximity of an academic research institution through joint research 
projects or the less tangible informal exchange of information (Hicks 
1996). This is turn creates jobs in key industries such as biotechnology, 
where centres of scientific excellence explain the geographic location of 
firms in America and Europe (Zucker, Darby and Armstrong 1994, Zucker 
and Darby 1995a, 1995b, Zucker, Darby and Brewer 1998, and Zucker 
and Darby 1999). 
Besides direct funding of research, investing more in the production of 
graduates is also believed to offer considerable benefit to society. 
Graduates "bring enthusiasm and a critical approach that stimulates 
others and raises standards. Moreover, the skills acquired during 
education are often a necessary precursor to the development of more 
industry-specific skills and knowledge" (Salter et al. 2000, p. 62). 
The existence of these spillovers is held to justify the nurturing of national 
talent as a key objective of science and technology policy. In light of 
these arguments, alleged underinvestment in higher education in the UK 
compared to other countries in mainland Europe has become a matter of 
political concern. 
A recent report commissioned by the Higher Education Funding Council 
for England has offered a characteristically gloomy assessment of 
Britain's future innovative strength. The authors claim that Britain has 
over the last two decades chronically underinvested in research and 
development in the higher education sector compared to other leading 
nations in Europe (ibid. ). 
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Figure 9-1 
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Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators OECD 1999 
However to assume Britain's below-average investment in higher 
education research and development has necessarily reduced 
competitiveness in disciplines vital to the economy is to confuse inputs 
with outputs. The belief that greatly increased government investment is 
desirable also implies considerable confidence in the ability of 
governments to "pick winners" in their funding policy: we know that 'in 
other areas of industrial policy the record has been very far from 
impressive (Burton 1983). 
Britain manages to attract a relatively larger number of young people into 
Science and Technology disciplines than many of its competitors. 
Germany, for instance, has less than half the number of IT graduates per 
100,000 employees as the UK (OECD 2000). The Financial Times 
reports that the situation is exacerbated by German study times, which 
are among the longest in the world. On average Germans stay in higher 
education for more than six years, compared with 4 in the United States 
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and 3.5 in the UK. The same source quotes Professor Klaus Landfried, 
President of the Association of Universities and Higher Education 
Institutions, who points out that "the staff-student ratio in Germany is 
three to four times more unfavourable than in the US or UK, " This means 
students are largely left to their own devices: "Often they are allowed to 
take papers and tests whenever they choose, attending lectures is 
seldom a requirement and direct contact between professors and 
students is rare" (Financial Times October 26,2000). 
Professor Landfried's figures are debatable; other sources suggest the 
staff-student ratio may be more favourable in Germany than in Britain. His 
point about limited contact between staff and students, however, is well 
made. It is also true that UK academics spend a larger proportion of their 
time teaching than do tenured German staff. 
Yet despite the apparent lack of investment in R&D compared to other 
European countries, research productivity remains high in the British 
higher education sector. Salter et al. (2000) concede that the productivity 
of its higher education system (expressed in both number of papers over 
total public investment in higher education, and citations per paper), puts 
Britain among the most productive nations, as illustrated in Table 9-1. 
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Table 9-1 




Rank Citations per 
$ million" 
Rank Papers per 
researcher*** 
Rank 
UK 16.0 1 70.5 1 11.2 4 
Canada 14.7 2 61.0 3 10.9 5 
Australia 13.9 3 48.3 7 10.2 6 
Ireland 12.9 4 38.2 10 7.0 11 
Spain 12.1 5 36.3 11 5.2 13 
Sweden 11.3 6 52.3 4 15.7 1 
Switzerland 10.9 7 65.7 2 13.3 2 
Netherlands 10.3 8 48.7 6 11.3 3 
France 9.8 9 38.3 9 8.4 9 
Belgium 9.5 10 41.3 8 9.9 7 
us 9.2 11 49.0 5 9.2 8 
Italy 9.0 12 34.0 12 5.6 12 
Germany 7.9 13 31.9 13 7.2 15 
Portugal 7.2 14 17.9 15 1.8 16 
Austria 7.1 15 25.9 14 7.3 10 
Japan 3.6 16 11.7 16 4.5 14 
Million of R&D expenditure in 1997 in $ PPP 
** from ISI National Science Indicators 
*** OECD sources 
Source: Katz 2000, taken from OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, 
OECD Statistics, 1999 and ISI National Science Indicators 
In absolute terms, Britain's total number of publications in all scientific 
fields is second only to that of the USA. British scientists are also the 
second most cited in the world, again after the Americans. In terms of 
citations per paper, Britain occupies sixth position. British papers receive 
on average 4.5 citations compared to Germany's and France's 2.7. The 
top two countries are Switzerland (5.9 citations per paper) and the US 
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(5.4) (Salter et a/ 2000 quoting National Science Indicators, Institute for 
Scientific Information). 
How does a higher education sector allegedly deprived of sufficient 
finance and talent produce such impressive results? The answer may 
again lie in flows of skilled labour, not only across borders but also from 
other sectors of domestic industry. Students and scientific personnel may 
be attracted to British centres of scientific excellence, by study 
opportunities and the convenience of English as a language of tuition and 
international scientific exchange. 
9.3 Labour mobility and clusters of research and development 
activity 
Technological clusters can be observed in many "high-tech" areas, for 
example biotechnology and information technology. In the corporate 
sector the more a firm is internationalised, the more likely it is that other 
inventors working in the same technological area are located in the same 
region, as Mariani (1999) suggests. This is also true for centres of 
research excellence at universities which attract clusters of firms 
operating in related technologies, both in Europe and in the United States 
(Zucker et al 1998 and 1999). 
If research and development investment concentrates on centres of 
excellence, it is a plausible assumption that R&D personnel in both 
science and technology move along with it. A country with a 
disproportionate number of such clusters is likely therefore to attract an 
influx of human as well as physical and financial capital. A country 
experiencing a net inflow of skilled scientists and technologists might, 
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even in the long term, be able to compensate for limited investment in 
research and the training of graduateS2. 
As far as a student's motivation to study in another country is concerned, 
it could be argued that their choice of subject area will be guided by the 
strength of a country in an academic discipline. After all, agglomeration 
theory suggests that good university departments attract employerS3, 
which in turn create jobs for new graduates. 
Figure 9-2 
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Citation Impact - International Rank 
2 Britain has already in the past managed to compensate labour shortages of, for 
instance, doctors and nurses by attracting such skilled labour from other countries. 
3 Companies may for example sponsor Professorships to have access to the best 
graduates, set up research facilities close to universities or co-operate in other ways with 
the local university. 
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There is however little evidence for this line of argument, as Figure 9.2. 
shows. When comparing the UK's and Germany's international citation 
impact: 4 with the ratio of foreign students in subject disciplines for which 
comparable figures are available, there appears to be no relationship 
between the two. Germany's share of foreign students is just about 
constant, between 8 and 11%, while Britain's share of foreign students 
appears to be slightly lower in most key disciplines except Engineering 
with 24% - surprisingly, an area where research output is ranked poorly. 
Britain's good research record in Maths and Biological Sciences, by 
contrast, attracts relatively few foreign students. 
The concentration of overseas students in particular fields is not the 
result of demand factors alone. The supply of higher education 
qualifications to foreigners depends on factors such as excess capacity at 
universities. Although relatively more engineering places have been 
made available at British universities compared to other disciplines, 
British students are probably filling proportionately fewer of these places. 
The reluctance of British students to take up engineering as a degree 
subject is well documented. As a result more places are offered to 
overseas students. Whatever the reasons for this, foreign graduates are 
increasingly sought after and Britain seems well placed to attract a good 
proportion of them. 
The relationship between research success and inflow of gifted people is 
likely to be stronger for academic staff. By comparison with students, 
however, the inflow of skilled academics is subject to higher entry barriers 
as a result of different qualification requirements. To illustrate flows in and 
out of a research environment Gravensen (2000, p. 3) uses a 'Tower and 
a 'Pyramid' model. 
4 Number of citations per paper published, a widely used measure of the quality of 
published research 
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Full Professor AII _Full Prot 
Associate Professod II _Assoc. Prot 
Assistant Professorl II_ Assistant Professors 
PhDs III- PhDs 
Candidates III Candidates 
Figure 9-3 : Tower and Pyramid research environments 
Source: Gravensen 2000, p. 3 
In the Tower model all candidates for higher research positions are 
educated at lower level and all "non-usable" candidates are sent back into 
the surrounding economy. In other words there is an outflow, but in the 
most extreme case no inflow into the system from outside - except at the 
entry level. Economists would see this as an extreme case of an internal 
labour market, with the usual strengths and weaknesses of such an 
arrangement. Compared to the Pyramid model, a 'Tower' environment 
helps create highly specialist knowledge as a result of the long time which 
higher level researchers spend in the system. A research Pyramid 
environment, however, is believed to create the greater innovation 
potential, with plenty of opportunity for knowledge transfer to and from the 
surrounding economy. 
The Tower model most closely resembles the German higher education 
research set-up. Entry barriers, except perhaps at PhD level, are high, 
partly due to the requirement of a 'Habilitation', the higher education 
teaching and research qualification which is still necessary to become a 
full professor at a German university5. Few academics outside Germany 
5 In June 2001 the German Secretary of State for Education initiated a reform of the 
German Higher Education Framework Law which will introduce the successful 
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or practitioners from outside the university sector can therefore become 
full professors. To complete both PhD and Habilitation typically takes ten 
years after obtaining a masters level qualification. An academic post at 
Habilitation level tends to be a five-year fixed-term assistant teaching or 
research contract, and few academics will want to delay progression to a 
tenured professorial position by working long spells outside the university 
sector. Unsurprisingly, in- and outflow in the German research 
environment is very limited. 
The situation is different in the UK research environment. Although career 
academics are the norm, considerable mobility between the research 
sector and other sectors of the economy is facilitated by the lack of entry 
barriers into higher education. Although the PhD qualification is becoming 
an entry requirement in most academic disciplines, more experienced 
members of staff still find it easy to move in and out of the university 
sector as long as they keep an active interest in research or other 
scholarly activities. Professors without a PhD are nothing unusual in the 
UK, while in Germany almost all Professors are DoctorS6. 
Ideally, mobility rates in the British and German higher education sector 
should be compared. This does however present problems of 
aggregation and comparability of data. As a first step Labour Force 
completion of 'Junior Professorships' as a pathway to a tenured position at German 
universities. Junior Professors are no longer expected to write an habilitation but embark 
on other research activities such as journal publications instead. The Junior 
Professorship is, however, still on a (six-year) fixed term base and does not allow for an 
automatic progression to a tenured position. Although research autonomy seems to 
have improved when compared to the previous regime, job security hasn't. The aim of 
the Junior Professorship to attract young scientists who would otherwise have left the 
country may well be compromised by this uncertainty. 
6 In order to cope with the rapid expansion of the German Higher Education Sector in 
the 1960s and 70s some Professorships were awarded to teaching staff without 
Habilitation or PhD qualification. Thirty years later, the German convention remains that 
of addressing professionals by their full title: it still allows people to distinguish the 
'proper Professor Doktor Meyer from the mere Professor Schulze. 
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Survey data have been used to identify mobility rates in the British 
education sector as a whole and compared with other sectors of 
economic activity, most notably the Information and Communication 
Technology sector, notorious for skills shortages and high levels of staff 
fluctuation. This is based on the methodology employed by the OECD to 
measure mobility rates in Scandinavian countries (Akerblorn 2000). 
Further to that, international mobility rates are shown for these sectors of 
activity. For this purpose industrial classification categories (SIC 92) have 
been recoded to identify three distinct ICT sectors and a further four 
broad industry sectors including education 7. In order to identify mobility of 
skilled personnel, the selected population includes only those members of 
the working age population in Great Britain who have achieved an 
educational qualification of at least first degree level. 
7 The following two- and three-digit industry codes have been isolated to represent the 
Information and Communication Technology sector: Manufacture of Office Machinery 
and Computers (SIC 30), Manufacture of Radio, Television and Communication 
Equipment (SIC 32), Telecommunications (SIC 642), Computer and Related Activities 
(SIC 72). The other sectors follow standard two-digit SIC classification, excluding the 
ICT sectors. A further breakdown into individual ICT sectors is possible although 
problematic because of the small number of respondents in these categories in the LFS. 
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It is worth noting that mobility in the ICT sector is far higher than in other 
sectors, a larger fraction of people having worked for a different 
organisation one year ago (this is termed the narrow mobility rate). The 
fraction of people having worked for a different organisation one year ago 
is among the lowest in the education sector, with around 8%. Interestingly 
the ICT sector does not attract disproportionately more people from other 
sectors of industry by comparison with other sectors. 
The cross-industry mobility rate, although above average, does not 
indicate that the ICT sector is 'poaching' talent from other sectors of 
industry. Again, the education sector has one of the lowest cross-industry 
mobility rates, which means that fewer people than in any other sector 
move across disciplines. 
Where the education sector is clearly on a par with ICT is international 
mobility. A disproportionately larger fraction of highly-skilled workers 
comes from abroad in comparison to other sectors. Almost 7% of all 
workers in education and ICT who were working for a different 
organisation one year ago came from a country outside the UK. This is up 
to three times as high as other sectors of industry. This suggests that 
education and ICT personnel are relatively highly mobile internationally, 
and that lowering and that measures to liberalise admissions are likely, in 
the UK at least, to pay dividends. 
A further breakdown of the education sector reveals that the more 
research intensive divisions of higher education and research institutes 
show far higher mobility rates that other educational institutes such as 
primary and secondary schools. Staff fluctuation in particular at research 
institutes is high, with around 17% of staff with a higher education level 8 
having worked for a different organisation. 
'3 Defined as holding at least a first degree 
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Calculating international mobility rates and cross-industry mobility rates 
(the latter being reported here) is, however, problematic because of the 
small size of the sample. Although it is not surprising that the cross- 
industry mobility rate is comparatively lower in schools when compared to 
universities (around 19% and 54%, respectively, having worked outside 
the education sector the year before), the number of observed cases in 
the Labour Force Survey is very low at this level of aggregation and these 
results have thus to be treated with caution. 
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Table 9-3 - Cross-industry higher level labour mobility rates in education 
in the UK 
Currently employed in: 
Education 
Employment situation 12 months ago: Universities Other Research 
educational institutes 
institutions 
Working in paid job or business 201908 578119 47017 
1 for same organisation 181430 538079 40095 
2 for different organisation 20478 40040 6921 
narrow mobility rate (2/1+2) in % 11.29 7.44 17.26 
4 Sectoral breakdown of 2: 
Office accounting and computing machinery 
Telecommunications 558 366 
Computer and related activities 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
Mining, quarrying 
Consumer goods 402 
Wood, pulp and paper, printing, oil refining 475 356 1573 
Metals, machinery (not ICT) 841 
Other manufacturing 834 509 
Energy and water 593 
Construction 336 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, 560 1916 403 
restaurants 
Transport, storage, post, communications 459 
Financial intermediation 880 455 
other services 2093 847 
Universities 5448 789 1285 
other educational institutions 2046 30511 
research institutes 470 443 
Health activities 2049 368 982 
other community services 2881 2320 1174 
5 Total of cross industry movers (included in 4) 11125 7469 5636 
Cross industry mobility rate (512) 54.32 18.65 81.431 
Source: Labour force Survey 1999/1, own calculations 
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Another set of data has been used to compare the effects of entry 
barriers in the German and British higher education sectors. Comparing 
the number of foreign academics completing a Habilitation in Germany in 
1999 with the number of foreign academics at lecturer/researcher level in 
the UK, two classifications broadly equivalent in seniority and age, the 
difference between Germany and the UK is remarkable. 
Of 1926 academics in Germany graduating at that level, 1822 are 
German, 104 or 5.3 % are from other countries (see Table 3). By 
contrast, in Britain as many as 18.2% of junior research staff (lecturers 
and teachers) are of foreign origin - 10.4% from outside the European 
Union (Table 4). China, Germany, the USA, the Irish Republic and France 
are the main countries of origin for foreign junior academic staff. Britain is 
a popular destination among young academics as a result of low entry 




Number of habilitations awarded by 
nationality In 1999 















Bosnia Herzegovina 2 
Others 28 
TOTAL 1926 
Total foreigners 104(5.4%) 
European 84(4.4%) 
Non-European 20(1%) 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
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Table 9-5 
Number of full-time junior academic staff 
(lecturer/ researcher) In the UK by nationality 














New Zealand 240 
Iran 190 
6600(7.8%) 
Non EU 18820 (10.4%) 
Total numberjunior 85050 
academic st, 
I 
Source: HESA staff record 1999 
And finally, using Higher Education Statistics Agency data, inflows and 
outflows of full-time wholly institutionally-financed British academic staff 
can be compared for selected "cost centres" (disciplines), as shown in 
summary form in Table 9-3. 
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Table 9-6 
Net flow of full-time academic staff for UK Higher Education Institutions (HEI) and 
selected cost centre groupings 
net net net net 
gain/loss gain/loss gain/loss movers 
UK HE UK overseas (% of 
Sector (% Private HEI (% of labour 
of labour Sector (% labour force) 
force) of labour force) 
force) 
Medicine (non-clinical) 3.38 0.60 mv 7.85 
Anatomy, Physiology and Biosciences 2.82 0.20 0.80 3.21 
Chemistry 2.76 -0.92 n1v 0.02 
Physics 0.65 mv mv -1.31 
Earth, Marine and Environmental Sciences 1.14 0.00 n1v 0.5.7 
Mechanical and Civil Engineering 2.51 0.97 mv 1.16 
Mineral, Metallurgy and Materials Engineering 1.85 0.00 mv 1.85 
IT and Computer Engineering 2.35 0.00 0.67 0.51 
Humanities, Languages, Design and 2.18 0.82 0.61 2.46 
Architecture 
Mathematics 1.79 mv mv 0.45 
Business and Management 2.40 0.80 0.13 3.74 
Media, Social Studies and Geography 2.76 0.79 0.59 4.13 
Education 3.67 0.43 mv 7.97 
TOTAL HE sector 2.51 0.63 0.49 3.57 
source: HESA staff record 1999 
mv: missing value, suppressed due to small numbers 
With the exception of Physics, it appears that all cost centres shown 
gained staff over the 1998-99 period. Medicine and education receive the 
largest net gain of almost 8%9, Anatomy, Physiology and Biosciences, the 
areas of particular interest in the context of this thesis, still experience a 
net gain of more than three per cent of the labour force. Columns 2 to 4 in 
the Table indicate the proportion of net movers (as a percentage of the 
Calculated as (total movers in minus total movers out) as a percentage of total staff. 
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labour force) coming from within higher education, from the private sector 
or from overseas higher education institutions. As one would expect, 
most British academics move within the HE sector. However most 
academic disciplines are net gainers from the private sector. Amongst the 
disciplines experiencing the biggest "brain gain" from private industry is 
mechanical and civil engineering. Even IT and computer sciences, 
however, shows no net loss even though private sector rewards are high. 
Of course net movement between higher education and other sectors 
does not reveal the quality of skills exchanged. Biotechnology specialists 
might be entering the Higher Education sector at a low level but exiting at 
a higher level, taking the skills they have acquired with them: this would 
constitute a "brain drain". On the other hand, older and more experienced 
staff might be leaving the private sector and moving into higher education 
towards the end of their career. The direction of changes in the quality of 
the stock of skills in higher education may therefore be ambiguous. 
Interestingly, all the key disciplines for which data are available show a 
significant gain from overseas higher education. Biosciences and 
information technology lead the way, with net gains of 0.8% and 0.67% of 
the labour force respectively. 
These results show a possible explanation why Britain has high research 
productivity despite relatively low investment in higher education research 
capacity. Britain has, as in other areas of its economy, benefited from its 
position as a prime destination for higher-skilled personnel. 
Judging by the considerable net inflow of scientists, particularly in those 
subject areas where British science is doing well, (such as biosciences 
and computer science), concerns about losing technological capabilities 
seem unfounded. Compared to Germany which, because of barriers to 
entry, attracts comparably few young academics from abroad, Britain is 
well placed to attract talent in key areas of technology. 
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Furthermore, if the number of university places is led by demand for 
graduate labour in a certain subject area, Britain is able to attract a 
significant number of foreign students where the number of domestic 
students falls short of capacity. Foreign engineering and technology 
graduates, for example, are likely to find it relatively easy to take up their 
first employment in the UK, especially if the government is making visas 
easier to obtain. This can also help alleviate skills shortages in the 
domestic labour force. 
From a science policy viewpoint, "brain gain" and "brain drain" data may 
help to identify academic disciplines where a country has a comparative 
advantage. A successful subject area experiencing a net inflow of 
scientists (and this could include an inflow from other sectors of the 
economy as well), is more likely to generate a knowledge-cluster-creating 
innovation and economic growth. The number of graduates needed is 
likely to increase in those areas where technological capabilities are 
strong and the higher education sector would be well advised to allocate 
funds and university places accordingly. 
9.4 Conclusion 
In this Chapter a number of aspects of the movement of highly-skilled 
labour between sectors and between countries were surveyed. A number 
of tentative conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. 
Discussions of the need for investment in higher education research and 
development ignore the considerable variations in research productivity 
associated with different levels of investment. Britain's strong 
performance in published research suggests that the institutional 
structures of higher education have a much more important effect than 
was previously thought. More open 'Pyramid' systems may have greater 
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potential for innovation and research productivity than 'Tower' systems 
where there is little inflow or outflow of personnel at higher levels of the 
hierarchy. This is certainly true for areas such as British biosciences 
which has experienced a net inflow from other sectors of the economy 
and abroad. 
A related observation is that inflows of students from the rest of the world 
may be an important factor in building research potential. A liberalised 
system of visas for students may allow many to be semi-permanent 
additions to the domestic stock of highly-skilled labour on graduation, 
offsetting the reluctance of domestic students to enter certain scientific 
and technological fields. 
More generally, a country which imports highly-skilled personnel may be 
enabled to maintain or improve its technological capabilities by this 
means as well as by domestic investment in research, development and 
the training of domestic skilled labour. European countries more generally 
now recognise the importance of attracting foreign financial and physical 
capital flows, bringing in new resources and the opportunity for transfers 
of technology and best practice. Recognition that attracting flows of 
human capital can pay similar dividends is beginning to dawn on 
policymakers. 
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10 The relevance of the thesis' findinqs for Science and 
Technoloqv Policv 
10.1 Background 
Prior to concluding the thesis this chapter will put the findings so far in the 
wider context of Science and Technology Policy. Here, other relevant 
aspects of Science and Technology Policy which lay beyond the scope of 
this thesis will also be discussed. 
From a macroeconomic perspective Science and Technology Policy 
takes inspiration from Neoclassical Growth Theory and Endogenous 
Growth Theory which sees the advancement of technology in production 
as an important factor underlying economic growth. Chapter four of this 
thesis introduced the reader to Solow's (1957) neoclassical growth theory 
and the notion of a long run steady state equilibrium, at which point the 
economy grows at a growth path at a rate equal to the sum of population 
growth and the rate of (labour augmenting) technological progress. 
Without a constant rate of technological progress, growth would cease 
because of decreasing marginal returns to the accumulated factor capital 
(Freeman 1997). 
The positive growth impact of R&D investment does not in itself provide a 
rationale for government intervention. If markets for the production of 
knowledge do fail, however, government would have a strong reason to 
reallocate resources in favour of R&D. As outlined in Chapter Three, 
Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) have argued that scientific and technical 
knowledge possesses a public goods dimension. Knowledge being a 
non-rival good from which consumers can only be partially excluded will 
not allow producers o'f that knowledge to fully appropriate the potential 
revenues, because other individuals can benefit from knowledge at no 
cost to them. 
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In this case not enough knowledge will be produced in the market 
economy. The difference between what consumers would be prepared to 
pay had knowledge been fully appropriable by the producer and what 
consumers actually pay is called spill-over. (Department of Finance 
Canada, 1997). 
This implies that there is a significant gap between social returns and 
private returns to R&D and a large empirical literature has attempted to 
estimate the extent of that gap. If social returns to R&D can be found to 
be substantially above private returns then that indicates that returns to 
R&D cannot be fully appropriated and hence there is underinvestment in 
R&D. 
Griffith (2000) explains, that the most common way to estimate private 
rates of return to R&D is using production functions of the kind: 
Equation 10-1 
Yn = Ali F(Kit, Ln) 
Where output Y of firm i in period t is produced using factors of production 
capital K and labour L and A defines total factor productivity. Total factor 
productivity will be endogenously determined' by the stock of knowledge 
G and other factors. This can be written as: 
Equation 10-2 
Alt = ilInGit + bInXft 
Where X stands for all other factors. The parameter: 
This method is obviously closely related to'endogenous' growth theory which attributes 
changes in total factor productivity to the amount of resources devoted to the creation of 




il = (8Yft / 8Git) x (Git/Yft) 
is then the elasticity of output with respect to knowledge stock and: 
Equation 10-4 
8YI, / 8Git 
is the rate of return to the accumulation of knowledge. Accumulation of 
knowledge is in empirical studies often proxied by R&D expenditure. 
Griliches (1992) estimates il (the elasticity of output with respect to 
knowledge stock) to be 0.07. Further to that, Griliches calculated Gj, /Y. 
(knowledge stock divided by total value added) to be 0.26 so r must be 
0.07/0.26 = 0.27 which implies that the private rate of return to R&D is 
around 27%. 
When this result is compared with estimated social rates of return it 
becomes apparent that knowledge spills over from the original inventor to 
other firms. Measurement of social rates of return follows this logic by 
estimating the growth of one firm as a result of R&D undertaken by other 
firms. These can of course be in the same industry, an upstream industry, 
and the scope can be broadened to include industries in other countries 
as well, which could significantly raise the social returns to R&D. Hence 
social rate of return estimates need to interpreted with the scope of 
measurement in mind. 
In a review of the literature Griffith (2000) finds that narrow measures 
(rate of return to industry from R&D conducted in same industry) range 
from 17-34% while broad measures (including for example R&D carried 
out in upstream industries) add another 41-82% to the narrow rate, which 
indicates that the total social rate of return to R&D is often in excess of 
100%. 
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Regardless of whether some of these measures under- or overestimate 
the true social rate of return, the consensus is that R&D spillovers are 
significant, and government therefore has a mandate to bring the private 
incentives to R&D back in line with the social rate of return and hence 
correct the outcome of the market with regard to the production of 
knowledge. The policy designed to achieve this correction is referred to 
as Science and Technology Policy. 
10.2 Science and Technology Policy 
Bringing private and social rates of returns more in line 2 can be achieved 
by a variety of means which can be broadly distinguished into regulatory 
and fiscal support3. 
Table 10-1 
Regulatory support Fiscal support 
* patent system and other 
measures to support intellectual 
property rights 
Source: Department of F 
" government-sponsored R&D 
" government procurement of new 
technologies 
" direct subsidies to universities or 
companies undertaking R&D 
" tax incentives (such as R&D tax 
credits) 
nce luui 
Other authors such as Griffith (2000). j'ake a broader view and would, for 
instance, include competition policy as regulatory measure4, which raises 
2 This does not imply that policy makers have accurate knowledge of socially optimal 
levels of R&D. 
3 Following the Canadian Department of Finance's interpretation of the scope of science 
and technology policy (Department of Finance Canada 1997) 
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the question whether other government policies which may indirectly 
influence a firm's innovative behaviour, such as education and training, 
monetary and trade policies, should also be considered under the rubric 
'science and technology policy' (Ruttan 2001). 
Mowery (1995) defines the boundaries of science and technology policy 
to include only policies that are "intended to influence the decisions of 
firms to develop, commercialise or adopt new technologies" (ibid, p. 514). 
The issue of intent is important here because according to Mowery 
indirect policies such as the above have rarely been designed or 
implemented to affect innovative performance. This may, however, 
exclude important explanatory factors from the analysis of science and 
technology policy. 
Mowery himself concedes that the policies that are intended to influence 
innovative performance may not exert the greatest influence on such 
performance when compared with, for example, indirect policies such as 
competition, monetary, fiscal or trade policy which will affect the level of 
investment in R&D in an economy. 
Griffith (2000) suggests the inclusion of human capital formation-, likewise 
Ruttan (2001) considers education and training an issue of science and 
technology policy. 
Here direct measures included in table 10.1 will be discussed, plus some 
issues in education and training policy, while other, indirect policies 
predominantly affecting the macro-environment of the firm lie well beyond 
the scope of this thesis. I 
4 Not least since Schumpeter claimed that large firms and concentrated markets are 
more likely to innovate, competition policy could indirectly influence a firm's innovative 
behaviour through its influence on market structure. 
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It is necessary to discuss the effectiveness of the above measures and 
the findings of this thesis in the wider context of national systems of 
innovation; different countries or groups of countries (such as the 
European Union) employ different means to influence the decisions of 
firms to develop, adopt or commercialise new technologies. The 
effectiveness of science and technology policy measures will also depend 
on the country-specific institutional context, part of which is set up and 
controlled by government, part of which outside the boundaries of science 
and technology policy but nevertheless exerts a strong influence on 
companies' innovative behaviour, such as for example the existence of a 
strong venture capital market. 
10.3 National Systems of Innovation 
Beije (1998) defines a national system of innovation as a group of private 
firms, public research institutions, and several of the facilitators of 
innovation (such as patent offices, government organisations for 
technology policy, chambers of commerce, innovation centres, venture 
capital organisations), which interact to promote technological 
innovations. 
Within these groups Bartholomew (1997) has identified a total of eight 
features of the national institutional context which can affect the stock and 
flow of scientific knowledge: the tradition of scientific education, patterns 
of basic research funding, linkages' with' foreign research institutions, 
degree of commercial orientatio , ri of academia, ' the venture capital 
system, national technology policy, technological accumulation in related 
industrial sectors, and the mobility of scientific labour. 
A national system of innovation is then, according to Metcalfe (1995, p. 
464), "a system of interconnected institutions to create, store, and 
transfer knowledge, skills and artefacts which define new technologies". 
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Ergas (1987) distinguishes two fundamental types of national innovation 
systems, those which are mission-oriented and those which are diffusion- 
oriented. 
Mission-oriented systems, such as the UK and the US, are according to 
Beije (1998), distinguished by university research which is geared 
towards the commercial exploitation of scientific findings. As a 
prerequisite to the effective knowledge transfer scientific labour tends to 
be highly mobile between universities and also universities and the 
private sector. A further feature of mission-oriented systems is an efficient 
market for corporate control and a well developed venture capital market 
which further aids the diffusion of scientific knowledge by selecting and 
promoting those R&D projects which are the commercially most 
promising. In such an environment government involvement is modest, 
and the diffusion of scientific knowledge is left to the market place. 
The pre-eminent shareholder value orientation in mission-oriented 
systems tends to create short-term R&D investment decisions5, however, 
so that long term research programmes with highly uncertain outcomes, 
in selected sectors such as defence, aerospace, and medicine, are 
(often exclusively) financed by government. 
Diffusion-oriented countries such as, for instance Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Germany maintain permanent and close links between government, 
banks and industries. These links are often of a financial nature: Banks 
are often creditors and shareholders in R&D-intensive industries, and 
would in many cases have a representative on the company's 
supervisory board. Such close scrutiny will at the same time allow a more 
long-term orientation of investment projects and perhaps present greater 
incentives to invest in projects with an uncertain outcome. 
Demsetz might ask whether we are not unduly comparing this kind of decision making 
to some elusive 'ideal' state of affairs. 
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At the same time, diffusion-oriented countries maintain a bond between 
industry and government in keeping up high levels of training and 
education. A good example for this is the German dual system of 
vocational training and the responsiveness of the German government in 
initiating a Green card scheme to alleviate skills shortages in the 
Information Technology sector of the economy. 
In such a system, technology diffusion and the broad-based capacity to 
innovate becomes an explicit part of the government mandate. 
In practice, most national systems of innovation would lean towards either 
of the two systems but show features of both mission and diffusion 
oriented systems. What lies beyond contention is that firms and 
entrepreneurs are the primary actors in the generation of technological 
artefacts, and that their activities are supported by the accumulation and 
dissemination of knowledge (Metcalfe 1995). - 
As far as regulatory support is concerned almost all national systems of 
innovation rely on a functioning patent system to protect innovation. The 
optimal patent length is still subject to debate (Carlton and Perloff 2000, 
pp. 522-528) and the current patent length of 20 years has been chosen 
rather arbitrarily6. It can be shown (ibid. ), at least theoretically, that either 
infinite patent protection or no patent protection will result in too little 
investment. The reason for this is quite clear: in the absence of any 
property rights, immediate imitation will lead to the innovator not being 
able to appropriate a return on R&D. Infinite patent protection will result in 
excessive duplication of research because too many firms will be racing 
Carlton and Perloff (2000) explain that prior to the patent law change of 1995, patents 
in the United States lasted for 17 years. The length of patent protection, part of the first 
piece of legislation passed after the Constitution was signed into law by George 
Washington in 1790, was apparently related to the length of an apprenticeship, whichý 
lasted for 7 years. Some in Congress wanted a patent length of two apprenticeships, 
others preferred a patent renewal after 14 years for another 7 years. Congress simply 
split the difference and offered a term of 17 years. 
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to obtain the patent which offers large potential rewards. The literature on 
patent races and patent length, and most recent game-theoretical 
contributions have been touched upon in Chapter Four and will not be 
discussed here any further. As far as the contribution of this thesis is 
concerned, the empirical investigation in Chapter Six did not show any 
evidence of a structural break in R&D intensity when firms could for the 
very first time obtain patent protection for biological products. 
As far as fiscal support measures are concerned, the starting point of any 
investigation should lie in a clearer understanding of the accumulation of 
R&D resources at the firm level. The empirical investigation in Chapter 
Six models R&D intensity in the specific case of the vaccine industry as a 
response to market and non-market forces. Although the predictive power 
of the model is somehow compromised by the small number of 
observations, at least one clear result seems to have emerged from both 
the partial-adjustment and error-correction specifications of the model: 
cash flow matters as a determinant of R&D intensity, either through its 
influence on the cost of finance of R&D projects or as a proxy for 
expected future returns. 
This is relevant inasmuch as it indicates that the emphasis on venture 
capital markets and the market for corporate control in mission-oriented 
systems is not misguided. For the -majority', of R&D projects, and 
specifically those which have not been earmarked by, government as 
strategically important will be able to attract private sector funding as long 
as the cost of finance is not prohibitively high or finance is not available at 
all. 
Most mission-oriented countries would rely on a mix of fiscal support 
measures to target specific technologies for further, development or 
commercialisation. The share of government support of the total R&D 
budget is often greater in mission-oriented countries than in diffusion- 
oriented countries. Metcalfe (1995); would call these policies 'supply 
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policies' as opposed to 'adoption policies' which are more widely used in 
diffusion oriented countries. 
Fiscal support would either take the form of direct subsidies, government 
procurement of new technologies or various forms of tax incentives. The 
principal difference is that direct subsidies or government procurement 
target specific projects and therefore involve governmental discretion, 
while tax incentives still leave it to the market to allocate resources. 
Targeted basic research funding would often cover the entire costs of 
projects undertaken at universities or public research institutions and new 
projects are often accompanied by a shift in priorities. Ruttan (2001) 
describes how in the United States the success of science in advancing 
military technology during the war, most notably the 'Manhattan project' 
created the belief that advances in scientific knowledge could become a 
major source of economic growth and human welfare. The author notes 
that different US administrations have each emphasised different social 
objectives. While in the 1960s military objectives have been expanded to 
include the conquest of space, during the Johnson and Nixon period an 
effort was made to shift resources to areas more relevant to President 
Johnson's 'war on poverty'. Nixon moved the basic research agenda to 
energy, control of natural disasters, transportation, drug control and most 
famously the 'war on cancer' to "demonstrate that the same focusing of 
scientific capacity that led to man's landing on the moon could also result 
in a cure for cancer" (ibid. p. 556). 
Many governments would view their funding of basic research activities 
as a sufficient means to support technological advance. Hindsight tells us 
that the faith in targeted government funding of basic research is perhaps 
exaggerated and more recently governments;. not only in the US, have 
reduced their support for basic research and led them to contemplate 
restrictions on the dissemination of. the result of; publicly-funded basic 
research (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989). 
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A possible reason for the lack of success of targeted basic research 
programmes is that public investment in R&D tends to 'crowd out' private 
investment, so that the total net increase in R&D is sometimes negligible. 
Hence, a subsidy-based incentive policy can be judged effective if it 
increases total R&D spending as a result of the subsidy. Any policy 
which simply replaces private R&D which would have been carried out on 
the same timescale has little justification (Metcalfel995). This is also 
referred to as the 'additionality' problem. 
Evidence of crowding out is inconclusive. In a review of -the -literature 
Mowery (1995) finds that federal funding of industry basic research 
produced offsetting decreases in private funding of basic research, while 
government basic research spending led to higher levels of private R&D 
expenditure in process development, i. e. during the later stages of the 
R&D process. This thesis has also investigated the possibility that some 
crowding out through targeted government financing occurs in research 
and development of vaccine products. In this study publicly held patents 
in the area of vaccines were used as aýproxy for R&D undertaken or 
financed by government. In the error correction specification of the model, 
the changes in the number of publicly held patents over a 23 year period 
were positively associated with' short term changes in R&D intensity in 
this area of research. While the interpretation of these short term 
dynamics is somewhat difficult, there appears to be no evidence of public 
investment crowding out private investment in vaccine research. 
A form of government support'which leaves the private*, sector more 
discretion as to where it directs R&D-investment are tax'incentives in 
favour of R&D expenditure, or R&D tax credits as they are often called. 
R&D tax credits are used in the US, Australia, Sweden, and have been 
recently introduced in the UK for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
R&D tax credits allow firms to offset a certain percentage of R&D 
a -G7 expenses against their tax bill. ý'As minimum: 'provisio'n: in all 
countries, R&D expenses are treated]ike any-other'current and-capital 
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expenditure and can be offset in their entirety against the tax bill. 
Expenses on R&D capital expenditure are often depreciated over a 
certain period, some tax systems allowing an accelerated depreciation. 
The R&D tax credit will allow companies to offset a certain percentage of 
their R&D expenses in excess of 100%. The base for this extra allowance 
is often an incremental increase in companies' R&D expenditure, i. e. 
extra R&D rather than total R&D will be rewarded through a reduction in 
cost of the increase in R&D. The United States, for example, provides a 
20 per cent R&D tax credit to all research expenditures that exceed a 
company's predicted R&D expenditures for a taxable year. This credit 
was enacted in 1981 and has been continuously extended ten times. 
Congress has recently approved a five-year continuous extension of the 
so called research and experimentation (R&D) tax credit, from June 30, 
1999 to June 30,2004. 
The reason for the temporary nature of the R&D tax credit is that tax 
credits come at a considerable cost to the tax payer. One should also 
bear in mind that the reason for government support is the existence of 
R&D spillovers. Should these spillovers accrue in a country other than the 
country granting the tax credit, the rationale for the tax credit is somehow 
weakened. Hall and Wosinka (1999, p. 4) concedes that the specifically 
Californian R&D tax credit may not have the desirable effect, since: 
"it would seem that encouraging firms to locate their R&D facilities in 
the state of California might not yield benefits that are easily confined 
to the state; in fact, most of the spillovers might flow to those outside 
the state. 
However, there appear to be reasons that high technology firms in the 
same industry like to locate next to each other so that: 
$I encouraging firms to move to your state early in the development of a 
new industry will probably mean that other firms will be attracted in the 
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future, and that other firms in the state are more likely to benefit from 
knowledge spillovers from the industry because of their geographical 
proximity" (ibid., p. 4) 
This reasoning is, of course, also relevant for R&D tax credits in other 
closely-i nteg rated economies such as the EU, where countries attempt to 
be among the first to attract high-tech clusters through preferential tax 
treatment or otherwise. 
Bloom et al. (1999) use a panel of data on tax changes and R&D spending 
in nine OECD countries over the period 1979-1997. They find that tax 
incentives are effective in increasing R&D intensity. A 10 per cent fall in the 
cost of R&D stimulates just over a1 per cent rise in the level of R&D in the 
short-run, and just under a 10 per cent rise in R&D in the long-run. 
In the short run, however, the total revenue lost from the granting of R&D 
tax credits appears to outweigh R&D expenditure induced by the tax 
relief, a result confirmed by Mansfield (1986b) who finds a ratio of 
between 0.3 and 0.4 of incremental R&D spending as a proportion of tax 
revenue forgone. 
These results do indicate, however, that an R&D tax credit can in the long 
run be effective in raising R&D expenditure. The results of this thesis, 
although not specifically measuring the effects of tax credits, can also be 
interpreted in favour of the effectiveness of R&D tax credits. R&D tax 
credits lower the cost of R&D finance through an increase in the 
company's cash flow. This effect was previously shown to be positively 
related to a firm's R&D spending. 
Griffith (2000) points out that this does not necessarily make R&D tax 
credits desirable. In her view, the rise in R&D expenditure may also be 
due to a re-labelling of activities, or a rise in scientists' salaries, rather 
than a genuine increase in knowledge output. 
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Hence, R&D tax credits raise serious cost-benefit questions, which are 
common to most forms of government subsidies. For reasons outlined 
above 7, overall benefit of R&D tax credits are notoriously difficult to 
measure and increases in industrial R&D often fall short of the revenue 
forgone, which has led Metcalfe (1995, p. 441) to dismiss R&D tax 
allowances in general, and find them "a blunt instrument with small 
effects". 
There are of course a number of policy instruments which are less target- 
oriented but take inspiration from the idea that faster knowledge diffusion 
and easier access to new information for those undertaking R&D will 
positively impact on economic growth and productivity. This fits 
reasonably well into the notion of a diffusion-oriented science and 
technology policy. 
Introducing a different terminology, Justman and Teubal (1986) would call 
the measures discussed so far 'tactical' measures, since they are often 
aimed at the development of specific technologies, and consider policies 
aimed at the innovation infrastructure in an economy 'strategic' 
measures. 
When the emphasis is laid on diffusion of knowledge or 
knowledge/technology transfer from one institution to another, networks 
of innovation and the connectedness of the institutions with one another 
become important subjects of investigation. 
Of course many different institutions are involved in this process of 
knowledge diffusion: not only firms, and universities but also government 
research institutions, banks, professional bodies and many more. Chapter 
Seven has in some detail reviewed the literature on research 
collaboration and networks of innovation, specifically in the biotechnology 
area, and this will not be repeated here. Metcalfe (1995) puts forward a 
in particular the difficulty in estimating social returns to R&D. 
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number of key research questions which cover knowledge diffusion 
issues and which have been partly, although not exhaustively, addressed 
in this thesis: 
The first question is concerned with the general direction of science and 
whether it should be directed more to supporting innovation. This is 
closely related to the question whether closer links with technology and 
research sponsorship from industry undermine the openness of science 
and its capacity to stimulate competitive development. This set of 
questions has been partly addressed with respect to biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical products in Chapter Eight. There is evidence that firms 
which show a greater proximity to science and which collaborate more 
closely with the scientific community show higher research productivity in 
the particular area of medical and specifically biotechnology research. 
What could also be shown is that the biotechnology companies in the 
sample were on average just as productive in research as the more 
traditional pharmaceutical companies, but showed a significantly higher 
exposure to the scientific community when compared to their 
pharmaceutical counterparts. 
These results can be interpreted as follows: while there cannot be a 
target level of collaboration, the extent of which seems to be determined 
by tradition and the development of the specific industry, those firms 
within a given industry which seek to explore the science base either 
through collaboration or own basic research are likely to be more 
successful researchers. 
Should 'connectivity' specifically between firms and universities therefore 
be promoted? This is a question more difficult to answer since in practice 
'connectivity' is achieved via a variety of mechanisms (Metcalfe 1995). 
Beside collaboration agreements, mobility of scientists in the labour 
market in particular between universities and firms are important 
connecting mechanisms. The empirical investigation in Chapter Eight 
could not establish whether scientific success preceded or 'Granger 
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caused' technological success or vice versa. The former would have 
indicated that it is the scientific activity of the firm itself which makes it 
more successful in research. A reverse 'causality' would have led to the 
conclusion that successful firms attract scientists which happen to publish 
extensively without this proximity to science being a contributing factor to 
research success. 
Whichever way causality runs in this case, the current trend in science 
policy to promote closer links between firms and the scientific community 
does not seem to be misguided. 
The mobility of scientists leads to the second central question of 
istrategic' science and technology policy according to Metcalfe (1995, p. 
465): 
"Since science and technology compete for many of the same skills 
how should policy influence the distribution of creative talent between 
the two worlds? What should be the appropriate balance between 
research and skill formation in higher education institutions? " 
The common view that a nation needs to educate and look after its own 
scientists has been recently popularised by Porter's (1990) 'competitive 
advantage of nations'. In Porter's view nations which produce a greater 
number of scientists per capita and will produce more leading edge 
research which in turn positively impacts on the nation's competitive 
advantage. 
Sharp (1989) and Yuan (1987), to quote another example of this view, 
praise the sheltered environment of German academics, through the 
provision of a well-financed research budget and facilities, social prestige, 
and the security of being a public servant. 
Bartholomew (1997) points out that a nation which does not look after its 
scientists may lose them to another nation, suffering from so called 'brain 
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drain'. In her view, the US competitive model is fed by very substantial 
expenditures on basic research, which provides the life blood of the 
system and so: 
"the failure to sufficiently support the basic scientific infrastructure 
remains a real concern in the UK, where the nation's strongest 
advantage - its superior pool of creative scientists - is increasingly 
drawn to other countries where scientific research is rewarded with 
financial support in addition to social respect" (ibid., p. 19). 
Chapter Nine has addressed a number of these issues, in particular the 
question whether the alleged underinvestment in scientific infrastructure 
in the UK causes brain drain which should manifest itself in a flow of 
scientists out of the university sector and an underperformance of UK 
science compared to other industrialised countries. This study has found 
no evidence for either of these two possible effects. UK scientists are 
among the most productive researchers in absolute and relative terms, 
i. e. not only publish a lot of papers, but churn out the highest number of 
research papers per dollar of research funding. 
More importantly, the British higher education sector experiences a 
considerably larger inflow of educated scientists from abroad (brain gain) 
when compared to, for instance, Germany, where entry barriers into the 
scientific labour market are much higher. Furthermore there is no 
evidence in any subject area that 'underpaid' scientist leave the scientific 
community in droves to benefit from the more lucrative terms in the 
private sector. On the contrary, strategically important disciplines such as 
biological sciences or Information technology experience a net inflow of 
scientists from the private sector. 
What cannot be concluded with any certainty is what kind of skills are 
crossing the boundaries between science and technology. Scientist'head 
counts' cannot distinguish between the Nobel price winner's exodus to 
the private sector and the failed technologist seeking refuge in the less 
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pressurised world of higher education. We have learned from the 
previous deliberations, however, that good scientists working more 
closely with the private sector can hardly be considered bad news. 
10.4 Concluding remarks 
A number of conclusions can be drawn in the context of two very different 
national systems of innovation, the US and Germany, and referring to the 
biotechnology industry as an illustrative example. 
The success of the US biotechnology industry is probably due to two 
factors. Firstly, the commercial orientation of the university system and 
the close co-operation of biotechnology firms with universities allows both 
sides to recognise commercial opportunities of findings and gain a first 
mover advantage. Secondly, biopharmaceutical research appears to be 
sensitive to the cost of finance of projects and start-up companies have 
proliferated thanks largely to entrepreneurial academics and a functioning 
venture capital market. 
Bartholomew (1997) points out that there is a downside to this focus on 
biopharmaceutical applications, which have the highest commercial value 
in the form of new drugs. The USA has not been able to develop a great 
breadth of expertise as for example in agriculture or environmental 
application of biotech, where other countries such as Germany are taking 
the lead. 
German universities and the state financed Max Planck Institutes are 
devoted to pure scientific research and operate very distantly from 
industry. While they are slow in translating scientific advances into 
commercial opportunity they do not necessarily lack, but lag (ibid. ) to link 
the science base with the industrial base. In the long run German firms 
may be able to recreate the American success in areas which are slower 
to reveal commercial opportunity. 
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In a diffusion-oriented system such as the German, innovators are further 
supported by extensive cooperation between industry and banks to 
secure finance, government, firms and education institutions to secure 
the right number of skilled personne18. 
A cause for concern is, however, that such a rigid system may not be 
sufficiently flexible or responsive to support the kind of academic 
entrepreneur which has emerged from US universities: The venture 
capital market is underdeveloped; the academic labour market is not 
open enough to attract scientific talent from abroad or compensate for 
any outflow of scientists to universities abroad. 
The 'sheltered environment' (i. e. a professorial position) may or may not 
be offered to a German academic at the end of a period of temporary 
employment (recently limited to a total of twelve years). Most scientists in 
other countries will have already obtained tenured positions (or be on a 
'tenure track') by then or recognised their lack of scientific potential and 
secured more suitable positions in the private sector instead. 
Under these circumstances foreign universities or high tech companies 
will continue to tap into the pool of expertise, which is not good news in a 
system which does not allow much entry from other sectors of the 
economy or countries. 
Alternatively, scientific talent could be drawn out of the higher education 
sector into the private sector. Although evidence from Britain indicates 
that mobility between the two sectors works both ways, entry barriers in 
German higher education could make it more of a one way street. 
'3 The German'dual system'of vocational qualification is considered very important for 
the competitiveness of German firms and requires a considerable planning effort. Each 
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This study indicates, however, that unless talent leaves the country for 
good, scientists crossing the Rubicon between science and technology is 
perhaps not such a great cause for concern. 
trainee will not only work in a firm but attend the local specialist secondary school for two 
days a week. 
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11 Conclusions 
This thesis was motivated by concern regarding an apparent lack of 
investment in the research and development of vaccine products which could 
offer a dramatic net benefit to societies, particularly those affected by 
diseases such as Malaria and Aids, which are yet incurable and particularly 
prevalent in the developing world. The important contribution vaccines 
products can make to world health was briefly outlined in Chapter Two. 
The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to provide decision support for science and 
technology policy which attempts to promote the research and development 
into new vaccine products. 
The starting point of this investigation has been to establish that markets fail 
to allocate sufficient resources to the development of new vaccine products. 
In Chapter Three it was shown that reason for this is twofold. Not only are 
vaccine markets imperfect due to the existence of positive externalities and 
the impure public good aspect of vaccine products. There is also evidence of 
systematic underinvestment in research and development in general, because 
firms cannot fully appropriate the social returns to their investment. 
Social returns to investment in excess of private returns to investment indicate 
the existence of R&D spillovers which justify government policy to increase 
the total volume of investment, either through direct or indirect science policy 
measures. Science policy can attempt to directly influence the direction of 
research through government subsidies or targeted fiscal support, or 
implement regulatory measures such as for example a patent system or 
policies designed to influence human capital formation. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of individual science policy measures 
_industry's 
response to a range of market and regulatory forces will have to be 
understood more clearly. 
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The microeconomic branch of the innovation economics literature was 
introduced in Chapter Four. Three determinants of R&D spending are often 
cited: technological opportunities, appropriability conditions and demand 
conditions. Much of the debate in the literature is related to the relative 
importance of these factors. 
Some authors attribute technical change to the supply of innovation 
(technology push), others argue that demand induces industry to innovate 
(demand pull) while at least some empirical evidence suggests that both 
factors are equally important. 
Most empirical studies will however be compromised by the unclear distinction 
between need and demand which reflects the lack of consideration of the role 
of the entrepreneur to foresee potential demand. 
Pharmaceutical economists attribute great importance to regulatory factors, 
which can influence a firm's R&D spending decision negatively through, for 
instance, a more stringent drug approval regulation, or positively through 
improved patent protection, both affecting what is referred to as appropriability 
conditions. 
Evidence from case studies suggests that drug companies are facing 
diminishing returns to R&D. The finance literature suggest rising cost of 
finance depending on whether new projects are financed through cash flow, 
new debts, or whether new equity finance will have to be raised. The 
combination of diminishing returns and rising cost of finance makes an R&D 
resource allocation model plausible which sees firms equate the return on the 
last R&D project (marginal return) with rising marginal cost of funds (due to 
differences in the cost of internal and external finance). The optimal level of 
R&D spending is where marginal return to R&D equals marginal cost of R&D 
and factors influencing the expected returns to R&D or cost of funds schedule 
are likely to influence the firm's R&D spending decision. 
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These factors were discussed in Chapter Five in the specific context of the 
global vaccine industry. The industry can be broadly divided into European 
and American manufacturers, which are pursuing two very different strategies 
with regard to scale and international exposure. 
American vaccine manufacturers supply almost exclusively to their domestic 
market which allows a return on investment similar to pharmaceutical 
products. This is partly due to a new generation of genetically engineered 
paediatric vaccines launched in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
These products gain market share very rapidly and are the first vaccines to 
enjoy full patent protection. 
European manufacturers operate on a much larger scale than their US 
counterparts and rely quite heavily on price-sensitive export tenders. These 
firms' return on investment depends to a large extent on economies of scale 
effects which are very significant in vaccine production. 
R&D investment into vaccines as a proportion of sales by US manufacturers 
declined for most of the 1970s which appears to have reflected poor patent 
protection, uncertainty over liability for vaccine injuries and exhausted 
technological opportunities during this period. Some crowding out by public 
sector research may also have occurred. 
The early 1980s have seen a reverse in R&D intensity which may be 
attributable to biotechnology as a new technological paradigm with many new 
vaccines derived from genetically modified organisms. A 1980 US Supreme 
Court ruling has also granted patent protection to biological products for the 
first time. Since 1988 US manufacturers also benefit from the National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Plan (NVICP) which has relieved them, at least 
domestically, of any liability for vaccine injuries. 
Chapter Six models R&D spending in the US vaccine industry over a 25 year 
period. In a simple partial adjustment model, changes in cash flow (deflated 
by sales) and past values of R&D intensity appear to positively impact on the 
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intensity of research and development (defined as R&D spending divided by 
sales) in the vaccine industry. 
Other factors, such as the size of the vaccine market relative to 
pharmaceutical products (as a proxy for 'demand pull'), or the share of 
vaccine related patents held by public sector institutions (testing for evidence 
of 'crowding out'), were not significantly related to research intensity, at least 
in the partial adjustment specification. Neither was there any evidence of a 
structural break after the extension of patent protection for biological products 
in 1980 or the implementation of the NVICP act in 1988, two events which 
were expected to have a positive impact on firms' R&D spending behaviour. 
Concerns over non-stationarity of the data series and a possible spurious 
regression led to the estimation of an error correction mechanism which, in 
the final form, confirmed the results of the partial adjustment model. 
More specifically, the results emphasise the long run relationship between the 
cost of funds and the allocation of R&D resources. This has implications for a 
range of policies to promote industrial research and development. Any such 
measures designed to lower the cost of funds seem likely to yield the desired 
response in private R&D spending. Such support often comes in the form of 
R&D tax credits which increases the firm's cash flow and hence lowers the 
cost of finance. The above investigation suggests that such measures can be 
effective. 
in the absence of government help, a capital market which is geared towards 
providing risk capital to innovators seems more likely to stimulate private R&D 
spending than a capital market which is risk averse, and as a result makes the 
financing of 'risky' R&D activity prohibitively expensive. The extent to which 
the US venture capital market has contributed to the success of the national 
biotechnology industry is, of course, well documented. 
The literature suggests that firms will also increase R&D spending as a 
response to an increase in expected returns to R&D. This cannot be ruled out, 
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since the variable used here as a proxy for the relative costs of funds will not 
allow the researcher to fully distinguish between cost of funds and expected 
return effects. 
Further to that, the significant error correction term indicates that firms will 
adjust to disequilibria in the long run relationship between the cost of funds 
and R&D intensity. The error correction specification of the model has also 
revealed two factors influencing short term variations in R&D spending. 
Changes in R&D spending in the previous period is a good indicator of 
changes in current R&D spending. This pattern is expected, since most R&D 
projects are longer-term and require the firm to devote a continuous stream of 
resources over a longer time period. 
The model also suggests positive short run influence of year-on-year changes 
in public sector research effort on changes in the firm's R&D intensity. It is 
difficult to envisage the short term dynamics of this relationship given the 
rather crude nature of the variable used as a proxy for public R&D effort. What 
can be stated, however, is that public sector research effort does not appear 
to 'crowd out' or replace private sector R&D spending in the short term. 
I 
The exclusive focus on vaccine-producing manufacturers will not allow for a 
large number of observations and given the more general relevance of the 
findings for science and technology policy, future research could be directed 
at the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. This would allow the collection of 
data on an individual firm level over a longer period of time. This pooling of 
data will increase the number of observations considerably and will result in a 
model with greater predictive power. 
In the remainder of this thesis the scope has been extended to include firms in 
the. biotechnology industry. The reason for the shift in emphasis is that 
biotechnology is becoming increasingly important for vaccine innovation, with 
almost a quarter of new biotechnology products in development being 
vaccines. 
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The focus of research in Chapters Seven and Eight is on collaborative 
research in the biotechnology industry, since joint research between the 
private and public sectors is believed to be a particularly productive way to 
bring new medicines to the market. 
Collaborative research has grown in importance since the first biotechnology 
companies were established in the 1970s. Depending on the stage of the life 
cycle of the individual firm, a biotechnology company will either seek to 
strengthen its scientific base by collaborating with a public sector institution 
such as a university, or at a later stage collaborate with a larger 
pharmaceutical company in order to distribute or market its products. Having 
products at different stages of development requires firms to enter networks of 
alliances. 
There is evidence in the literature that firms which maintain close links with 
the scientific community are more successful researchers in terms of patents 
obtained. This thesis has empirically investigated the research productivity of 
a sample of large biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in the United 
States. Using the number of papers published per research dollar spent as a 
proxy for basic research and the number of co-authorships as a proxy for 
public-private interaction, Biotech companies undertake on average more 
basic research and interact more closely with the university sector than 
traditional pharmaceutical companies. While showing a much greater 
variance, the average research productivity of the biotech companies in the 
sample is also greater than that of the traditional pharmaceutical industry. 
Within each of the two sectors, companies which undertake more science or 
co-operate more closely with universities than their competitors are likely to 
show a higher level of research productivity. This confirms earlier findings for 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
What did not become clear from the original specification of the model is 
whether greater proximity to science does indeed cause greater research 
productivity. Some authors suggest that the interaction with scientists makes 
271 
the firm more productive in research, while others believe that a firm which is 
successful in research attracts those scientists, who tend to publish more than 
their peers. In other words, good scientists may follow research success 
rather than cause it. 
The implications of the latter scenario for science and technology policy would 
be very different indeed, since publications can be seen as a necessary evil 
rather than a warrant for research success. Hence, the issue of causality 
required a closer investigation. 
Although evidence from a Granger causality test proved to be quite weak, it 
cannot be ruled out that research productivity precedes the number of 
publications. The consequences of this, not only for science and technology 
policy but also the firm's research strategy, are twofold: Proximity to science 
may not cause superior research outcomes and there are some indications 
that successful companies attract scientists and generate publications almost 
as a by-product. The analysis also suggests, however, that companies which 
employ good scientists are the more productive researchers, not necessarily 
because they interact with science or publish papers, but because they have 
talented employees which are more likely to produce good medicines. 
This makes the promotion of scientific talent and the movement of scientist 
between the public and the private sectors an important issue to investigate, 
in particular when it comes to designing an effective national system of 
innovation. 
Chapter Nine has addressed a number of these issues, in particular the 
question whether the alleged underinvestment in scientific infrastructure in the 
UK causes an outflow of scientists from the university sector possibly to other 
countries (brain drain) and an underperformance of UK science compared to 
other industrialised countries. 
it was found that discussions of the need for investment in higher education 
research and development ignore the considerable variations in research 
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productivity associated with different levels of investment. UK scientists are 
among the most productive researchers in absolute and relative terms, i. e. not 
only publish a lot of papers, but churn out the highest number of research 
papers per dollar of research funding. Britain's strong performance in 
published research suggests that the institutional structures of higher 
education have a much more important effect than was previously thought. 
More open 'Pyramid' systems may have greater potential for innovation and 
research productivity than 'Tower' systems where there is little inflow or 
outflow of personnel at higher levels of the hierarchy. 
More generally, a country which imports highly-skilled personnel may be 
enabled to maintain or improve its technological capabilities by this means as 
well as by domestic investment in research, development and the training of 
domestic skilled labour. 
The British higher education sector experiences a considerably larger inflow 
of, educated scientists from abroad (brain gain) when compared to, for 
instance, Germany, where entry barriers into the scientific labour market are 
much higher. Using data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), 
there is no evidence that scientist leave the scientific community to benefit 
from the more lucrative terms in the private sector in any of the subject areas 
investigated. On the contrary: disciplines believed to contribute more than 
others to current and future growth of an economy such as biological sciences 
or information technology experience a moderate net inflow of scientists from 
the private sector. 
What cannot be concluded with any certainty is what kind of skills are 
crossing the boundaries between science and technology. The scientist 'head 
counts' used here could not distinguish between star scientists and junior 
researcher and future research into the movements of scientists might want to 
look at the specific type of skill associated with these movements. 
This thesis concludes with Chapter Ten which aims to put the findings of the 
thesis in the wider context of science and technology policy. 
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National systems of innovation differ considerably and can be broadly 
distinguished into mission- and diffusion-oriented systems. In practice, 
national system of innovation would lean towards either of the two systems, 
and rely on a mix of policies to promote research and development. 
Mission-oriented systems such as the United States generally rely on 
functioning venture capital markets to select promising R&D projects and 
promote academic entrepreneurs. As a prerequisite to an effective knowledge 
transfer and rapid commercialisation of innovations, scientific labour tends to 
be highly mobile between universities and also universities and the private 
sector. 
Mission-oriented systems tend to create short-term R&D investment 
decisions. Long term research programmes with highly uncertain outcomes, 
such as the important 'war against cancer' or the more controversial 'missile 
defence shield' are then (often exclusively) financed by government. 
This thesis' findings support the effectiveness of the principal design of 
mission-oriented systems. What could be shown is that firms' R&D decisions 
are sensitive to the cost and availability of finance. A good example for this is 
the proliferation of the US biotechnology industry which has proliferated 
thanks largely to entrepreneurial academics and a functioning venture capital 
market. 
Diffusion-oriented systems emphasise the transfer of knowledge from 
universities to the private sector because, traditionally, basic scientific 
research operates more distantly from industry. 
While these systems are slow in translating scientific advances into 
commercial opportunity, they may be able to recreate commercial success 
stories such as biotechnology in areas which are slower to reveal commercial 
opportunity. Innovators are further supported by co-operation between 
industry and government to secure the right number of skilled personnel. 
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Some national innovation systems may, however, not be sufficiently flexible or 
responsive to support the kind of academic entrepreneur which has emerged 
from US universities: Venture capital markets, particularly in continental 
Europe, are underdeveloped; and the academic labour market is not open 
enough to attract scientific talent or compensate for any outflow of scientists 
to universities or companies abroad. 
What is beyond doubt, is that vaccine research and development offers 
considerable social gains which cannot be fully appropriated by private 
enterprise. Expected private return on vaccine products is further 
compromised by uncertainty over the future market size and scientific 
feasibility of new vaccines. If this is the case, any innovation system will have 
to resort to targeted government or donor financing for projects deemed too 
risky and long term by academic entrepreneurs. 
This does not mean that institutions entrusted with the task of developing 
vaccines should derive exclusively from the public sector. Collaborative 
research between biotechnology firms and universities has been shown to 
work effectively and more successfully than institutions operating on their 
own. 
Since entrepreneurs have a role to play in the development of future vaccines, 
any national system of innovation cannot ignore the importance of the cost 
and availability of funds on the R&D spending decisions of these firms. The 
marginal R&D project, which could after all be the future malaria vaccine, is 
more likely to be developed if the cost of R&D funds are low enough to 
compensate for the considerable risk of vaccine projects. 
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